Paraphrasing myself: Philosophy tell us only that things have natures, but what these natures are is the job of specific sciences. The rest of philosophy’s task is to tell us the rules by which to discover the specific natures.

  June 20, 1958

  The philosophy which I now will have to present is, in essence, the “rules of thinking” which children should be taught in the proper society (which the Wet Nurse needed). It is fundamental epistemology—plus psychological “epistemology.” All the evils of philosophy have always been achieved via epistemology—by means of the “How do you know that you know?” Consider the fact that the first and greatest destroyer, Plato, did it by means of the issue of “universals vs. particulars.” Mankind as a whole seems to be caught in the trap of the nature of its own epistemology: men cannot think until they have acquired the power of abstractions and language, but having done so, they do not know how they got there and are vulnerable to any attack on their means of knowledge. Like the discovery of “A is A,” their epistemology is implicit in their thinking, but unidentified. This will be the main part of my job: my theory of universals—the hierarchical nature of concepts—the “stolen concept” fallacy—the “context-dropping” and the “blank-out” (the refusal to identify)—the “Rand’s razor” (“state your irreducible primaries”)—the rules of induction (and definitions)—the “integration into the total sum of your knowledge”—the proof that “that which is empirically impossible is also logically impossible (or false)”—etc.

  This will be the issue of “teaching the world my particular kind of epistemology” (which I took to be self-evident and known). This is also why I always thought of philosophy as a static, “finite” base, like logic, i.e., as a closed discipline which has to be learned in order then to proceed to live, with “life” beginning above this base. This, probably, is the root of what Leonard [Peikoff] had in mind when he called the present state of the world “the age of pre-reason.” It will help me to think of my job as “Philosophy for Hank Rearden. ”

  Notes for “Objectivism ”

  [Most of the remaining notes for the book deal with AR’s theory of concepts, which she later published in Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.]

  A unit is a concrete entity considered apart from the other entities which are subsumed under the same abstraction.

  Thus, an inch is a concrete entity of the abstraction “length ” and is a unit of measurement for any other length which is conceptualized by means of its relationships to the chosen unit; thus a yard is so many inches, a mile is so many yards, etc.

  Number is the abstraction of the process of abstraction. It stands for the relationship of an entity to other entities, all of which have to be absolute and immutable in their defining characteristic, in that which permits them to be regarded as units subsumed under a single concept. Number is the concept that identifies the transition from “entity to ”unit, “ the mental transformation of a concrete, perceptual entity into the material to be integrated by a concept. Mathematics is the pattern (the blue print) of the conceptual level of man’s consciousness—the abstract pattern of the process of concept-formation, in the sense that it isolates and identifies the process which man’s mind has to perform in regard to every abstraction, every concept it reaches, regardless of the concretes involved—that is: the abstraction of ”number“ stands for any concrete entities regarded as ”units“ to be integrated into a concept which then becomes a new, single unit. (The concept ”ten“ is a single unit denoting a certain number of ”ones“; the abstraction ”man“ is a single unit denoting ”n number“ of concrete men, that is: denoting a mathematical series to be extended into infinity, to subsume any number of men.)

  (Next step: The relationship of every concept to the “open-ended” mathematical series.)

  “Measurement” is the establishment of a relationship—the relationship between a concrete unit, which serves as the standard of measure, and other concretes belonging to the same abstraction (length, weight, etc.). A “concept” is also the establishment of a relationship—the relationship between a concrete unit and other concretes belonging to the same abstraction; the standard of measure here is the defining characteristic.

  Fallacies:

  “Stolen Concept” (connected with “irreducible primaries”).

  “Context-dropping.”

  “Reification of the Zero.”

  “Stepping into Limbo.”

  “Non-differentiation between Existence and Consciousness.”

  (A “unit” is the concept of identity. If you take “a group” as a start and proceed to define a “unit” by breaking up the group—you have committed the fallacy of the “stolen concept”: you have already accepted the group as a unit.)

  Regarding “context-dropping ”: a variant or corollary fallacy is the idea that considering a thing in context is a “relativistic ” premise, thus: if values are selected by man, they are “relative” to man. This is an example of the “whose whim” fallacy: either values are intrinsic (arbitrarily set by the whim of God or nature)—or they are subjective (“relative” to or set by the whim of man); the concept of objectivism (of an immutable nature of things) is missing. The reasoning behind it goes like this: if a thing has to be considered in a context, then it is not an absolute, then anything goes. The error is: the substitution of infinity for a given, known context. Example: [a philosophy professor] claiming that the airplane invalidates the absolutism of the law of gravitation.

  April 9, 1959

  Notes for Epistemology (Re: Mathematics of Consciousness)

  The basic and most universal concepts in the functioning of a human consciousness are: existence—identity—entity—unit.

  The first two pertain to metaphysics, the second two to epistemology.

  To grasp existence is to grasp that existence is identity—that a thing is what it is.

  To grasp that is to grasp the concept of entity—a thing.

  To continue the process of consciousness is to transform the concept of entity into the concept of a unit, thus: a “unit” is an entity which is independent of any other entity of its own kind—or, a unit is any part of an entity considered independently of the rest of its own kind, such as an inch of string considered as an independent length of string while it is part of a ten-inch string. This is the start of the process of measurement.

  All measurement is integration, by means of a basic unit, that is: the bringing of a vast or complex whole into conceptual form by relating it mathematically to a basic unit. Example: a mile is so many feet.

  All abstractions (all concepts) are the identifications of a basic unit of measurement, with the specific measurements of the particular concretes omitted. For example, length is the abstraction of spatial extension, which omits the specific spatial extension of any given entity, but defines the kind of unit by means of which this entity is to be measured in regard to its attribute of spatial extension.

  The unit of measurement for all concepts pertaining to consciousness is their content. Since consciousness is a “representation” or “reflection” (a more exact term is here needed) of existence, the concepts pertaining to consciousness are ultimately reducible to the existents which they “reflect” or “represent.” Examples: a “thought” is differentiated from another thought by means of its subject (of what the thought is about); an “emotion” is differentiated from another emotion by means of the value judgment it represents, and a value judgment is a thought (a thought dealing with the realm of action in existence).

  In establishing a unit of measurement one has to observe two rules: the unit has to be a tool of both division and integration, it must give one the conceptual possibility of breaking an entity into such units and of integrating it back again, as well as integrating it with other entities of the same kind into groups or sums. Example: if an “inch” is taken as the unit to measure length, one must be able to break up a longer string into inches, then add them up to get a concept of the string in terms of an integrated sum of inches. (This requires a great deal more careful thinking and more precise definitions. But this is a lead to the process of forming concepts or abstractions.) [...]

  My hypothesis is that all consciousness is a mathematical process (or, rather, the function of any consciousness is a mathematical process). To prove this I would have to identify the basic principles common to perception and mathematics. (By perception I mean here the total process of human awareness, from sensations to perceptions to conceptions.) I would have to identify the wider abstractions underlying the processes of concept-formation and of mathematics. And I would have to integrate them with neurology on the one hand (with the physiological part of the integration of sensations into perceptions)—and with metaphysics on the other.

  If my hypothesis is true, then algebra might give me the clue to the objective rules of induction—to a kind of “Organon of Induction.” [Aristotle’s works on logic are called the “Organon, ” Greekfor “instrument. ”]

  June 18, 1959

  (Hurried notes, which require hours and hours of further thinking.)

  Arithmetical numbers are taken as entities in any arithmetical calculation, which means: an arithmetical calculation is an action by which the relationship of certain entities leads to the discovery of a final entity, which is the goal and the stop of the action. A series of arithmetical equations involving action is incomplete until it has reached the stopping point of a specific arithmetical entity, e.g., a number.

  But the numbers themselves are composites. The only primary entity here is the unit—the concept of one (1). Every other number is an abstraction which replaces a certain repetition of ones by a single concept meant to stand for that repetition (111 1 means 4).

  This is the epistemological method of the first level of abstractions—that is, the abstractions (or conceptions) derived directly from perceptions and constituting “ostensive definitions,” e.g., the abstractions of immediately perceived objects, such as: chair, table, man, red, green, color, living being, etc. (Note the mixture of levels, such as “red” and “color.”) [AR seems to be correcting herself here—“color” and “living being” are not

  “first-level” abstractions.] (Perceptions here mean that which a human consciousness automatically integrates out of sensations.) The next (and volitional) level are the abstractions from abstractions—which is the epistemological method of algebra (the discovery of unknown quantities by means of their relationship to the known quantities).

  December 15, 1960

  Notes,for “Objectivism”

  Re: fallacies. The two most important fallacies which I must define thoroughly are, in effect, extensions of two of the fallacies defined by Aristotle: “context-dropping” is really the wider (and more modem) name for Aristotle’s “ignoratio elenchi”; and “the stolen concept” is the other side, the reverse, of “petitio principii.” If this last is “begging the question” or “assuming that which you are attempting to prove,” then “the stolen concept” is “begging the answer” or “assuming that which you are attempting to disprove.” (Many instances of “the stolen concept” are, in fact, instances of “petitio principii,” such as [Bertrand] Russell’s attempt to derive the concept “unit” from [the concept] “group,” which, throughout the whole reasoning, presupposes knowledge of the concept “unit.” But such instances are merely fraudulent attempts to prove something; the most important part of “the stolen concept” is its application to the fraudulent attempts to disprove something, particularly to disprove basic axioms. This is the worst of the fallacies in modern philosophy.)

  [The notes for Objectivism: A Philosophy for Living on Earth end here.]

  [During an interview in 1961, AR remarked: I don’t know whether I will ever write fiction again. The difficulty is that Atlas Shrugged was the climax and completion of the goal I had set for myself at the age of nine. It expressed everything that I wanted of fiction writing. Above everything else, it presented my ideal man fully. I can never surpass Galt. More than that, I now have four variants: Roark, Galt, Rearden, and Francisco. There is no point in multiplying them. What worries me about my future in fiction is that the motor of my interest—the presentation of the ideal man and the ideal way of life—is gone. It’s completed, fulfilled....

  If and when I see an aspect of my sense of life that I have not covered, then I will write another novel. One can’t exhaust the sense of life; it is not like philosophical problems.

  At the time, AR had already made a few notes for To Lorne Dieterling. In Atlas Shrugged, the focus was on the whole of society, and the philosophic issues were dealt with explicitly. In To Lorne Dieterling, the focus is on the heroine, Hella, and her sense of life.]

  November 30, 1957

  First notes for: To Lorne Dieterling.

  Basic theme: The story of a woman who is totally motivated by love for values—and how one maintains such a state when alone in an enemy world.

  Next step of theme: The whole issue of values and of happiness. The role of values in human psychology, in the relationships among men and in the events of their lives. What it means to “live for one’s own sake”—shown not on a social-political scale, but in men’s personal lives.

  As a consequence, show the manner in which men betray their values, and show the results. Select, for the characters of the story, the key versions of men’s attitudes toward values.

  The hidden, basic issue here will be: effort or non-effort, or happiness versus non-effort. The issue “to think or not to think” takes actual form, existentially and psychologically, as the issue: “To value or to conform. ” It is not the independent thinker as such that people actually resent, but the independent value—which means: the person who feels intensely about his values. (This point will require long, detailed analysis here.)

  The set-up of characters, at present: Hella: the fully rational valuer.

  Lome Dieterling: the repressor (a rational man who goes off the rails on the question of action—who, starting with the absolute that he will not let people stop him, finds himself placing action above ideas).

  The “practical man.”

  The “glamorizer.”

  The “idealist.”

  Gloria Thornton: the “energy without effort” type.

  The above are pro-life people. Hella and Lorne are rational; the rest are the better types of social-metaphysicians.

  On the “below-zero” side are the pro-death people—the actual haters of life and values.

  The “Uncle Ed” type: the power-luster, who wants power for the sake of power; actually, he is after nothing at all.

  The sneerer: the professional cynic, whose sole motive is to sneer at everything; specifically, at any kind of values (the New Yorker magazine type).

  The humanitarian: the type whose motive is to penalize values for being values, to make men feel guilty about their intelligence, or ability, or beauty, or success, or wealth.

  The story must show: that the death-premisers are actually after nothing, that they achieve nothing but a senseless, meaningless vacuum, that their horror is their mediocrity; and that they are the value-setters of a society of social-metaphysicians. (The rational men do not “take care” of other men; the thinkers require thinking men. It is only the most profoundly dependent social-metaphysicians, the power-lusters, who will undertake to “think for others.” As a consequence, the value-betrayers in the story—the men who gave up values for the sake of “safety,” on the ground that “others know best”—find, in the end, that their treason and all of their torture were for no better purpose than to have the world obey “Uncle Ed‘s” opinion on cigarettes. Or, as another example: the girl who renounces the man she loves, because of her mother’s objections—finds that her mother’s ultimate purpose was to stay in bed an hour later than usual “on whim.”)

  The story must also show: that the value-betrayers end up by achieving the exact opposite of the goals they sought to achieve by social-metaphysical means.

  Here there are two separate aspects to consider: Whether these men have some semi-rationally selected goal and believe (emotionally) that social-metaphysics is the means—or whether in their very selection of goals, they chose the socially prescribed, chose it uncritically, as a self-evident, irreducible primary. (I believe it is more this second. As an example: the “practical man” who chooses wealth and material success without any thought of “why?” or “what for?,” simply on some such feeling as “it’s good to be successful, everybody wants to be successful, how can that be doubted?”—which amounts to the feeling: “one is supposed to be successful.” Another example: the woman who has children without ever questioning whether she wants to have them—simply on the feeling that “one is supposed to have children.”)

  The “practical man” goes bankrupt.

  The “glamorizer” is viciously betrayed by his “best friend” (or wife) and suffers a terrible tragedy.

  The “idealist” becomes the particular “cat’s paw” of the villains in their attempted destruction of ideals.

  Gloria Thomton—whose “ego-value” was her competence in the achievement of any values prescribed by society, who obeyed, adjusted and conformed in the expectation that “others” (or “reality”) would reward her with happiness—finds herself empty, exhausted, enjoying nothing and reaching a state of chronic panic.