President Obama obtained: Mark Landler, “Short, Tense Deliberation, Then a General Is Gone,” New York Times, June 23, 2010.

  Two years earlier, Biddle had written: The article was Stephen Biddle, “The New US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and Political Praxis,” Perspectives on Politics, June 2008.

  Through a mix of cajoling: Spencer Ackerman, “Petraeus’ First Big Afghanistan Gamble: Militias Local Cops,” Wired (Danger Room blog), July 14, 2010; and interviews.

  “the ideal situation”: Galula, op. cit., 25. Galula even drew a sketch of what an ideal country for insurgents would look like; it’s almost exactly the shape of Afghanistan.

  “secure and serve the population”: Unclassified portions of Petraeus’s “Tactical Directive” were quoted in HQ, ISAF, press release, “General Petraeus Issues Updated Tactical Directive; Emphasizes ‘Disciplined Use of Force,’” August 4, 2010, www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/general-petraeus-issues-updated-tactical-directive-emphasizes-disciplined-use-of-force.html. The full “COIN Guidance” was issued as HQ, ISAF, Kabul, Afghanistan, “COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,” August 1, 2010.

  In his first three months: US Air Forces Central Combined Air and Space Operations Center, “Combined Forces Air Component Commander, 2007–2010 Air Power Statistics” (as of September 30, 2010), www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2010/10/30-September-2010-Airpower-Stats.pdf.

  killing or capturing three hundred midlevel Taliban leaders: Fred Kaplan, “A New Plan for Afghanistan: Less Counterinsurgency, More Killing and Capturing,” Slate, October 13, 2010; I got these numbers from an ISAF official at the time.

  in late 2002, Rothstein had written: Seymour M. Hersh, “The Other War: Why Bush’s Afghanistan Problem Won’t Go Away,” New Yorker, April 12, 2004; the rest of the section on Rothstein comes from my interviews.

  “I have three main enemies”: Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “As US Assesses Afghan War, Karzai a Question Mark,” Washington Post, December 13, 2010.

  But a few weeks later: Joshua Partlow, “Karzai Wants US to Reduce Military Operations in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, November 14, 2010.

  “Your president has put me in an untenable position”: Part of this quote and story comes from Joshua Partlow and Karen DeYoung, “Petraeus Warns Afghans About Karzai’s Criticism of US War Strategy,” Washington Post, November 15, 2010; part comes from my interviews.

  At Petraeus’s urging, and with President Obama’s: In his first three years as president, Barack Obama launched nearly six times as many drone strikes on Pakistan as George W. Bush did in the previous five years (241 from 2009–11 compared to 42 from 2004–08). Casualties are harder to determine, but the most authoritative unclassified estimate puts the number at between 2,400 and 3,000, of whom 80 percent were militants. New America Foundation, Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative, The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004–2012, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones.

  But despite an impressive hit rate: As late as January 2012, Ryan Crocker, US ambassador to Afghanistan, sent a top secret cable to the CIA, concluding that the persistence of enemy havens in Pakistan was jeopardizing the US war strategy. (Greg Jaffe and Greg Miller, “Secret U.S. Cable Warned About Pakistani Havens,” Washington Post, February 24, 2012.)

  The tale of Pakistan’s role in the American adventure in Afghanistan is worthy of its own book. Pakistan’s leaders have, at best, an ambivalent view of the Islamist militants in their midst. On the one hand, they regard al Qaeda insurgents as a threat to their own rule; on the other hand, many officers in the military’s intelligence service have alliances with some militant groups, a relationship that was forged at Pakistan’s very birth as a nation in 1947. See Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).

  As for the Taliban on the Afghan border, Pakistan’s military has fought some groups but protected others. Pakistan’s officials uniformly see the bigger threat as India and are thus reluctant to place too many troops on the western border with Afghanistan, lest they leave themselves too exposed to India to the east. For the same reason, the Pakistanis have an interest in establishing a presence in Afghanistan—to secure a “defense in depth” against a possible invasion from India and, more immediately, to counter the economic foothold that India has established in Afghanistan in recent years—and they do this through not-so-covert sponsorship of the Haqqani network, one of the more militant of the insurgencies. To the extent the Pakistanis desire peace in Afghanistan, they want it only on their terms through their agents. In early 2010, the Pakistani government boasted of capturing two dozen Taliban leaders; but a few months later, US intelligence discovered that those specific leaders had been trying to set up peace talks—their sin being that they hadn’t done so through Pakistan. On this, see Dexter Filkins, “Pakistanis Tell of Motive in Taliban Leader’s Arrest,” New York Times, August 22, 2010.

  From the outset of his presidency, Obama was well aware of the conflict’s regional dimension and appointed veteran diplomat Richard Holbrooke as his AfPak envoy. The two men were temperamentally very different—Obama cool, Holbrooke melodramatic—but this was one of the few personnel bones that the president threw to Hillary Clinton, who’d been a friend of Holbrooke’s for years. (Had she won the 2008 presidential election, he almost certainly would have been her secretary of state.) At his first meeting with Karzai, Holbrooke launched into a screaming tirade, which may have worked with the likes of Slobodan Milosevic (in Bill Clinton’s administration, Holbrooke had negotiated the Dayton Accords, which removed the Serbian dictator from power), but not with Karzai. The Afghan president refused to meet with him again. Holbrooke focused more on rallying the US civilian bureaucracy to the cause of Afghanistan, with uneven results. He died on December 13, 2010, and was replaced with Marc Grossman, a veteran diplomat of a lower key. Still, little progress was made. One limitation from the outset was that India’s leaders refused to negotiate in any forum that regarded their country as one of three points in a triangle.

  McMaster linked up with the intelligence: US Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, interview with H. R. McMaster, Commander, CJIATF-Shafafkyat, HQ ISAF, Kabul, January 27, 2012; and interviews.

  His efforts resulted: Matthew Rosenberg and Graham Bowley, “Intractable Graft Hampering US Strategy,” New York Times, March 7, 2012; Dexter Filkins, “The Afghan Bank Heist,” New Yorker, February 14, 2011; and interviews.

  A few nights before his farewell ceremony: The guests were John M. Barry, Newsweek’s military correspondent, who was writing a profile of Petraeus, and Paula Broadwell, a former West Point cadet who was writing a hagiographical book about the general. The description comes from John Barry, “Petraeus’ Next Battle,” Newsweek, July 17, 2011, and from additional details provided to me by Barry.

  Chapter 22: “A New American Way of War”

  He’d learned back in December 2010: The date comes from Paula Broadwell, All In: The Education of David Petraeus (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), although the author doesn’t report, or even speculate, why Petraeus didn’t get the chairman-ship.

  The eight-page document: US Defense Department, “Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” January 2012, www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.

  “As we look beyond the wars”: President Obama, press conference, January 5, 2012.

  “conduct large-scale”: See ch. 6.

  They include nine lieutenants: The numbers are from Rick Hampson, “At West Point, a Quiet Place to Honor Warriors,” USA Today, January 4, 2012; all other material in this section comes from interviews.

  The most often-cited models: Examples of successful noncolonial counterinsurgency campaigns launched by outside powers, especially in the post-WWII era, are rare. See Erin Marie Simpson, The Perils of Third-Party Counterinsurgency Campaigns, PhD dissertation, Harvard University, June 2010.

  The successful COIN campaigns: On Malaya, see Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 75; on the Philippines, see Max Boot, Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 125.

  “Vietnam was an extremely painful”: David Howell Petraeus, The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam, PhD dissertation, Princeton, October 1987. He excerpted this section of the thesis in an article, “Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam,” in the Autumn 1986 issue of Parameters.

  Index

  Abdullah, Abdullah, 315

  Abizaid, John, 170–71, 173, 181–82, 195, 198, 223, 224, 231, 232, 234, 239, 260

  Abraham Lincoln, USS, 58, 71

  Abraham Lincoln Brigade, 9

  Abrams, Creighton, 41, 194

  Abu Ghraib prison, 160

  Ackerman, Spencer, 292

  Afghanistan, 4, 16, 42, 66, 69, 200

  Soviet invasion of, 85, 104, 309

  Afghanistan Reconstruction Group, 321

  Afghan War:

  Afghan election and, 300–302, 315

  Afghan government as U.S. partner in, 313–14

  al Qaeda in, 294–97, 300–304, 310, 316, 345, 353

  assessment of, 363–64

  assessment teams’ report in, 305–8, 311

  Biden’s strategy for, 297–98, 300–301, 309, 315–16

  CIA’s drone campaign in, 347–48, 353

  civilian casualties problem in, 324–26, 327, 328–29, 331, 344

  clear-hold-build strategy and, 307, 330–32

  cost of, 299–300

  counterterrorism-counterinsurgency rivalry in, 300–301, 302, 308–9, 310, 311, 315–17, 319–20, 353–54

  Eikenberry’s critique of McChrystal’s strategy in, 313–15

  failed strategy in, 353–54

  Five Pillars strategy in, 320–22

  Gates and U.S. policy in, 309–10

  government corruption and patronage in, 301–2, 307–8, 324, 334, 339–41, 346–48, 363

  Iraq conflict compared with, 345–46

  ISAF problem in, 307–8

  Karzai’s threats to undermine U.S. in, 345–46

  legitimacy issue and, 302, 307, 314–15, 340–41

  McChrystal’s posting to, 303, 305

  McChrystal’s tactical directives in, 325–27, 343

  Marja battle in, 329–31, 332, 336

  NATO in, 294, 301, 305–8, 317–18, 322–26, 330, 334

  Obama’s “comprehensive” strategy for, 300–301

  Obama’s national address on, 351–53

  Obama’s West Point address on, 316–18

  Operation Moshtarak in, 330

  “opinion leaders” tour in, 338–40

  Petraeus’s guidelines for, 341–44

  Petraeus’s posting to, 338–40

  Riedel report on U.S. policy in, 295–97, 299–300, 301, 323

  RMA and, 53–55

  Rothstein report on, 344–45

  Rumsfeld and, 55–56

  Shinwari pact in, 332, 334–37, 363

  Special Forces in, 54–55

  specter of the Vietnam War and, 310–11

  Status of Forces Agreement and, 294

  surge and drawdown in, 317–18, 351–53

  “three-block war” scheme in, 327

  African National Congress, 68–69

  Agency for International Development (AID), 27, 112, 149, 183, 251–52, 287–88, 296, 319–20, 331

  Agriculture Department, U.S., 287–88, 296

  Air Force, U.S., 53, 99, 145, 232, 359

  drones dispute and, 271–72, 274–75

  revised Army field manual and, 57

  RMA and, 46–47, 48–51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 110, 271–72, 353, 359

  Transportation Command of, 274

  AirLand Battle (Army field manual), 57–58, 105, 129, 146, 162

  Algeria, 15, 17, 19, 104, 160, 170, 225, 364

  al Haramain Foundation, 66

  Ali-Jassim, Abu, 247

  Allen, John, 248

  al Qaeda, 86, 178, 250, 253, 263, 268, 278, 357

  in Afghan War, 294–97, 300–304, 310, 316, 345, 353

  Anbar Awakening and, 244, 246–48

  in Bosnia, 65–66

  drones strikes against, 54–55

  U.S. Baghdad operations and, 257–58, 267

  al Qaeda in Iraq, 201, 253, 304

  American Anthropological Association, 285

  American Enterprise Institute (AEI), 200, 233, 235, 236–37, 305, 308, 350

  American Interest, 222

  Anaconda, Operation, 55

  “Analysis of Iraqi and Coalition End States” (Ward), 209–10

  Anbar Awakening, MacFarland and, 244–48, 259, 261, 262, 268–69, 276, 334, 342, 363

  al Qaeda and, 244, 245–48

  Casey’s doubts of, 246–47

  clear-hold-build strategy and, 246

  Odierno’s visit to, 248

  People’s Council in, 246

  Petraeus’s visit to, 249

  Sattar and, 247–48

  Ancker, Clinton, 133–34, 136–37

  Anderson, Gary, 81–84, 91

  Anderson, Joseph, 71–72, 251

  Anthropology Today, 285

  “Anti-Iraq Forces” (AIF), 252–53

  Aristide, Jean-Bertrand, 63

  Armed Forces Journal, 278

  Armitage, Richard, 51

  Armstrong, Joel, 234–35, 236, 237, 240

  Army, U.S., 1, 5, 61, 65, 130, 178, 195, 229, 362

  AirLand field manual of, 57–58, 105, 129, 146, 162

  firepower doctrine of, 2–3, 41, 110–11

  force generation model of, 236

  Future Combat System of, 271–73, 299

  General Officer Management Office of, 280

  Human Terrain Teams program of, 214, 285

  JRTC of, 130, 225–26, 228

  low intensity warfare disdained by, 45–46, 112

  Maneuver Center of Excellence of, 358

  MRAP controversy and, 272–74, 275

  National Training Center of, 37, 45, 130–32, 156, 167, 169, 172, 225–26, 277

  Office of Plans, Policy, and Programs of, 322

  Operations field manual of, 41–42

  Petraeus’s retirement from, 351

  post-Iraq role of, 358–59

  promotions system of, see promotions system

  Ranger School of, 191

  “Ready First” Brigade of, 277

  SAMS of, 57–58, 69–70, 81, 162

  after Vietnam, 2, 32–33

  Vigilant Warrior wargame of, 59–60

  Walter Reed Hospital scandal and, 271, 276, 280–81

  Army After Next (think tank), 102–3

  Army and Vietnam, The (Krepinevich), 33, 168

  Army Intelligence Center, 213–16

  Army War College, 29, 59, 88, 92, 94, 107, 112, 138, 139, 141

  Peacekeeping Institute of, 45

  Arrowhead Brigade, 77, 403

  Art of War, The (Sun Tzu), 57

  Assault Breaker, 47–48

  “Assessment of the Counterinsurgency Effort in Iraq” (McMaster), 171

  Association of the United States Army, 276

  Atlantic, 153

  Atmar, Hanif, 331

  Australia, 85, 90, 141, 166

  Baath Party, Iraqi, 184, 245, 246

  Bremer’s CPA Order banning, 74–75, 114, 126, 171, 190, 196

  Baghdad security operations, 253–69, 272

  al Qaeda assault plan in, 257–58

  Maliki and, 263–64, 267–68

  Sadr City raid in, 263, 267

  security stations in, 256–57, 264–65

  Sons of Iraq and, 262, 267–69

  surge troop deployment in, 258–59

  Baker, James, 204–5, 233

  Baker-Hamilton Commission, 204–8, 233, 270, 279

  Casey’s meeting with, 205–6

  Chiarelli’s briefing of, 207–8, 211

  members of, 204–5

  report of, 206–7, 234–35

  surge concept and, 204–5, 206, 207

  Bali terrorist bombing, 141

  Balkans, 44, 277

  Barno, David, 236, 319–21, 322

  Basin Harbor conference, 108–16, 119, 147, 174, 194

  Bateson, Gregory, 285

  Batiste, John, 189–90

  Battle Command Training Program, 69, 130, 153, 239

  Bechtel Group, 185

  Bell for Adano, A (Hersey), 90

  Benevolence International Foundation, 66

  Bergner, Kevin, 198–99

  Berlin Wall, 2, 36, 48

  Bernstein, David, 155–56

  Beschloss, Michael, 310

  “Best Practices of Counterinsurgency” (Sepp), 146, 150, 167, 174

  Better War, A (Sorley), 194, 311, 320

  Beukema, Herman, 6–9

  Beverly Hills Cop (film), 67

  Biddle, Stephen, 238, 261–62, 305, 308, 338, 340–41, 342, 362

  Biden, Joseph, 210, 295, 309, 310, 312, 337, 353

  Afghan War debate and, 297–98, 300, 315–16

  Bigeard, Marcel “Bruno,” 15–16, 160

  bin Laden, Osama, 54–55, 56, 294

  death of, 353

  Bolivia, 29

  BooksAMillion.com, 320

  Boot, Max, 338

  Borneo, 85

  Bosnia, 53, 65–69, 76, 95–96, 127, 180, 182, 225, 229, 245, 251, 254, 350, 356

  Bremer, L. Paul “Jerry,” 82–83, 110, 191, 229, 251

  and CPA Order banning Baathists, 74–75, 114, 126, 171, 190, 196

  Briggs, Harold, 39, 79

  Broadwell, Paula, 367–68

  Brookings Institution, 306

  Brooks, Nichoel, 257–58

  Buckley, Dave, 131

  Bundy, McGeorge, 310–11

  Bureaucracy Does Its Thing (Komer), 209, 289

  Burma, 39

  Bush, George H. W., 49, 193, 204, 205, 239, 310, 349

  Bush, George W., 51, 56, 71, 91, 95, 191, 193, 194, 196, 197, 199, 211, 233, 263, 270, 273, 280, 281, 296, 300, 353

  Baker-Hamilton report rejected by, 207

  in Iraq visit, 200–202, 203

  “mission accomplished” declaration of, 58, 71

  surge policy and, 237–43, 257, 260

  2004 election and, 204

  in White House surge meeting, 237–38, 239

  Bush, G. W. administration, 84, 118, 146, 185, 210, 285, 294–95, 298, 300, 322

  Cable News Network (CNN), 49, 335–36, 364