If only the South had won the US Civil War, there would have been no consolidated national regime, and therefore no American entry into World War I, no Treaty of Versailles, no Hitler, no World War II, no Holocaust, no Stalinist occupation of Eastern Europe, no Cold War, no arms race, no Korean War and no War in Vietnam. Indeed, it would appear that the failure of the Confederate States of America was one of the greatest tragedies in world history. Applying these principles of secession and sovereignty to the modern world, it becomes obvious that anti-imperialists must stand by all nations and movements who defy the New World Order. This means defending Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Venezuela, Cuba, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Somalia, the Sudan, Iran, North Korea, Lebanon and any other nations who display resistance, regardless of what one may think of their internal politics. It means standing by nations like Russia, Germany, France, Turkey and Belgium when they refuse the dictates of American imperialism, even if this is largely an intramural dispute within the ranks of the masters of the New World Order. It means supporting armed insurrectionary movements on the periphery, such as the FARC of Colombia, the Peoples’ War Group of Nepal, the Shining Path of Peru, the Zapatistas of Chiapas, Hamas, Hezbollah, the ETA, IRA and the Corsican autonomists.

  Hoppe’s views on secession also involve a preference for small communities. Critiquing the failure of the Confederacy, Hoppe argues that the Union refused to allow the secession because the loss of revenue, subjects and territory involved was simply more costly to itself than fighting a war “to preserve the Union”. As an alternative, a modern secessionist effort should:

  “…take its cues from the European Middle Ages when, from about the twelfth century until well into the seventeenth century (with the emergence of the modern central state), Europe was characterized by the existence of hundreds of free and independent cities, interspersed into a predominately feudal social structure. By choosing this model and striving to create a U.S. punctuated by a large and increasing number of territorially disconnected free cities-a multitude of Hong Kongs, Singapores, Monacos and Liechtensteins strewn out over the entire continent-two otherwise unattainable but central objectives can be accomplished. First, besides recognizing the fact that the liberal-libertarian potential is distributed highly unevenly across the country, such a strategy of piecemeal withdrawal renders secession less threatening politically, socially and economically. Second, by pursuing this strategy simultaneously at a great number of locations all over the country, it becomes exceedingly difficult for the central state to create a unified opposition in public opinion to the secessionists which would secure the level of popular support and voluntary cooperation necessary for a successful crackdown.” 39

  Of course, it is important to realize that Hoppe is proceeding from a totally different set of ideological presumptions than those of the national-anarchists. Hoppe is clearly in the liberal-Enlightenment tradition while national-anarchists are critical of modernity in a way that is similar to that of traditional conservatives in the Burkean tradition, notably Russell Kirk. Also, Hoppe is primarily interested in a more uniform liberal-libertarian-capitalist ideological secession while national-anarchists favor a proliferation of communities that span the ideological and cultural spectrum. The national-anarchist position appears to be the preferable one, as it is more conducive to the kind of diversity that would be necessary to make such efforts viable. Hoppe’s views on secession are very similar to those of David Michael. Unlike many leftist or libertarian anarchists, Michael does not reject electoral action, demonstrations, infiltration or “lone wolf” actions out of hand. Michael is refreshingly pragmatic and methodical when it comes to questions of strategy. 40 While favoring a “fight on all fronts” approach, Michael’s primary emphasis is on acquiring territory, resources and influence and building communities and alliances. On the question of alliances, Michael comments:

  “Many groups are opposed to globalization-often for different reasons: anarchists, national-anarchists, nationalists, Islamic fundamentalists, Maoists, national Bolsheviks, national socialists, national revolutionaries, third positionists, environmentalists…As globalization and American imperialism tighten their grip upon the world we might wonder whether the old, and largely redundant, distinction between ‘left’ and ‘right’ in politics might be replaced by a new and far more bitter struggle: the struggle between the global Establishment-the monopolar New World Order, dominated by America and American neoliberal economics and values-and those many and varied people who oppose it. ” 41

  In the process of building communities and homelands, David Michael suggests a number of core conditions that need to be met. Such projects must be adequate in size, involve enough people and involve people of high quality and commitment. Geographical isolation is also a necessity, along with ideological isolation, the avoidance of provocation of external authorities, an absence of destructive ideological or personality traits among the participants and a resolute commitment to the avoidance of efforts to dominate other communities. Michael notes:

  “Certain of our fellow travelers in the struggle against the Establishment have imperialist potential. The communists, National Socialists, and Islamic fundamentalists-all of these are fighting against the New World Order. Yet each, if it were to triumph all over the earth, has the potential to produce a globalised world order every bit as sinister as that of the current American empire. Care needs to be taken, when working with such people, that in working with them for the destruction of the Establishment, we do not inadvertently work towards the replacement of one globalizing or imperialist force with another.” 42

  We might also remember that is has been precisely these types of internecine battles among rival revolutionary factions that have destroyed prior revolutionary efforts, such as those of France of 1789, Russia of 1917, Spain of 1936 and Paris of 1968. David Michael’s warnings concerning these matters echo those of Bakunin, whose foresight regarding the inherent statist and centralist tendencies of the Marxists offered a prophetic vision of the horrors and tragedies that were to emerge in the twentieth century. As a means of avoiding the replacement of one kind of imperialism with another, we might once again return to the lessons of classical anarchism and learn from the example of the First International. The Marxists favored the concentration of power into the hands of the International’s General Council, which they had control over, while the Bakuninists (who comprised a majority of the International’s membership) believed the International should be a model for the future post-revolutionary society with as much autonomy as possible afforded to the local sections. Similarly, the alliance against the New World Order should be radically decentralized. Just as the International maintained sections in various countries, each with their own specific ideological inclinations, so should an alliance against Anglo-Zionist imperialism be structured in such a way as to reflect the varying ideological and cultural currents found within distinctive communities, regions and nations.

  I am not particularly knowledgeable of the cultural map of Europe or Asia beyond the purely elementary level. However, I might be able to provide a sketch of how such an alliance might be formed in North America, “in the belly of the beast,” as Guevara said. America, Canada and Mexico each include a number of distinctive regions. In the US, the primary regions are the Northeast corridor, long time home of the mercantile trade and banking interests, the Southern “Bible Belt”, a hot bed of religious fundamentalism and social conservatism, the Midwest, with its inclinations towards heartland populism, the West, still a bastion of Marlboro country individualism, and the Left Coast, a multicultural region with many diverse ethnic and religious populations and a reputation as a haven for “alternative” lifestyles.

  Breaking things down a bit further, the rural and small town communities within America tend to lean towards social and cultural conservatism while the urban, metropolitan areas are more inclined towards “liberalism” and “progressivism”. It is instructive to note the ideological content of various secessionist and decentralist movements that have appeared in the US in recent years. A San Francisco newspaper published an editorial calling for secession by that city and the creation of a liberal-progressive city-state, citing Iceland as a model. A still small but growing neo-secessionist movement in the old Confederate states claims Christianity and conservative Southern heritage as its banners. A libertarian-capitalist group, the Free State Project, wishes to colonize an American state and set about the business of eliminating its government. During the 1970s some in the hippie movement undertook an effort to colonize Vermont with some apparent success, as anyone familiar with the internal politics of Vermont is no doubt aware. The white separatist tendencies in the US have at times subscribed to a doctrine called “Northwest Imperative”, the aim of which would be to establish a white nationalist homeland in the Northwestern United States. Similarly, the Black Nationalist Nation of Islam organization has long called for a sovereign black homeland within the borders of the US. While Europe is more traditionally homogenous and less pluralistic than America, no doubt similar arrangements can be found in European society as well. Troy Southgate notes that a number of the tendencies in the national-anarchist family tree, such as the National Front and the English Nationalist Movement, called for regional independence for the distinctive regions among the British Isles and, despite a strong anti-immigration stance, cooperation with black and Asian communities within Britain.43 Independence movements exist in northern Italy, Flanders, Corsica, the Basque country and, of course, Northern Ireland.

  All of this brings us back to the original vision of Thomas Jefferson. At the risk of grotesque oversimplification, we might characterize American political history as an ongoing battle between the decentralist, agrarian ideals of Jefferson and the mercantilist, centralist preferences of his rival, Alexander Hamilton. Indeed, we might regard the establishment of the US national state in its earliest, late eighteenth century form as the first triumph of the Hamiltonians over the Jeffersonians, an event where the far more libertarian and decentralized Articles of Confederation was replaced via mercantilist coup with the more centralist, presidential form of government with which Americans are familiar. Subsequent American history has dramatically illustrated the wisdom of the early anti-federalist critics of the US Constitution, such as Jefferson and Patrick Henry. The Jeffersonians went on to suffer severe military defeat during the US Civil War of 1861-65 and Hamiltonian mercantilism and state capitalism continued to tighten its grip on America. Mark Winchell observes:

  “By 1930, the Hamiltonian vision had triumphed everywhere in the United States except for the South and a few isolated pockets of rural culture elsewhere in the country…The Agrarians, however, believed that the Faustian bargain being offered to the south would result in the region giving up too much for too little. (It is doubtful that even they could have imagined the contemporary Sunbelt, with indistinguishable shopping malls stretching from Phoenix to Atlanta and a landscape of high-rise hotels with revolving restaurants on top.)” 44

  The early Jeffersonian vision of a republic of republics, with governmental systems ordered on the basis of counties divided into wards, and political leadership drawn from the ranks of natural aristocrats who achieved their position through superior ability, intelligence and character, with distinct communities achieving self-determination, includes a core set of ideas whose evolution continues through the work of Proudhon and Kropotkin, godfathers of British Distributism like G. K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc, traditionalist American conservatives such as Richard Weaver and M. E. Bradford, libertarians like Karl Hess and, today, the national-anarchist movement. To be a Jeffersonian in the America of today is to be both an extreme radical and, in a sense, an extreme reactionary. A modern Jeffersonian, in any authentic sense, is a “conservative revolutionary” of the first order. Norman Mailer, a self-described “Left-Conservative”, characterizes such an outlook as “thinking in the style of Karl Marx in order to attain certain values suggested by Edmund Burke.” Mark Winchell continues:

  “Certainly, one of the challenges now facing any political philosophy is to find a way to achieve harmony in an increasingly pluralistic society. Properly understood, the qualities of diversity and tolerance are more natural to a conservative than a schematic leftist mindset. Among his ‘six canons of conservative thought,’ (Russell) Kirk identifies an ‘affection for the proliferating variety and mystery of traditional life as distinguished from the narrowing uniformity and equalitarianism and utilitarian aims of most radical systems.’ Decentralization-political, cultural, and economic-is one way of maintaining and enhancing that proliferating variety.” 45

  Samuel Francis has speculated that paleoconservatives may be mistaken in adopting the label of “conservative”. What is it about the world order of modern times that anyone should wish to conserve? The ideals of the paleocons and the national-anarchists converge on a number of key points-regionalism, localism, agrarianism, traditionalism. The vociferous anti-Americanism of the national-anarchists may trigger an instinctively negative reflex among those paleocons who regard themselves as patriots, but is the America which the national-anarchists reject so fervently the America of either classical Jeffersonian or contemporary paleoconservative ideals? Obviously not. Perhaps Francis is right. 46 Perhaps those modern thinkers who find inspiration in classical American values are not conservatives at all, but anarchists. Benjamin R. Tucker once remarked that if Jefferson had been alive in his own era (this was the late nineteenth century!), he would have been an anarchist. Indeed, the iconic conservative sociologist Robert Nisbet expressed admiration for the communitarian ideals championed by classical anarchists like Kropotkin. And for those who wish to preserve both authentic diversity and distinctive communities, both inside and outside the territorial United States, national-anarchism does indeed offer a way. Indeed, it might not be too much of a stretch to say that national-anarchism is paleoconservatism taken to its logical conclusions. Of course, it remains to be seen whether paleoconservatives and national-anarchists alike would agree with that estimation.

  An Alternative to the American Empire of the New World Order

  Almost childish naiveté, a lack of imagination, simplifications reaching commonness, blind generalizations – these are the impressions one gets after reading Francis Fukuyama’s famous essay The End of History and the Last Man. Communism’s crash in the East and the retreat from the “welfare state” in the West are, in the author’s opinion, supposed to mean “the end of history”. Humanity has already found its Kingdom of Heaven, which is liberal democracy married to liberal capitalism, and at this point any change or movement becomes impossible and aimless. In his “wishful thinking” Fukuyama is blind to the liberal model’s crisis, exemplified by such things as growing electoral absence, the loss of credibility of the great traditional parties47, and the constant continuance of recession. Fukuyama doesn’t want to notice the vitality and dynamism of authoritative free-market systems because this would shake his theory of an unbreakable relationship between parliamentary democracy and the free market.48 Fukuyama believes in the absolute of the current model of civilization and cannot imagine the existence of humanity in a way different from the technological civilization of economic growth. With the disarming trust of a child, Fukuyama believes that reaching the Paradise on Earth is quite possible (What else would one call “the best possible state of affairs”?).

  I guess that is enough of enumerating the new Eternal Happiness Prophet’s mistakes. Without a shadow of a doubt, the days of August 1991,49 although not meaning the end of humanity’s history, ended one special age of it. It ended the age in which the major problem was making people happy by fulfilling their material needs, and the most important of the conflicts (whose expression was ideological rivalry between egalitarians and liberals) was attached to distribution of the consumers’ goods. However, as soon as the social-statists [adherents of the welfare state] disgracefully stepped down from the stage of history and the free-marketers, as it seemed, triumphed everywhere, the apparent monolith of the “free world” started breaking up again. On a global scale, the “cold war” between the communist East and capitalist West is being replaced by economic occupation of the backward Peripheries by the highly-developed Center.50 On the internal political scenes, the conflict between the “globalists”51 and defenders of political autonomy and cultural identity begins to sharpen. There is growing resistance to the self-driving economic growth which, by destroying the natural environment, becomes a threat to the further existence of the human species. Sooner or later these conflicts will find their ideological expression and take the place of the old division between the right and the left wing.52 New division lines run across the traditional parties. Occurrences that could be noticed during the French referendum concerning the Maastricht treaty can be treated as a standard example: political, economic and cultural elites are quite “pro-globalist” and among ordinary people there is much resistance. The great parties of the center remain the defenders of the “status quo” and at the same time the extreme wings of the political scene are protesting.53