This story was often told to illustrate the intelligence of McNamara and the stupidity of the generals. McNamara was going to get rid of the “spasm” and substitute a new doctrine of “Flexible Response.” Furthermore, he would do this for lower cost, keeping everyone happy.

  Part of McNamara’s plan involved negotiations with the Soviet Union. In order to induce them to be cooperative, we had to let them feel safe; this meant that we could not have strategic superiority (which, according to the McNamara doctrine, was meaningless anyway).

  The result of all this was our “new” strategic doctrine: Mutual Assured Destruction, usually abbreviated as MAD.

  MAD has a rigid logic; indeed, it was what Herman Kahn had called a “homicide pact.” Medieval writers would have called it an exchange of hostages—except, of course, we value our citizens, while the esteem in which Soviet leaders hold their subjects is not so certain. MAD assured safety by assuring mutual destruction: war was to be so horrible that no one would ever start one, since no one could ever win it. Since it would never start, one need not have plans for fighting it; it was necessary only to prove that both sides would be killed—which is to say, to perfect the horrible spasm. From Flexible Response we grew the MAD doctrine that said: since Civil Defense measures mitigate the effects of war, and protect the American people against the enemy’s retaliation, Civil Defense is “provocative”; indeed, taking measures that protect American lives in the event of war is an “act of aggression against the Soviet Union.”

  MAD drew the same conclusions about defenses. Anti ballistic missile defenses (known sometimes as ABM and sometimes as BMD) were also provocative and aggressive systems. The Soviets would never accept that, and invested heavily in defensive systems; so we negotiated a treaty called SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) that prohibited BMD, except that both sides could deploy one defense system. Because the protection of one’s citizens negated MAD, the ABM system was supposed to protect only weapons, specifically a missile farm. If we had deployed an ABM (we didn’t), it would have been out at Minot, South Dakota. The Soviets chose to protect the weapons they had deployed near Moscow…

  In THE STRATEGY OF TECHNOLOGY, Possony and I proposed a different strategic doctrine which we thought would make more sense. We called it Assured Survival. We thought that the primary mission of the armed forces should be to assure the survival of the United States and as many citizens as possible. One of the best ways to do that would be to develop defensive systems.

  This was also dictated by the Judaeo-Christian doctrine of Just War. MAD, which offers to kill the enemy’s helpless civilians in retaliation for the acts of their masters, presents a moral dilemma of staggering proportions.

  Defense systems, we argued, are inherently stabilizing: they don’t threaten the other side, but they do complicate his war plan, making it much harder for him to know just what would happen if the war started. Only a fool would believe his missile defenses were perfect; but only another fool would attack a nation armed with both missiles and good defenses.

  Some years later, Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, US Army (Ret’d), an infantryman who became Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and Deputy Director of the CIA, became interested in a new strategic plan. This became Project High Frontier.

  General Graham’s concepts are explained in great detail in the High Frontier report, available for $15 from Project High Frontier, 1010 Vermont Ave., N.W. Suite 1000, Washington, DC 20005, (202) 737-4979. Project High Frontier is endorsed by many enthusiasts including former astronaut Buzz Aldrin; perhaps his most enthusiastic endorsement is given below.

  THE GOOD NEWS OF HIGH FRONTIER

  by Robert A. Heinlein

  “High Frontier,” is the best news I have heard since VJ Day.

  For endless unhappy years the United States has had no defense policy. We had something we called a defense policy… but in the words of Abraham Lincoln, “Calling a tail a leg doesn’t make it a leg.”

  Under our present policies what do we have? H-bombs, airborne, water-borne, and in silos, capable of destroying anything, anywhere on this planet. Elite troops second to none in our Marine Corps, in our Army’s 82nd Airborne, and in our Navy SEALs. Other armed forces stationed around the world and on every ocean. Eyes in the sky that can spot any missile launched in our direction.

  And none of these can even slow down an ICBM launched at Washington.

  (Or at your hometown).

  So we have no defense. Instead we have something mislabeled a “defense policy,” called “Mutually Assured Destruction,” referred to as “MAD.”

  Never has Washington produced an acronym that fitted so perfectly. Picture two men at point-blank range each with a .45 aimed at the other man’s bare chest. That is MAD. Crazy. Insane. And stupid.

  High Frontier places a bullet-proof vest on our bare chest. High Frontier is as non-aggressive as a bulletproof vest. There is no way to kill anyone with High Frontier—all that High Frontier can do is to keep others from killing us.

  That is one of the two best aspects of High Frontier. It is so utterly peaceful that the most devout pacifist can support it with a clear conscience—indeed must support it once he understands it… as it tends to stop wars from happening and to save lives if war does happen. All who supported GROUND ZERO should support High Frontier.

  The other best aspect of High Frontier is that its systems are non-nuclear. I am not one who gets upset at hearing the word “nuclear”… but no one in his right mind wants nuclear explosions going on over his head or anywhere on this planet. It is happy indeed that the best defense we can devise does not call for nuclear explosions. To save ourselves we do not need to blow up Moscow, we do not need to add to the radioactive fallout on our lovely planet.

  The designers of High Frontier calculate that this new strategy will decrease our military costs. I am not in a position to judge this... but, frankly, I don’t give a damn. A man with a burst appendix can’t afford to dicker over the cost of surgery.

  But will High Frontier in fact protect the Republic? As an old Research and Development engineer with the pessimism appropriate to the trade, I am certain that most of the hardware described in the High Frontier plan will undergo many changes before it is installed; that is the way R & D always works. But I am equally certain that the problems can be solved.

  The first stages of High Frontier, point defense of our missile silos, we could start building later this afternoon; it involves nothing but well-known techniques and off-the-shelf hardware. That first stage alone could save us, as it denies to an enemy a free chance to destroy us by a preemptive first strike. It forces him to think twice, three times and decide not to try it.

  But the key point is not whether this hardware will do the trick; the key lies in a change of attitude. A firm resolve to defend the United States… rather than resigning ourselves to the destruction of our beloved country. If we will so resolve, then the development of hardware is something we certainly know how to do.

  But we won’t get there by throwing up our hands and baring our necks to the executioner. God helps those who help themselves; he does not help those who won’t try.

  So let’s try!

  Robert A. Heinlein

  PROJECT HIGH FRONTIER

  by Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham USA (Ret.)

  The following statement was given by Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, USA (Ret.), at a High Frontier press conference last spring. This statement, because of its brevity, omits High Frontier’s committment to civil defense as a vital part of the program. Similarly, the space-based, solar-power system does not appear. And it does not mention the 200,000 jobs that probably would be created in the slumbering aerospace industry, nor the incalculable boost to America’s image both at home and abroad. These and other spinoffs from the program are described in High Frontier: A New National Strategy, available from High Frontier, 1010 Vermont Ave., N.W., Suite 1000, Washington, D.C. 20005, or call (202) 737-4749. The 175-page, illustrated book costs $15. [2015: offer no longer available.]

  The High Frontier concepts constitute first and foremost a change of U.S. strategy—from the bankrupt and basically immoral precepts of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), to a stable and morally defensible strategy of Assured Survival. But High Frontier is not a mere military strategy, it is a true national strategy addressing the legitimate economic and political aspirations of the nation and those of our allies as well as security needs.

  The High Frontier study set out to seek technology that would support a new strategy, and not the other way around. Fortunately, the United States—at least for the moment—has a technological lead over the Soviet Union, especially in space. This advantage has been dramatically demonstrated by the Space Shuttle, which gives us the capability of delivering men and material into space to do some of the key things High Frontier is recommending.

  High Frontier’s objective is to formulate a national strategy option that would (1) nullify, or substantially reduce, the growing threat to the United States and its allies posed by the unprecedented Soviet military buildup; (2) replace the dangerous doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction with a strategy of Assured Survival, and (3) provide both security and incentive for realizing the enormous industrial and commercial potential of space.

  We insist that this objective be met with recommendations that are militarily sound, technologically feasible, fiscally responsible and politically practical.

  The essence of the High Frontier report can be summarized as follows:

  (1) It is possible for the United States to close the window of vulnerability in two years and move from the MAD (balance of terror) strategy to an Assured Survival strategy in five or six years, while at the same time contributing greatly to U.S. economic growth.

  (2) This requires only a national commitment to do so, an end-run of bureaucratic obstacles, and a redirection (as opposed to an add-on) of available resources.

  (3) The basic military requirement is: a layered strategic defense, starting with a cheap and simple point defense (similar to a gigantic shotgun) of U.S. missile silos; then, a spaceborne capability to intercept re-entry vehicles in mid course.

  (4) The basic non-military requirement is the improvement of the space-transportation system to lower the cost-per-pound to orbit to less than $100, thus providing incentives for private industry to develop the broad spectrum of commercial opportunities in space.

  (5) These requirements can be met by technically sound, fiscally responsible and politically practical programs conceived and analyzed by Project High Frontier experts, other research institutions and private companies.

  (6) The High Frontier programs can be accomplished in remarkably short time and at low cost because the off-the-shelf technologies and system components are used to the maximum, avoiding long lead times and high costs of research and development. Political practicality is ensured by avoiding solutions demanding nuclear weaponry.

  (7) Our analysis of both military and civilian program costs to meet High Frontier requirements is about $150 billion (in constant dollars) over 10 years. Of this, about $35 billion would be defense money, the rest NASA.

  (8) We are convinced that the only way that costs can be held to these low levels and the time schedules met is through a Manhattan Project-type managerial arrangement at the top of government. Business-as-usual would add two to five years of crucial and unnecessary time to all High Frontier target dates, as well as greatly inflate the costs.

  (9) The specific systems recommended by High Frontier include:

  Global Ballistic Missile Defense System,

  SWARMJET Point Defense System,

  Advanced Shuttle System, and

  Solar Power Satellite System.

  Editor's Afterward to:

  PROJECT HIGH FRONTIER

  by Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham and Robert A. Heinlein

  Daniel O. Graham (April 13, 1925 – December 31, 1995) died in 1995, but he lived to see his Strategic Defense Initiative play a major role in ending the Cold War without nuclear conflict. At the 1986 Reykjavik summit, the Soviet head of state Mikhael Gorbachev begged U.S. President Ronald Reagan to end SDI. Reagan's price for doing so was the destruction of the Berlin Wall in addition to a few other demands. Gorbachev rejected Reagan then.

  Three years later, in 1989, the Berlin Wall came down.

  TWO POEMS

  by Jon Post

  CITY-KILLER

  Portrait of death

  a tactical target

  the blasted city

  footprints of mars

  nine million dead

  a trillion dollar loss

  Portrait of abstract beauty

  laser-carved rubble-sculpture

  crushed cars on asphalt

  and that mineral of bones & glass

  rock and vaporized steel:

  Hiroshimite

  Portrait of political process

  the top-level negotiators drunk at

  the whorehouse in Geneva

  GROUND ZERO

  Ride a burning horse to heaven

  ride a golden horse to hell

  with the horn of battle blaring

  who can hear the distant bell?

  When the sons have gone to slaughter

  who’s to keep the daughters warm?

  Ride a burning horse to heaven

  leave a headstone at the farm

  “Yes, sir, Company 11

  in the radiation zone.”

  When the sons have gone to slaughter

  who’s to keep the daughters warm?

  Ride a rocketship to heaven

  go to hell in your own home.

  Editor's Introduction to:

  DIASPORAH: A PROLOGUE

  by W.R. Yates

  “When they go down, it shall be to the dust of the earth. And when they rise, it shall be to the stars…”

  —Megillah 16a

  In times past, editors worked closely with writers. Alas, that seldom happens now.

  John F. Carr, my long-suffering associate, reads all the submissions for these anthologies. It’s a thankless job, but it has its rewards. One was the discovery of this story.

  Mutual Assured Destruction, MAD, works only as long as it works; it does not know what to do if deterrence fails, for it envisions no defensive capabilities. A deterrent works until it is needed; then one needs defenses. General Graham told how we might construct defenses, so that mistakes need not be irrevocable. In his first published story, W. R. Yates tells what happens to those who have no defenses.

  DIASPORAH: A PROLOGUE

  by W.R. Yates

  August 12, 1997

  Somewhere in the Negev

  Av 9, 5757

  Tuesday

  6:17 A.M., Jerusalem Time

  The sign is in a gate post of blue Elat tile. The road on which it stands branches off from one of the main highways which leads from Beer Sheba to Elat. The road is narrow, but paved with grey asphalt. And the sign reads:

  The guard walked over, as Zvi pulled up to the gate. Zvi rummaged for his wallet, as the guard leaned from the booth. Zvi handed him the card and pressed his hand against a plate of glass. The card and his palm print both verified that he was indeed, Zvi Sivan. The formalities over, Zvi pointed to the sign. “When are we going to take that thing down?” he asked. “I think that the only people who still believe it are the Israelis!”

  “Be fair,” laughed the guard. “There really is a research station here.”

  Zvi shrugged. The electronic gate began to swing open. “Ad mahar,” he cried, driving through.

  Zvi’s comment was probably right. The inhabitants of New Persia had possessed spy satellites for nearly six years. Reports from the Mossaad had shown that they knew where the major Israeli missile bases were located.

  Zvi parked the white ‘87 Mercedes in a space by the administration building. Opening the trunk, he pulled out a fitted tarpaulin and began stretching it over the vehicle. “How can white fade?” someone had once jokingly asked him. But it protected the finish against the sun. The heavily waxed surface was still as bright and shiny as it was on the day that he bought it.

  With his hands on his hips, he surveyed the rows of maturing orange trees. It was somewhat odd to see so much green here. The shifting sand of the Negev still dusted the horizon with a reddish haze. If the experiments worked out right, the whole desert would bloom with purified water from the Mediterranean. Then the dust would cease to attack the eyes and block the nostrils.

  But more Israeli marks had been spent on what lay below the ground than above. The blue of the irrigation canals and the green of the shrubbery concealed Israel’s deadliest and most secret weapons. Twenty feet beneath the canals, safe within their cradles, nestled Yoshua, surface to surface, cruise missiles.

  Nobody questioned the military look of things, which surrounded the installation. The guard towers, the barbed wire, the electrified fencing, had surrounded every major Israeli installation for nearly fifty years.

  The whine of a jeep engine made Zvi turn back toward the parking lot. Zvi grinned. It was his new driver. The dark-skinned figure braked to a halt. Zvi got in next to him.

  “Where to, Adonai?” the man asked.

  “I am with Yoshua,” answered Zvi. “You can drop that ‘adonai’ business. We’re very informal around here. My name’s Captain Zvi Sivan. You can just call me Zvi. And you?”

  “Sergeant Major Ibrahim…” The other grinned. “Name’s too long to say in one breath. As long as we’re so informal here, just call me Ib.”

  Zvi felt his flesh tingle. He looked again at the other’s dark hair, skin and eyes. “You are Sephardic?” he asked.