46 In contrast with earlier indemnities, most of the Boxer indemnity was later renounced or redirected by the foreign powers to charitable enterprises within China. The United States directed a portion of its indemnity to the construction of Tsinghua University in Beijing.

  47 These strategies are recounted in compelling detail in Scott A. Boorman, The Protracted Game: A Wei-ch’i Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

  48 Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 485.

  Chapter 4: Mao’s Continuous Revolution

  1 For Mao on Qin Shihuang, see, for example, “Talks at the Beidaihe Conference: August 19, 1958,” in Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek, and Eugene Wu, eds., The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 405; “Talks at the First Zhengzhou Conference: November 10, 1958,” in MacFarquhar, Cheek, and Wu, eds., The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, 476; Tim Adams, “Behold the Mighty Qin,” The Observer (August 19, 2007); and Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, trans. Tai Hung-chao (New York: Random House, 1994), 122.

  2 André Malraux, Anti-Memoirs, trans. Terence Kilmartin (New York: Henry Holt, 1967), 373–74.

  3 “Speech at the Supreme State Conference: Excerpts, 28 January 1958,” in Stuart Schram, ed., Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed: Talks and Letters: 1956–71 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), 92–93.

  4 “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship: In Commemoration of the Twenty-eighth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China: June 30, 1949,” Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 4 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969), 412.

  5 “Sixty Points on Working Methods—A Draft Resolution from the Office of the Centre of the CPC: 19.2.1958,” in Jerome Ch’en, ed., Mao Papers: Anthology and Bibliography (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 63.

  6 Ibid., 66.

  7 “The Chinese People Have Stood Up: September 1949,” in Timothy Cheek, ed., Mao Zedong and China’s Revolutions: A Brief History with Documents (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 126.

  8 See M. Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes,” International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 56–57; “A Himalayan Rivalry: India and China,” The Economist 396, no. 8696 (August 21, 2010), 17–20.

  9 Zhang Baijia, “Zhou Enlai—The Shaper and Founder of China’s Diplomacy,” in Michael H. Hunt and Niu Jun, eds., Toward a History of Chinese Communist Foreign Relations, 1920s–1960s: Personalities and Interpretive Approaches (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Asia Program, 1992), 77.

  10 Charles Hill, Grand Strategies: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 2.

  11 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, July 10, 1971, 12:10–6 p.m.,” in Steven E. Phillips, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 17, China 1969–1972, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 404. Zhou Enlai recited these lines during one of our first meetings in Beijing in July 1971.

  12 John W. Garver, “China’s Decision for War with India in 1962,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 107.

  13 Li, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, 83.

  14 “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People: February 27, 1957,” Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), 417.

  15 Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution (New York: Random House, 1972), 217.

  16 Lin Piao [Lin Biao], Long Live the Victory of People’s War! (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 38 (originally published September 3, 1965, in the Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily]).

  17 Kuisong Yang and Yafeng Xia, “Vacillating Between Revolution and Détente: Mao’s Changing Psyche and Policy Toward the United States, 1969–1976,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 2 (April 2010).

  18 Chen Jian and David L. Wilson, eds., “All Under the Heaven Is Great Chaos: Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968–69,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 11 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Winter 1998), 161.

  19 Michel Oksenberg, “The Political Leader,” in Dick Wilson, ed., Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 90.

  20 Stuart Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 23.

  21 “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party: December 1939,” Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2, 306.

  22 John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History, 2nd enlarged edition (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), 395.

  23 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, Feb. 21, 1972, 2:50–3:55 pm.,” FRUS 17, 678.

  24 “The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains,” Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 3, 272.

  Chapter 5: Triangular Diplomacy and the Korean War

  1 “Conversation Between I. V. Stalin and Mao Zedong: Moscow, December 16, 1949,” Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), fond 45, opis 1, delo 329, listy 9–17, trans. Danny Rozas, from Cold War International History Project: Virtual Archive, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, accessed at www.cwihp.org.

  2 Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed., Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 240.

  3 “Conversation Between I. V. Stalin and Mao Zedong,” www.cwihp.org.

  4 Ibid.

  5 Ibid.

  6 Ibid.

  7 See Chapter 6, “China Confronts Both Superpowers,” page 170.

  8 “Appendix D to Part II—China: The Military Situation in China and Proposed Military Aid,” in The China White Paper: August 1949, vol. 2 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 814.

  9 “Letter of Transmittal: Washington, July 30, 1949,” in The China White Paper: August 1949, vol. 1 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), xvi.

  10 Dean Acheson, “Crisis in Asia—An Examination of U.S. Policy,” Department of State Bulletin (January 23, 1950), 113.

  11 Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 98.

  12 Acheson, “Crisis in Asia—An Examination of U.S. Policy,” 115.

  13 Ibid.

  14 Ibid., 118.

  15 The results of postwar Sino-Soviet negotiations still rankled four decades later. In 1989, Deng Xiaoping urged President George H. W. Bush to “look at the map to see what happened after the Soviet Union severed Outer Mongolia from China. What kind of strategic situation did we find ourselves in? Those over fifty in China remember that the shape of China was like a maple leaf. Now, if you look at a map, you see a huge chunk of the north cut away.” George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 95–96. Deng’s reference to China’s strategic situation must be understood also in light of the significant Soviet military presence in Mongolia, which began during the Sino-Soviet split and lasted throughout the Cold War.

  16 Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, 103.

  17 Stuart Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 153.

  18 “Conversation Between I. V. Stalin and Mao Zedong,” at www.cwihp.org.

  19 Soviet forces had initially advanced further south, past the 38th parallel, but heeded a call from Washington to return north and divide the peninsula roughly halfway.

  20 Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 87–88 (citing author interview with Shi Zhe).

  21 Kathryn Weathersby, “‘Should We Fear This?’: Stalin and the Danger of War with America,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series, working paper no. 39 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, July 2002), 9–11.

  22 “M’Arthur Pledges Defense of Japan,” New York Times (March 2, 1949), from New York Times Historical Archives.

  23 Acheson, “Crisis in Asia—An Examination of U.S. Policy,” 116.

  24 Ibid.

  25 Weathersby, “‘Should We Fear This?’” 11.

  26 Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, 144.

  27 Ibid.

  28 Ibid., 145.

  29 Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War, 112.

  30 Shen Zhihua, Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War, trans. Neil Silver (forthcoming), Chapter 6 (originally published in Chinese as Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng [Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 2003]).

  31 Ibid.

  32 Ibid.

  33 Yang Kuisong, Introduction to ibid. (as adapted from Yang Kuisong, “Sidalin Weishenma zhichi Chaoxian zhanzheng—du Shen Zhihua zhu ‘Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng’” [“Why Did Stalin Support the Korean War—On Reading Shen Zhihua’s ‘Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War’”], Ershiyi Shiji [Twentieth Century], February 2004).

  34 Harry S. Truman, “Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea, June 27, 1950,” no. 173, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 492.

  35 Gong Li, “Tension Across the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s: Chinese Strategy and Tactics,” in Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds., Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 144.

  36 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 376(V), “The Problem of the Independence of Korea” (October 7, 1950), accessed at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/059/74/IMG/NR005974.pdf?OpenElement.

  37 For a fascinating discussion of these principles as applied to the Ussuri River clashes, see Michael S. Gerson, The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict: Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969 (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 2010).

  38 On Mao’s war aims, see for example Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 101–7, 123–25, 132–33; and Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 91–96.

  39 Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War, 137.

  40 Shen, Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War, Chapter 7.

  41 Ibid.

  42 Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War, 143.

  43 Ibid., 143–44.

  44 Ibid., 144.

  45 Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, 164–67.

  46 Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War, 149–50.

  47 Ibid., 150.

  48 Ibid., 164.

  49 “Doc. 64: Zhou Enlai Talk with Indian Ambassador K. M. Panikkar, Oct. 3, 1950,” in Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, 276.

  50 Ibid., 278.

  51 Ibid. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had written to Zhou, as well as to U.S. and British representatives, regarding prospects for limiting the Korean conflict.

  52 “Letter from Fyn Si [Stalin] to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov): October 8, 1950,” APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 65–67 (relaying text asserted to be Stalin’s cable to Mao), from Cold War International History Project: Virtual Archive, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, accessed at www.cwihp.org.

  53 Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, 177.

  54 Ibid.

  55 Ibid.

  56 See Shen Zhihua, “The Discrepancy Between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao’s 2 October 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War: A Chinese Scholar’s Reply,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 8/9 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Winter 1996), 240.

  57 Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, 200–201, citing Hong Xuezhi and Hu Qicai, “Mourn Marshal Xu with Boundless Grief,” People’s Daily (October 16, 1990), and Yao Xu, Cong Yalujiang dao Banmendian [From the Yalu River to Panmunjom] (Beijing: People’s Press, 1985).

  58 Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners, 195–96.

  Chapter 6: China Confronts Both Superpowers

  1 “Assistant Secretary Dean Rusk addresses China Institute in America, May 18, 1951,” as reproduced in “Editorial Note,” Fredrick Aandahl, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1951, vol. 7, Korea and China: Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 1671–72.

  2 Due to differences in dialect and methods of transliteration, Quemoy is elsewhere known as “Jinmen,” “Kinmen,” or “Ch’in-men.” Matsu is also known as “Mazu.”

  3 Xiamen was then known in the Western press as “Amoy”; Fuzhou was “Foochow.”

  4 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union: February 2, 1953,” no. 6, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 17.

  5 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2005), 131.

  6 Robert L. Suettinger, “U.S. ‘Management’ of Three Taiwan Strait ‘Crises,’” in Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng with Danielle F. S. Cohen, eds., Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 254.

  7 Ibid., 255.

  8 “The Chinese People Cannot Be Cowed by the Atom Bomb: January 28th, 1955 (Main points of conversation with Ambassador Carl-Johan [Cay] Sundstrom, the first Finnish envoy to China, upon presentation of his credentials in Beijing),” Mao Tse-tung: Selected Works, vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), 152–53.

  9 “Text of the Joint Resolution on the Defense of Formosa: February 7, 1955,” Department of State Bulletin, vol. 32, no. 815 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 213.

  10 “Editorial Note,” in John P. Glennon, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), vol. 19, National Security Policy, 1955–1957 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 61.

  11 Suettinger, “U.S. ‘Management’ of Three Taiwan Strait ‘Crises,’” 258.

  12 Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed., Khrushchev Remembers : The Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 263.

  13 “Memorandum of Conversation of N. S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, Beijing: 2 October 1959,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 12/13 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Fall/ Winter 2001), 264.

  14 Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (New York: Random House, 2005), 389–90.

  15 Zhang Baijia and Jia Qingguo, “Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber, and Diplomatic Probe in Confrontation: Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks Seen from the Chinese Perspective,” in Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds., Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 185.

  16 Steven Goldstein, “Dialogue of the Deaf? The Sino-American Ambassadorial-Level Talks, 1955–1970,” in Ross and Jiang, eds., Re-examining the Cold War, 200. For a compelling history of the talks making use of both Chinese and American sources, see Yafeng Xia, Negotiating with the Enemy: U. S.-China Talks During the Cold War, 1949–1972 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).

  17 “Text of Rusk’s Statement to House Panel on U.S. Policy Toward Communist China,” New York Times (April 17, 1966), accessed at ProQuest Historical Newspapers (1851–2007).

  18 Ibid.

  19 Talbott, trans. and ed., Khrushchev Remembers, 249.

  20 Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 38.

  21 The October Revolution refers to the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917.

  22 Stuart Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 113.

  23 Ibid., 149.

  24 Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, 50, citing author examination of 1956 Chinese “Internal Reference Reports” and Wu Lengxi, Shinian lunzhan, 1956–1966: ZhongSu guanxi huiyilu [Ten Years of Debate, 1956–1966: Recollections of Sino-Soviet Relations] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1999), (memoirs of the former head of China’s official Xinhua news agency).

  25 Ibid., 62–63.

  26 Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, trans. Tai Hung-chao (New York: Random House, 1994), 261–62.