62 “Message from the Premier of the People’s Republic of China Chou En-lai to President Nixon, Beijing, May 29, 1971,” FRUS 17, 332.

  Chapter 9: Resumption of Relations: First Encounters with Mao and Zhou

  1 Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary, trans. Peter Rand and Lawrence R. Sullivan (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 162.

  2 “Answers to the Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci: April 21 and 23, 1980,” in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1982), vol. 2, trans. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), 326–27.

  3 Gao Wenqian’s Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary offers a complex and at many points admiring portrait of Zhou. It ultimately adopts a different conclusion than Deng about Zhou’s participation in Mao’s domestic upheavals. A recent work on the Cultural Revolution by Hu Angang, Mao Zedong yu wenge [Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution] (Hong Kong: Da Feng Chubanshe, 2008), passes a somewhat harsher verdict on Zhou’s role in this period. For an English-language discussion, see Yafeng Xia, moderator, H-Diplo Roundtable Review 11, no. 43 (October 6, 2010), http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XI-43.pdf

  4 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, July 9, 1971, 4:35–11:20 p.m.,” in Steven E. Phillips, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 17, China 1969–1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 363.

  5 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, October 21, 1971, 10:30 a.m.–1:45 p.m.,” FRUS 17, 504. The original American records of these conversations list the name “Zhou” using the then-prevalent Wade-Giles transliteration “Chou.” To avoid frequent shifts in spelling between the present volume’s main text and the quoted conversations, in passages excerpted from American transcripts the names of Chinese interlocutors, as well as Chinese-language words originally spoken by Chinese parties, have been rendered using pinyin spellings.

  6 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 17–18, 1973, 11:30 p.m.–1:20 a.m.,” in David P. Nickles, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 18, China 1973–1976 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 124.

  7 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, July 9, 1971, 4:35–11:20 p.m.,” FRUS 17, 367.

  8 Ibid., 390.

  9 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, July 10, 1971, 12:10–6:00 p.m.,” FRUS 17, 400.

  10 Shortly after my July 1971 visit, Zhou flew to Hanoi to brief North Vietnamese leaders on China’s new diplomatic posture. By most accounts, these talks did not proceed smoothly; nor did Zhou’s subsequent discussions with Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, the implacable shadow foreign minister of the Hanoi front “Provisional Revolutionary Government” of South Vietnam. See Chen Jian, “China, Vietnam and Sino-American Rapprochement,” in Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge, eds., The Third Indochina War: Conflict Between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972–1979 (London: Routledge, 2006), 53–54; and Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 196–97.

  11 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, July 9, 1971, 4:35–11:20 p.m.,” FRUS 17, 367–68.

  12 Ibid., 367.

  13 Ibid.

  14 Ibid., 369.

  15 “Memorandum of Conversation: Shanghai, February 28, 1972, 8:30–9:30 a.m.,” FRUS 17, 823.

  16 A partial record of this luncheon discussion is available in FRUS 17, 416.

  17 In the years since, Fujian has become a center of cross-Strait trade and tourism links, including via Quemoy and Matsu.

  18 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, July 10, 1971, 12:10–6:00 p.m.,” FRUS 17, 403–4.

  19 Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 267.

  20 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, July 10, 1971, 12:10–6:00 p.m.,” FRUS 17, 430–31.

  21 Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2007), 22.

  22 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 21, 1972, 2:50–3:55 p.m.,” FRUS 17, 681.

  23 Ibid., 678–79.

  24 Ibid., 681.

  25 Ibid., 680.

  26 Ibid., 681–82.

  27 Edward (Ted) Heath, British Prime Minister from 1970 to 1974. Heath would later visit Beijing and meet with Mao in 1974 and 1975.

  28 Charles de Gaulle, French resistance leader and President from 1959 to 1969. Paris had recognized the People’s Republic of China in 1964.

  29 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 21, 1972, 2:50–3:55 p.m.,” FRUS 17, 679–80.

  30 Ibid., 684.

  31 Ibid., 683.

  32 Ibid.

  33 “Conversation Between President Nixon and the Ambassador to the Republic of China (McConaughy): Washington, June 30, 1971, 12:18–12:35 p.m.,” FRUS 17, 349.

  34 Ibid., 351–52.

  35 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 21, 1972, 5:58–6:55 p.m.,” FRUS 17, 688.

  36 Ibid., 689.

  37 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 22, 1972, 2:10–6:00 p.m.,” FRUS 17, 700.

  38 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 24, 1972, 5:15–8:05 p.m.,” FRUS 17, 770.

  39 “Memorandum of Conversation: Washington, February 14, 1972, 4:09–6:19 p.m.,” FRUS 17, 666.

  40 See, for example, Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai, 151–53, 194–200.

  41 See Kuisong Yang and Yafeng Xia, “Vacillating Between Revolution and Détente: Mao’s Changing Psyche and Policy Toward the United States, 1969–1976,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 2 (April 2010): 407.

  42 “Joint Statement Following Discussions with Leaders of the People’s Republic of China: Shanghai, February 27, 1972,” FRUS 17, 812–16.

  43 Ibid., 814.

  44 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 22, 1972, 2:10–6:00 p.m.,” FRUS 17, 697.

  45 “Joint Statement Following Discussions with Leaders of the People’s Republic of China: Shanghai, February 27, 1972,” FRUS 17, 815.

  46 CCP Central Committee, “Notice on the Joint Sino-American Communiqué, March 7, 1972,” as translated and quoted in Yang and Xia, “Vacillating Between Revolution and Détente,” 395.

  Chapter 10: The Quasi-Alliance: Conversations with Mao

  1 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 17–18, 1973, 11:30 p.m.–1:20 a.m.,” in David P. Nickles, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 18, China 1973–1976 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 124.

  2 Ibid., 124–25.

  3 Ibid., 381.

  4 Ibid., 387–88.

  5 George Kennan’s 1946 “Long Telegram” from Moscow and his nominally anonymous 1947 Foreign Affairs article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” argued that the Soviet Union was driven by ideology to implacable hostility to the United States and the West, and that Soviet-led Communism would expand wherever not met by a resolute response. Though Kennan posited that Soviet pressure could be “contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points,” his theory of containment was not primarily a military doctrine; it placed significant weight on the use of diplomatic pressure and the power of internal political and social reform in the non-Communist world as a bulwark against Soviet expansion.

  6 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, November 12, 1973, 5:40–8:25 p.m.,” FRUS 18, 385.

  7 Ibid., 389.

  8 The People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, then a separate state aligned with Moscow.

  9 “Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon: Washington, November 1971,” in Steven E. Phillips, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 17, China 1969–1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 548.

  10 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, November 12, 1973, 5:40–8:25 p.m.,” FRUS 18, 391.

  11 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 17–18, 1973, 11:30 p.m.–1:20 a.m.,” FRUS 18, 125.

  12 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, November 12, 1973, 5:40–8:25 p.m.,” FRUS 18, 131. According to some accounts, Mao’s list of the countries in the horizontal line included China. The word was not translated and did not appear in the American transcript of the conversation. China’s inclusion was at least implied by the presence of countries to China’s east and west.

  13 Kuisong Yang and Yafeng Xia, “Vacillating Between Revolution and Détente: Mao’s Changing Psyche and Policy Toward the United States, 1969–1976,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 2 (April 2010): 408.

  14 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 17–18, 1973, 11:30 p.m.–1:20 a.m.,” FRUS 18, 134.

  15 Ibid., 136.

  16 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, October 21, 1975, 6:25–8:05 p.m.,” FRUS 18, 794.

  17 Yang and Xia, “Vacillating Between Revolution and Détente,” 413.

  18 Ibid., 414.

  19 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 15, 1973, 5:57–9:30 p.m.,” FRUS 18, 38.

  20 Ibid., 32.

  21 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 17–18, 1973, 11:30 p.m.–1:20 a.m.,” FRUS 18, 137.

  22 See Chapter 13, “‘Touching the Tiger’s Buttocks’: The Third Vietnam War,” and Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 16–18, 339–67.

  23 The Chinese analysis proved less accurate than usual for the long term, since the Helsinki Accords, signed in 1975, are now generally recognized as having been a major element in weakening Soviet control of Eastern Europe.

  Chapter 11: The End of the Mao Era

  1 Roderick MacFarquhar, “The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969–1982,” in Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 278–81, 299–301. In quest of finding a successor among China’s “pure” young generation, Mao elevated the thirty-seven-year-old Wang Hongwen, previously distinguished only as a provincial-level leftist organizer, to the third-ranking position in the Communist Party hierarchy. His meteoric rise baffled many observers. Closely aligned with Jiang Qing, Wang never achieved an independent political identity or authority commensurate with his formal position. He fell with the rest of the Gang of Four in October 1976.

  2 This comparison is elaborated, among other places, in David Shambaugh, “Introduction: Assessing Deng Xiaoping’s Legacy” and Lucian W. Pye, “An Introductory Profile: Deng Xiaoping and China’s Political Culture,” in David Shambaugh, ed., Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese Statesman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 1–2, 14.

  3 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, November 14, 1973, 7:35–8:25 a.m.,” in David P. Nickles, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 18, China 1973–1976 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 430.

  4 “Memorandum from Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, January 25, 1974,” FRUS 18, 455.

  5 Gao Wenqian, Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary, trans. Peter Rand and Lawrence R. Sullivan (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 246.

  6 Kuisong Yang and Yafeng Xia, “Vacillating Between Revolution and Détente: Mao’s Changing Psyche and Policy Toward the United States, 1969–1976,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 2 (April 2010): 414. The proceedings of this meeting have not been published. The quotation draws on an unpublished memoir by the senior Chinese diplomat Wang Youping, who was privy to Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua’s summary of the Politburo meeting.

  7 Chou Enlai, “Report on the Work of the Government: January 13, 1975,” Peking Review 4 (January 24, 1975), 21–23.

  8 Ibid, 23.

  9 “Speech by Chairman of the Delegation of the People’s Republic of China, Teng Hsiao-Ping, at the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly: April 10, 1974” (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1974).

  10 Ibid., 5.

  11 Ibid., 6.

  12 Ibid., 8.

  13 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, October 21, 1975, 6:25–8:05 p.m.,” FRUS 18, 788–89.

  14 Ibid., 788.

  15 George H. W. Bush, Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing; Winston Lord, Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff; and myself.

  16 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, October 21, 1975, 6:25–8:05 p.m.,” FRUS 18, 789–90.

  17 Ibid., 789.

  18 Ibid., 793.

  19 Ibid. In 1940, Britain withdrew its expeditionary force after the Battle of France.

  20 Ibid., 794.

  21 Ibid.

  22 Ibid., 791.

  23 Ibid., 792.

  24 Ibid.

  25 Ibid., 790.

  26 Ibid., 791.

  27 Ibid.

  28 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, October 25, 1975, 9:30 a.m.,” FRUS 18, 832.

  29 Ibid.

  30 “Paper Prepared by the Director of Policy Planning Staff (Lord), Washington, undated,” FRUS 18, 831.

  31 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, December 2, 1975, 4:10–6:00 p.m.,” FRUS 18, 858.

  32 Ibid., 859.

  33 A companion of Mao’s in Yan’an during the civil war; a former general, now ambassador in Washington.

  34 Wang Hairong and Nancy Tang.

  35 Qiao Guanhua, Foreign Minister.

  36 “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, December 2, 1975, 4:10–6:00 p.m.,” FRUS 18, 859.

  37 Ibid., 867.

  38 Some of the texts leveled harsh criticism against the excesses of Qin Shihuang and the Tang Dynasty Empress Wu Zetian, rhetorical stand-ins for Mao and Jiang Qing respectively.

  39 See Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 897.

  Chapter 12: The Indestructible Deng

  1 Richard Evans, Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China (New York: Viking, 1993), 186–87.

  2 See, for example, “The Army Needs to Be Consolidated: January 25, 1975,” Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping: 1975–1982, vol. 2, trans. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), 11–13; and “Some Problems Outstanding in the Iron and Steel Industry: May 29, 1975,” in ibid., 18–22.

  3 “The Whole Party Should Take the Overall Interest into Account and Push the Economy Forward: March 5, 1975,” in ibid., 14–17.

  4 “Priority Should Be Given to Scientific Research: September 26, 1975,” http://web.peopledaily.com.cn/english/dengxp/vol2/text/b1080.html.

  5 “The Army Needs to Be Consolidated: January 25, 1975,” in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 13.

  6 “Things Must Be Put in Order in All Fields: September 27 and October 4, 1975,” in ibid., 47.

  7 Deng Xiaoping, “Memorial Speech,” as reproduced in China Quarterly 65 (March 1976): 423.

  8 “The ‘Two Whatevers’ Do Not Accord with Marxism: May 24, 1977,” in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 51, note 1 (quoting February 1977 editorial advancing the principle); see also Roderick MacFarquhar, “The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969–1982,” in Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 312–13.

  9 MacFarquhar, “The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969–1982,” in MacFarquhar, ed., The Politics of China, 312.

  10 “Speech at the All-Army Conference on Political Work: June 2, 1978,” in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 132.

  11 “The ‘Two Whatevers’ Do Not Accord with Marxism: May 24, 1977,” in ibid., 51.

  12 “Respect Knowledge, Respect Trained Personnel: May 24, 1977,” in ibid., 53.

  13 Stanley Karnow, “Our Next Move on China,” New York Times (August 14, 1977); Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 632.

  14 See Lucian W. Pye, “An Introductory Profile: Deng Xiaoping and China’s Political Culture,” in David Shambaugh, ed., Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese Statesman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006).