6 David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 305.

  7 George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 89–90.

  8 Ibid., 97–98.

  9 Congress and the White House shared a concern that visiting students who had publicly protested in the United States would be subject to punishment on their return to China. The President had signaled that applications for visa extensions would be treated favorably, while Congress sought to grant the extensions without requiring an application.

  10 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 100.

  11 Ibid., 101.

  12 Ibid.

  13 Ibid., 102.

  14 Ibid.

  15 Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams, 302.

  16 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 105–6. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen disputes this account in his memoirs, averring that the plane was never in any danger. Qian Qichen, Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 133.

  17 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 106.

  18 Ibid.

  19 Qian, Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy, 134.

  20 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 109.

  21 Ibid., 107.

  22 Ibid.

  23 Ibid., 107–8.

  24 Ibid., 107–9.

  25 Ibid., 110.

  26 Deng had made clear that he intended to retire very shortly. He did, in fact, do so in 1992, though he continued to be regarded as an influential arbiter of policy.

  27 The five principles of peaceful coexistence were negotiated by India and China in 1954. They concerned coexistence and mutual noninterference between countries with different ideological orientations.

  28 Deng made a similar point to Richard Nixon during the latter’s October 1989 private visit to Beijing: “Please tell President Bush let’s end the past, the United States ought to take the initiative, and only the United States can take the initiative. The United States is able to take the initiative. . . . China is unable to initiate. This is because the stronger is America, the weaker is China, the injured is China. If you want China to beg, it cannot be done. If it drags on a hundred years, the Chinese people can’t beg [you] to end sanctions [against China]. . . . Whatever Chinese leader makes a mistake in this respect would surely fall, the Chinese people will not forgive him.” As quoted in Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams, 29.

  29 Some in the White House maintained that it was unnecessarily provocative to invite Fang Lizhi to attend a presidential banquet with the same Chinese authorities he was criticizing. They blamed the American Embassy in Beijing for failing to forewarn them of the impending controversy. In including Fang on the list of potential invitees, the American ambassador in Beijing, Winston Lord, had in fact flagged him as an outspoken dissident whose inclusion might provoke Chinese government consternation, but who nonetheless merited an invitation.

  30 “Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, SITREP No. 49, June 12, 0500 Local (June 11, 1989),” in Jeffrey T. Richardson and Michael L. Evans, eds., Tiananmen Square, 1989: The Declassified History, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 16 (June 1, 1999), Document 26.

  31 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 99.

  32 U.S. Embassy Beijing Cable, “China and the U.S.—A Protracted Engagement,” July 11, 1989, SECRET, in Michael L. Evans, ed., The U.S. Tiananmen Papers: New Documents Reveal U.S. Perceptions of 1989 Chinese Political Crisis, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book (June 4, 2001), Document 11.

  33 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 101–2.

  34 Deng’s reference was to Winston Lord.

  35 Qian, Ten Episodes in China’s Diplomacy, 140.

  36 Bush and Scowcroft, A World Transformed, 174.

  37 Ibid., 176–77.

  38 Fang and his wife would ultimately depart China for the U.K. on an American military transport plane. They subsequently relocated to the United States, where Fang became a professor of physics at the University of Arizona.

  39 Richard Evans, Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1993), 304 (quoting Zheng Ming, Hong Kong, May 1, 1990).

  40 “Deng Initiates New Policy ‘Guiding Principle,’” FBIS-CHI-91-215; see also United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China: A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2000” (2007), 7, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/070523-china-military-powerfinal.pdf.

  41 “Deng Initiates New Policy ‘Guiding Principle,’” FBIS-CHI-91-215.

  Chapter 16: What Kind of Reform? Deng’s Southern Tour

  1 Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 334.

  2 “Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai: January 18–February 21, 1992,” Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, trans., The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), 359.

  3 Ibid., 360.

  4 Ibid., 361.

  5 Ibid., 362–63.

  6 Ibid, 364–65.

  7 Ibid., 366.

  8 David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), xi.

  9 “Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai: January 18—February 21, 1992,” Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 370.

  10 Ibid., 369.

  Chapter 17: A Roller Coaster Ride Toward Another Reconciliation: The Jiang Zemin Era

  1 See David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 293, 308.

  2 State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “China: Aftermath of the Crisis” (July 27, 1989), 17, in Jeffrey T. Richardson and Michael L. Evans, eds., “Tiananmen Square, 1989: The Declassified History,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 16 (June 1, 1999), Document 36.

  3 Steven Mufson, “China’s Economic ‘Boss’: Zhu Rongji to Take Over as Premier,” Washington Post (March 5, 1998), A1.

  4 September 14, 1992, statement, as quoted in A. M. Rosenthal, “On My Mind: Here We Go Again,” New York Times (April 9, 1993); on divergent Chinese and Western interpretations of this statement, see also Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams, 32.

  5 “Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World,” President Clinton Address to the United Nations General Assembly, New York City, September 27, 1993, from Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 39 (September 27, 1993).

  6 Robert Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2003), 161.

  7 Deng Xiaoping had given a speech in November 1989 calling on China to “Adhere to Socialism and Prevent Peaceful Evolution toward Capitalism.” Mao had warned repeatedly against “peaceful evolution” as well. See “Mao Zedong and Dulles’s ‘Peaceful Evolution’ Strategy: Revelations from Bo Yibo’s Memoirs,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6/7 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Winter 1996/1997), 228.

  8 Reflecting this fact, “Most Favored Nation” has since been technically renamed “Permanent Normal Trade Relations,” although the “MFN” label remains in use.

  9 Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” address at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., September 21, 1993, from Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 39 (September 27, 1993).

  10 Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen, 165.

  11 William J. Clinton, “Statement on Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status for China” (May 28, 1993), Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), book 1, 770–71.

  12 Ibid., 770–72.

  13 Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement.”

  14 Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen, 168–71.

  15 Warren Christopher, Chances of a Lifetime (New York: Scribner, 2001), 237.

  16 Ibid.

  17 Ibid., 238.

  18 Ibid., 238–39.

  19 See, for example, Deng Xiaoping, “An Idea for the Peaceful Reunification of the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan: June 26, 1983,” Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 40–42.

  20 John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 15; James Carman, “Lee Teng-Hui: A Man of the Country,” Cornell Magazine (June 1995), accessed at http://www.news.cornell.edu/campus/Lee/Cornell_Magazine_Profile.html.

  21 Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams, 101.

  22 William J. Clinton, “Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters Following Discussions with President Jiang Zemin of China in Seattle: November 19, 1993,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 2022–25.

  23 Garver, Face Off, 92–97; Robert Suettinger, “U.S. ‘Management’ of Three Taiwan Strait ‘Crises,’” in Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng with Danielle F. S. Cohen, eds., Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 278.

  24 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary (New York: Hyperion, 2003), 546.

  25 Robert Lawrence Kuhn, The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin (New York: Crown Publishers, 2004), 2.

  26 Albright, Madam Secretary, 531.

  27 Christopher Marsh, Unparalleled Reforms (New York: Lexington, 2005), 72.

  28 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007), 142–43.

  29 Michael P. Riccards, The Presidency and the Middle Kingdom: China, the United States, and Executive Leadership (New York: Lexington Books, 2000), 12.

  30 Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams, Appendix A, 379–80.

  31 Zhu Rongji, “Speech and Q&A at the Advanced Seminar on China’s Economic Development in the Twenty-first Century” (September 22, 1997), in Zhu Rongji’s Answers to Journalists’ Questions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) (forthcoming), Chapter 5.

  Chapter 18: The New Millennium

  1 Richard Daniel Ewing, “Hu Jintao: The Making of a Chinese General Secretary,” China Quarterly 173 (March 2003): 19.

  2 Ibid., 21–22.

  3 Xiaokang, now a widely used official policy term, is a 2,500-year-old Confucian phrase suggesting a moderately well-off population with a modest amount of disposable income. See “Confucius and the Party Line,” The Economist (May 22, 2003); “Confucius Makes a Comeback,” The Economist (May 17, 2007).

  4 “Rectification of Statues,” The Economist (January 20, 2011).

  5 George W. Bush, “Remarks Following Discussions with Premier Wen Jiabao and an Exchange with Reporters: December 9, 2003,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 1701.

  6 David Barboza, “Chinese Leader Fields Executives’ Questions,” New York Times (September 22, 2010).

  7 Cui Changfa and Xu Mingshan, eds., Gaoceng Jiangtan [Top-leaders’ Rostrums] (Beijing: Hongqi Chubanshe, 2007), 165–82, as cited in Masuda Masayuki, “China’s Search for a New Foreign Policy Frontier: Concept and Practice of ‘Harmonious World,’” 62, in Masafumi Iida, ed., China’s Shift: Global Strategy of the Rising Power (Tokyo: NIDS Joint Research Series, 2009).

  8 Wen Jiabao, “A Number of Issues Regarding the Historic Tasks in the Initial Stage of Socialism and China’s Foreign Policy,” Xinhua (February 26, 2007), as cited in Masuda, “China’s Search for a New Foreign Policy Frontier: Concept and Practice of ‘Harmonious World,’” 62–63.

  9 David Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China,” The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 8.

  10 Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (September/October 2005): 22.

  11 Hu Jintao, “Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity,” speech at the United Nations Summit (New York, September 15, 2005).

  12 The number eight is regarded as auspicious in Chinese numerology. It is a near homonym for the word “to prosper” in some Chinese dialects.

  13 Nathan Gardels, “Post-Olympic Powershift: The Return of the Middle Kingdom in a Post-American World,” New Perspectives Quarterly 25, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 7–8.

  14 “Di shi yi ci zhuwaishi jie huiyi zhao kai, Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao jianghua” [“Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao speak at the 11th meeting of overseas envoys”], website of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, accessed at http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2009-07/20/content_1370171.html.

  15 Wang Xiaodong, “Gai you xifang zhengshi zhongguo ‘bu gaoxing’ le” [“It is now up to the West to face squarely that China is unhappy”], in Song Xiaojun, Wang Xiaodong, Huang Jisu, Song Qiang, and Liu Yang, Zhongguo bu gaoxing: da shidai, da mubiao ji women de neiyou waihuan [China Is Unhappy: The Great Era, the Grand Goal, and Our Internal Anxieties and External Challenges] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 2009), 39.

  16 Song Xiaojun, “Meiguo bu shi zhilaohu, shi ‘lao huanggua shua lü qi’” [“America is not a paper tiger, it’s an ‘old cucumber painted green’”] in Song, Wang, et al., Zhongguo bu gaoxing, 85.

  17 A classical Chinese expression signifying a postconflict return to peace with no expectation of recommencing hostilities.

  18 Song, “Meiguo bu shi zhilaohu,” 86.

  19 Ibid., 92.

  20 Ibid.

  21 Liu Mingfu, Zhongguo meng: hou meiguo shidai de daguo siwei yu zhanlüe dingwei [China Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-American Era] (Beijing: Zhongguo Youyi Chuban Gongsi, 2010).

  22 Ibid., 69–73, 103–17.

  23 Ibid., 124.

  24 Ibid., 256–62.

  25 Some analyses posit that while the sentiments expressed in these books are real and may be common in much of the Chinese military establishment, they partly reflect a profit motive: provocative books sell well in any country, and nationalist tracts such as China Is Unhappy and China Dream are published by private publishing companies. See Phillip C. Saunders, “Will China’s Dream Turn into America’s Nightmare?” China Brief 10, no. 7 (Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, April 1, 2010): 10–11.

  26 Dai Bingguo, “Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development” (Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, December 6, 2010).

  27 Ibid.

  28 Ibid.

  29 Ibid.

  30 Ibid.

  31 Ibid.

  32 Ibid.

  33 Hu Jintao, “Speech at the Meeting Marking the 30th Anniversary of Reform and Opening Up” (December 18, 2008), accessed at http://www.bjreview.com.cn/Key_Document_Translation/2009-04/27/content_194200.htm.

  34 Dai, “Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development.”

  35 Ibid.

  Epilogue: Does History Repeat Itself? The Crowe Memorandum

  1 Crowe knew the issue from both sides. Born in Leipzig to a British diplomat father and a German mother, he had moved to England only at the age of seventeen. His wife was of German origin, and even as a loyal servant of the Crown, Crowe retained a cultural and familial connection to the European continent. Michael L. Dockrill and Brian J. C. McKercher, Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890–1951 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 27.

  2 Eyre Crowe, “Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany” (Foreign Office, January 1, 1907), in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. 3: The Testing of the Entente (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1928), 406.

  3 Ibid., 417.

  4 Ibid., 416.

  5 Ibid., 417.

  6 Ibid., 407.

  7 Ibid.

  8 Phillip C. Saunders, “Will China’s Dream Turn into America’s Nightmare?” China Brief 10, no. 7 (Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, April 1, 2010): 10 (quoting Liu Mingfu Global Times article).