Drake said, “We followed her from police headquarters. I don’t know what she’d been doing there.”

  “And where did you follow her to?” Mason asked.

  “To the Milpas Apartments on Canyon Drive, to apartment three-fourteen.”

  “And did you investigate to see how she was known in that place, or under what name she was going?”

  “I did.”

  “And what name was it?”

  “Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial,” Sampson said. “Also, it’s hearsay. It makes no difference what name she was going under.”

  “Sustained,” Judge Barnes ruled.

  Mason frowned, as though in annoyance. Mason said, “I’ll try and get at it this way, Mr. Drake. Was there a person living in that apartment house known as Pete Chennery?”

  “Yes, sir.”

  “In what apartment did he live?”

  “In apartment three-fourteen,” Drake said, before Sampson could object.

  Sampson said, “Your Honor, I object to this. I move to strike out the answer until I have an opportunity to interpose an objection. I object on the ground that it is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, that it has nothing whatever to do with the present case.”

  “I think the objection is well taken,” Judge Barnes said, “unless you can show some theory on which it would be admissible.”

  Mason said irritably, “If the district attorney’s office will keep from throwing legal monkey wrenches into the machinery, I expect to show that Pete Chennery murdered Austin Cullens. I expect to show it by proof which …”

  “That will do, Mr. Mason,” Judge Barnes interrupted. “You have no call to refer to Counsel as throwing legal monkey wrenches into the machinery. Counsel has interposed objections which, so far, the Court has deemed to be well taken. The Court has asked you only to explain why you consider this evidence relevant.”

  “I will connect it up,” Mason said. “I will connect it up by proving that this defendant couldn’t have killed Austin Cullens because Pete Chennery did.”

  Judge Barnes said, “This is a very unusual procedure.”

  “It’s a very unusual case,” Mason said.

  “For the moment, I will overrule the objection,” Judge Barnes said, “but will strike out so much of the answer as relating to the apartment where Pete Chennery lived. There is no evidence connecting Pete Chennery with Ione Bedford.”

  “There is no evidence,” Mason said, “because the Prosecution won’t allow us to introduce that evidence.”

  “The Prosecution has nothing to do with it,” Judge Barnes said. “It is the Court which is controlling the order of proof. you will proceed, Mr. Mason, and confine your remarks to the Court.”

  “Very well,” Mason said. “I will ask you, Mr. Drake, whether or not you took, or caused to be taken under your supervision, photographs of latent finger-prints in the house in which Austin Cullens lived.”

  “I did.”

  “I will ask you whether you secured photographs of the finger-prints of Pete Chennery.”

  Drake said, “I entered the apartment where he had been living. I developed latent finger-prints. I found there the fingerprints of a man which I assume were those of Pete Chennery because they were the only finger-prints which I found in any number in the apartment occupied by Pete Chennery.”

  “Who was with you when you took these prints, Mr. Drake?”

  “Sergeant Holcomb.”

  “From those finger-prints, did you ascertain whether Pete Chennery had a criminal record?” Mason asked.

  “I object to that,” Sampson said, “as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial on the further ground that no proper foundation has been laid, and as assuming a fact not in evidence. The witness himself has admitted that he doesn’t know that the finger-prints were those of Pete Chennery.”

  Mason glanced up inquiringly at Judge Barnes.

  Judge Barnes said, “The objection is sustained. After all, the question before the Court in this case is whether this defendant killed Austin Cullens. Within reasonable limitations, any evidence tending to prove that Cullens met his death at the hands of some other person is, of course, proper, but there must be limits to that, and the evidence must be adduced in proper form.”

  “Of course, Your Honor,” Mason pointed out urbanely, “I am but a private practicing attorney. This man is a private detective. We, neither of us, have available the facilities which are at the command of the district attorney’s office for making complete investigations.”

  “I fully understand that,” Judge Barnes said, “but that is something which doesn’t concern this Court. This Court is only concerned with having evidence pertinent, proper, and admissible. What this witness may have assumed to be the case isn’t binding on the Prosecution.”

  Mason said, “Well, perhaps I can get at it in another way. I’ll withdraw this witness temporarily and ask that Sergeant Holcomb be called as a witness for the Defense.”

  Sergeant Holcomb came belligerently forward, his manner all too plainly indicating that he certainly didn’t intend to be of any assistance to the Defense.

  “I will ask you,” Mason said, “if you have located the owner of the jewelry which was found in the bag which it is claimed belonged to the defendant in this case.”

  “Objected to,” Sampson said, “as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. It makes no difference who owned the jewelry.”

  “But,” Mason said, “I thought it was the contention of the Prosecution that this jewelry had been taken from a chamois-skin belt found on the body of the decedent.”

  “There is no such contention,” Sampson said. “The photograph of the body shows the position of the chamois-skin belt and its condition, but beyond a necessary inference, we have made no claim that …”

  “I think the necessary inference is there,” Judge Barnes ruled. “The witness sought to make that inference even more pointed. I’m going to permit this question to be answered. Have you ascertained the owner of that jewelry, Sergeant Holcomb?”

  “We have,” Sergeant Holcomb said sullenly.

  “That jewelry had been stolen?” Mason asked.

  “Yes.”

  “From someone in New Orleans?”

  “That’s right.”

  “And an insurance company had offered a reward for the recovery of it?”

  “Yes,” Sergeant Holcomb said shortly.

  “And you, as one of the discoverers, have claimed a part of that reward?”

  “Yes.”

  “How much of the reward?”

  “Objection to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial,” Sampson said. “It doesn’t go to show the interest or bias of the witness—in this case in the least.”

  “Sustained,” Judge Barnes ruled.

  Once more, Mason appeared nettled. “When you examined the premises, Sergeant,” he said, “immediately following the discovery of Mr. Cullens’ body, you found that a fuse had been blown out.”

  “That’s right.”

  “And did you ascertain what had caused the blowing out of that fuse?”

  “Yes. An electric light globe had been unscrewed from one of the sockets. A copper penny had been inserted in the socket, and then the globe had been screwed back in. As soon as the electric switch was turned on, the fuse blew out.”

  “Now then,” Mason asked, “did you test that copper penny for latent finger-prints?”

  “Objected to as incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial,” Sampson said.

  Judge Barnes frowned, then looked down at Sampson. “Is it,” he asked, “the position of the Prosecutor’s office that the defendant is not to have the advantage of any evidence uncovered by the police which may have indicated the crime was committed by some other person?”

  Sampson said, “If the Court please, it’s the position of the Prosecutor’s office that we don’t want the issues clouded. There is absolutely no evidence in the case as it now stands tending to show that any person other than the defendant entered that house.”

  “But, as I understand it,” Judge Barnes said, “it was your position at the time of your opening statement that robbery had been a motive and …”

  “Sometimes,” Sampson said, “if the Court will pardon the interruption, a prosecutor deems it necessary to change his trial tactics in order to meet varying conditions which develop during the trial.”

  “I understand that,” Judge Barnes said, “but this evidence is clearly proper. It would have even been proper on cross-examination. This witness is now called by the Defense. The objection will be overruled. Did you develop latent fingerprints on that coin, Sergeant Holcomb?”

  Sergeant Holcomb said, “Yes.”

  “Did you,” Mason asked, “take finger-prints of the defendant in this case?”

  “Yes.”

  “Did you compare the finger-prints of the defendant with the finger-prints on the copper coin?”

  Sergeant Holcomb said, “She was wearing gloves. She wouldn’t have left any finger-prints.”

  “I’m not asking that,” Mason said. “I’m asking if you compared the two finger-prints.”

  “Yes.”

  “Were they the same?”

  “No.”

  “Now then, if the Court please,” Mason said, “I would like to have Sergeant Holcomb produce photographs of the fingerprints which were developed on that penny, and give the witness, Drake, an opportunity to demonstrate that these were the finger-prints of Pete Chennery, a man with a known criminal record.”

  “I object to that. I object to the statement. I object to the procedure, and I object to the manner in which this offer is made before the jury,” Sampson said. “It is an attempt to cloud the issues. The Court has already ruled that the witness, Drake, has no means of knowing whether the finger-prints which he took are those of Pete Chennery.”

  “Do I understand that the Prosecution wishes to keep the Defense from showing the identity of the person who placed that copper coin in the light socket?” Judge Barnes asked.

  “I fail to see where it has anything to do with the present case,” Sampson said. “It’s simply going to cloud the issues. Let us suppose that some person did enter the dwelling for the purpose of robbery at some time prior to the murder. That has nothing to do with this case.”

  “No,” Judge Barnes said ominously, “but suppose that person entered the dwelling at the time of the murder!”

  “In that event,” Sampson said, “it makes no difference who that person was. There is already evidence before this Court showing that the finger-prints on the copper coin were not the finger-prints of the defendant. That’s all that the defendant is entitled to show…. That is, Your Honor, I don’t want to appear in a position of blocking any legitimate proof, but from a technical standpoint, the defendant is only entitled to prove that she did not participate in the commission of a robbery or in short-circuiting those lights. Having once established that fact, the identity of the person who did tamper with the lights becomes absolutely incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial, unless it is shown that such person was acting in a conspiracy with the defendant. And the Prosecution makes no claim that such is the case.”

  Mason threw up his hands. “All right. If the Prosecution doesn’t want the jury to know who killed Austin Cullens, I’m not going to waste my time trying to do their work. The question is withdrawn. The witness is excused.”

  Sampson said, “That’s unfair. You’re just trying to razzle-dazzle the jury.”

  Mason shouted, “You’re the one who’s …”

  Judge Barnes banged with his gavel. “Gentlemen,” he said, “we will have order in the court. There will be no more such remarks. Mr. Mason, your remark was improper and uncalled for. Mr. Sampson, your accusation as to Mr. Mason’s purpose in asking questions was entirely out of order. The Court would administer a more stern admonition to you, Mr. Sampson, were it not for the fact that Mr. Mason’s remark which called forth your statement, was so obviously improper. The fact remains, gentlemen, that we are going to have no more personalities injected in the case. This is the Court’s last warning.”

  Mason sat back and said resignedly, “All right. That’s the defendant’s case.”

  “You mean you quit?” Sampson asked.

  Mason glanced up at the Court and said, “Since I must address my remarks to Your Honor, may I suggest to the Court that the Court advise Counsel for the Prosecution that when the defendant announces, ‘That’s the defendant’s case,’ it is improper for the prosecution to seek to capitalize on that by addressing remarks to Counsel. As a matter of fact, I believe the jurors will understand that the Defense has made every effort to solve this case, and that the only reason the Defense has not solved it is …”

  “Careful, Mr. Mason,” Judge Barnes frowned.

  Mason finished with a smile. “ ‘Only too obvious,’ were the words I was going to use, Your Honor.”

  Judge Barnes said, “Do you wish to argue the case, gentlemen?”

  Sampson did, and his argument sought to go just as far as a district attorney dared to go in commenting on the failure of a defendant to deny the charges which had been made against her. He brought forward the defendant’s shoe, which had been introduced in evidence, pointed to the tell-tale stain on the sole, and challenged counsel to explain how that stain got on the shoe if it did not indicate the guilt of the defendant. “Standing, as it does,” Sampson thundered, “unchallenged, undenied and uncontradicted.”

  He cited the attempt of the defendant to bring in some mythical criminal, who must have entered the house and, by implication, killed Austin Cullens, and, above all, excoriated Mason for his attempt to becloud the issues by confusing Sergeant Holcomb and mixing up the bullets.

  When he had finished, Mason approached the rail, to stand in front of the jurors with a smile. “Ladies and gentlemen,” he said, “the Court will instruct you that in order to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must not only be consistent with the guilt of the defendant, but inconsistent with every other reasonable hypothesis. In the event there is any reasonable hypothesis, other than that of guilt, on which the circumstantial evidence can be explained, then it becomes your duty to acquit the defendant.

  “This is a case in which the Prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence. As far as the gun is concerned, that evidence has proven a boomerang. The evidence proves conclusively that the gun found in the defendant’s handbag—and I will admit to you, ladies and gentlemen, that it is the defendant’s handbag, not that she has told me so, because her mind is a blank as to what transpired, but because I think it’s a fair inference from the evidence that it was her handbag—that gun did not kill Austin Cullens. But that gun did kill George Trent. There are only two bullets in the case. If the bullet from the Breel gun didn’t kill Cullens, then it must have killed George Trent. Now then, on the evening Cullens was killed, there was only one shot fired from this gun. That one shot was fired by Austin Cullens at someone who was in the room with him. That shot lodged in the back of a chair. Cullens carried that revolver in his right hip pocket—which was the reason the coroner’s examination disclosed nothing in that pocket.

  “Now then, gentlemen, what more reasonable than to suppose that Mrs. Breel guessed that her brother was dead, and strongly suspected that Austin Cullens had killed him. Austin Cullens had every reason to want George Trent out of the way. There is every reasonable inference to indicate that George Trent had uncovered evidence which, when communicated to the police, would convict Cullens of a series of gem robberies. Therefore, Cullens killed Trent. In order to cover up that killing, he did various and sundry things, such as pretending that Trent had pawned gems with a gambling house. And to bolster up that claim, Cullens even went to the gambling house and put on an act, trying to establish a false motive for Trent’s death.

  “It is very evident, gentlemen, that, as in the case of Cullens, Trent couldn’t have been killed with the gun that the Prosecution claims was used in that murder. Therefore, it becomes equally evident that he must have been killed with the other gun, since there are only two guns and only two fatal bullets, one fatal bullet fired from each gun. It’s very evident that Sergeant Holcomb naturally assumed that the gun in Mrs. Breel’s handbag had killed Austin Cullens, and that the gun in Trent’s office had killed Trent. He took from his right-hand vest pocket the bullet which the autopsy surgeon had handed him as having killed Cullens, and handed it to the witness, Hogan. Hogan checked it with the guns and advised Sergeant Holcomb that that bullet had been fired by the gun found in Trent’s office.

  “What happened?” There was a moment of tense silence, while Mason waited for the point he had made to soak in. “You have seen the character of Sergeant Holcomb,” he said. “He exhibited that character very plainly on the witness stand. He thought that he had confused the bullets; that he had inadvertently transposed the bullets in his pockets, when he had in reality done nothing of the sort. In order to cover up what he fancied was his mistake, he immediately handed the other bullet to Hogan with the statement that that bullet had been the one which killed Cullens.

  “It is a little thing, ladies and gentlemen, but it is one of the important little things which become increasingly vital in a case. It is an index to the character of Sergeant Holcomb. Doubtless, he would never have sought to frame this defendant had he thought that she was innocent. But, having thought he’d made a mistake, he tried to cover that mistake, and carried his subterfuge so far as to go on the witness stand and testify to what is a manifest impossibility. Regardless of what the deputy district attorney may tell you, and in spite of Sergeant Holcomb’s testimony, it’s a physical impossibility for the bullet which killed Austin Cullens to have been fired from the Breel gun. On the other hand, it’s a physical impossibility for George Trent to have been killed by the Trent gun.

  “Now then, ladies and gentlemen, if I had been permitted to pursue my proof, I believe I could have demonstrated to you who did murder Austin Cullens. However, since I wasn’t permitted to follow that proof to its logical conclusion, I will take the facts as they now stand, and give you a reasonable hypothesis which will explain away every fact in this case. And not only is that hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the defendant, but the innocence of this defendant is the only hypothesis under which the facts can now be explained.