The secretary of state called on Monroe to “reconsider the whole subject.” The introduction would shock the country, he said, and it seemed odd coming in “a period of so deep calm and tranquility as we now enjoyed. We never were upon the whole in a state of peace so profound and secure with all foreign Nations as at this time.” Yet “[t]his Message would be a summons to arms—To arms against all Europe; and for objects of policy exclusively European, Greece and Spain.” (Adams clearly had not read Madison’s letter to Monroe of October 30th, in which the former president had recommended the United States take the positions Monroe here was taking in regard to Greece and Spain.)

  Adams pointed out to the president that his message in its present form would work a revolution in American foreign policy, which through three decades had been one of studied aloofness as virtually every country in Europe had been “alternately invading and invaded—Empires, Kingdoms, Principalities, had been overthrown, Revolutionised and counter-revolutionised; and we had looked on, safe in our distance beyond an intervening Ocean, and avowing a total forbearance to interfere.…” Here America would at least seem to be declaring her intention to participate in Europe’s broils, “and I should not be surprized if the first answer to it from Spain, and France, and even Russia, should be to break off their diplomatic intercourse with us.…” If Adams had his way, America would remain above it all as long as feasible.

  Calhoun, Adams said, interjected at this point to say that his Massachusetts colleague had it all wrong. “[T]here was great anxiety in the thinking part of the Nation” and “a general expectation that the Holy Alliance would employ force against South-America,” which meant “it would be proper that the President should sound the alarm to the Nation.” Southard said little in this discussion, according to Adams, though he did generally prefer Adams’s argument to Calhoun’s. Monroe and Calhoun both replied to Adams, saying that the recent French intervention in Spain was different in kind from the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon. France in Spain had acted directly against “the popular principle.” Thus it could be right for Monroe to break with past practice and decry this latest European act of conquest. (Albert Gallatin, freshly returned from a tour as American minister to France, had urged Monroe to speak out about the French invasion only a month earlier, though he had rightly observed at the same time that America had actually been silent in the past about monarchist attacks on republics, notably during the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon.2 What neither Gallatin nor Monroe knew was that even before Rush’s letters reached the White House, Canning had persuaded the French ambassador to the Court of St. James’s, the prince de Polignac, to give him a memorandum vowing that France had no intention to intervene in Spanish America—thus rendering Canning’s initiative with Rush moot.)3

  The next day Adams stopped by to discuss this matter with Monroe one more time. If he could finish his term “at peace and amity with all the world,” Adams said, the president’s administration would be recalled “as the golden age of this republic.” What Adams wanted was “earnest remonstrance against the interference of the European powers by force with South America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with Europe; to take an American cause, and adhere inflexibly to that.”4

  Though responsible for enormous American territorial expansion, James Monroe is most remembered today for parts of his Seventh Annual Message.5 That is where he laid out the point of policy on which he, Adams, Calhoun, and Southard, with the input of Rush, Jefferson, and Madison, had worked so doggedly—the foreign policy principle now known as the Monroe Doctrine. The famous pronouncement about foreign policy is found in the main at the end of a string of rather tedious sections telling what the Executive has spent money on in the last year, an account which reminds one of Francis Walker Gilmer’s appraisal of the third, fourth, and fifth presidents’ intellects. A son of Jefferson’s Albemarle County friend and neighbor Dr. George Gilmer and brother-in-law of Attorney General William Wirt, Francis Gilmer was chosen by Jefferson to go to Europe and recruit faculty members for the University of Virginia. After that a grateful Master of Monticello tapped him to be the new university’s first law professor (though he would die before teaching law). Francis thus knew whereof he spake when he told one of Jefferson’s nephews concerning Jefferson and Madison that “[t]here is no comparison between the two men. Madison I hear was logical in debate. But in every thing I have seen from him, his logic is artificial & shallow. In conversation he is a disputatious polemic; but I think by no means a powerful adversary. He is however as much superior to his successor as he is inferior to his predecessor.”6 (In correspondence with his own brother, Gilmer, after having been to dinner at Monticello with Monroe present, evaluated Monroe even more harshly.)

  On the other hand John C. Calhoun, who had worked closely with Monroe for eight years and whose intellectual star far outshone Gilmer’s, remembered his former chief more positively at the time of his death. “Tho’ not brilliant,” he wrote, “few men were his equals in wisdom, firmness and devotion to the country. He had a wonderful intellectual patience; and could above all men, that I ever knew, when called on to decide an important point, hold the subject immovably fixed under his attention, until he had mastered it in all its relations. It was mainly to this admirable quality that he owed his highly accurate judgment. I have known many much more rapid in reaching a conclusion, but few with a certainty so unerring.”7

  While toned down enough to placate the secretary of state, the message’s opening paragraph still said that “there never was a period since the establishment of our Revolution when, regarding the condition of the civilized world and its bearing on us, there was greater necessity for devotion in the public servants to their respective duties, or for virtue, patriotism, and union in our constituents.” After some matters of routine or passing interest, in the seventh paragraph of his message Monroe got to the Russian minister’s invitation to negotiate each party’s rights in northwestern North America. In this context, he said, “the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.” Two paragraphs farther down, he said American ministers had been instructed to implement the House of Representatives’ resolution that American ministers in Europe and America propose proscription of the slave trade, which Monroe called an “odious and criminal practice,” by having it classified as piracy and those who engaged in it punished as for piracy. The president also said that America was seeking to have the European powers adopt as their rules the rules France imposed on itself in its current war with Spain: no privateering and no interference with enemy or neutral commerce at sea unless it was “in the breach of a lawful blockade.” These policies, for which America had contended in the War of 1812, would yield an “essential amelioration to the condition of the human race” with only “the consent of a few sovereigns,” which “the friends of humanity” must hope would be forthcoming.

  The process of recognizing the newly established Hispano-American republics continued apace, as did the exchange of diplomats. So too did the speedy extinguishment of the public debt. Without mentioning Calhoun, Monroe boasted of the remarkable improvement of the state of the army and its supply system. Three significant military posts would be completed in the coming year. An act of 1820, Monroe continued, “provides that the system of tactics and regulations of the various corps of the Regular Army shall be extended to the militia. This act has been very imperfectly executed from the want of uniformity in the organization of the militia.…” Averse to Calhoun’s innovative organizational initiatives relating to the U.S. Army, Congress would not have welcomed more significant steps in relation to the militia, even though it had proven an inapt instrument—and the Executive would continue to find it inapt—as Monroe knew all too well it had been during the War of 1812.

  Meanwhile orders had gone out for American-flagged ships engaged in the slave trade to be arrested and brought to port. “I have the gratification to state,” the president said, “that not one so employed has been discovered, and there is good reason to believe that our flag is now seldom, if at all, disgraced by that traffic.”

  Monroe reminded Congress that in his previous annual message he had explained his understanding of “the encouragement which ought to be given to our manufactures and the principle on which it should be founded.” His understanding remained unchanged. He therefore again called on Congress to provide tariff protection for “those articles which we are prepared to manufacture, or which are more immediately connected with the defense and independence of the country.” So too he reported that the last congressional session’s appropriations for repairs of the Cumberland Road had been spent for that purpose. On the related subject of a canal connecting the Chesapeake Bay to the Ohio River, Monroe said that he believed “Congress possess the right to appropriate money for such a national object (the jurisdiction remaining to the State through which the canal would pass),” so Congress ought to consider whether the Army Corps of Engineers should research the project’s feasibility. Too, he recommended that the Corps investigate the feasibility of connecting the Ohio River to Lake Erie. His final proposal along this line was that in light of Congress’s omission to propose an internal improvements amendment to the states, the Executive might be authorized to inquire of governors through whose states the Cumberland Road passed about being allowed to set up tolls to fund ongoing repairs to the road.

  Monroe next explained why Americans hoped for success in “the heroic struggle of the Greeks, that they would succeed in their contest and resume their equal station among the nations of the earth. It is believed,” he hazarded, “that the whole civilized world take a deep interest in their welfare.” This logically led him into two lengthy paragraphs—the last two before his message’s conclusion—enunciating the Monroe Doctrine. “[W]e should consider,” the president said, “any attempt on [the allied powers’] part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.” America had not interfered and would not interfere with European colonies, and “with the Governments who have declared their independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.” Further, America would continue to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of any European power, “to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us,” and “to cultivate friendly relations,” “meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none.” Spain obviously could not subdue her former colonies, but America’s policy was not to interfere.

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  James Monroe’s Seventh Annual Message was an immediate success. Members of Congress endorsed it (though Daniel Webster wished Monroe had proposed concrete action on behalf of the Greeks), and the U.K.’s minister in Washington said Madison’s position on European interference in former Spanish colonies “has evidently found in every bosom a chord which vibrates in strict unison with the sentiments so conveyed.” The General Assembly of Pennsylvania adopted a resolution that Monroe’s statement about “defence of the cause of Liberty in this Western Hemisphere” had earned “the entire approbation of the General Assembly of this Commonwealth.” The British press liked that too, though Canning felt compelled to disclose the Polignac letter. In France liberals like Lafayette were pleased, while the government was not. It was also generally well received in South America.1

  Though this annual message was the highlight of Monroe’s second term, other matters drew his attention as well. For example, in February 1824 he addressed the long-standing claim of the government of Massachusetts for federal reimbursement of some of the expenses the Commonwealth had incurred in mobilizing its militia during the War of 1812.2 Recall that Massachusetts had taken the lead among New England states in being uncooperative with the Federal Government’s military effort, among other ways by refusing to make the state’s militia available when properly requested. Monroe’s official memorandum to Congress explained the lengthy delay in addressing this matter by saying, “It affords me great pleasure to state that the present executive of Massachusetts has disclaimed the principle which was maintained by the former executive, and that in this disclaimer both branches of the legislature have concurred.” He went on to recommend to Congress that Massachusetts militiamen who had served during the war be fully compensated as those from other states had been—even though Governor Strong had refused to put the Bay State’s militia under federal command. During the war, the war secretary had told Massachusetts authorities that this would mean the state would not receive compensation, yet its governor had continued to refuse full cooperation. Here Monroe held out an olive branch to citizens of Massachusetts, saying that “even those who now survive who were then in error can not fail to see with interest and satisfaction this distressing occurrence thus happily terminated.”3

  Another significant issue that came up repeatedly across the eight years of Monroe’s presidency was government spending on roads, canals, and bridges—what in those days were called “internal improvements.” Monroe entered into the presidency as his immediate predecessor, the constitutional authority, had just issued a thundering veto of Representatives Clay and Calhoun’s Bonus Bill. He followed in James Madison’s footsteps in this regard, after a fashion. He mentioned internal improvements in his First Inaugural Address, his First Annual Message, and elsewhere, urging Congress to propose a constitutional amendment to address the problems Madison’s Bonus Bill Veto Message had identified. Congress did not do so, as proponents of this policy commonly insisted Madison had been mistaken in vetoing the Bonus Bill. Monroe’s position was somewhat opaque.

  So, for example, midway through his second term Monroe vetoed a bill “for the preservation and repair of the Cumberland Road” from Cumberland, Maryland, to Wheeling, Virginia.4 He did so “with deep regret, approving as I do the policy,” he said. Then followed six paragraphs explaining how he had come to the conclusion that the bill was unconstitutional.

  He conceded that Congress had a constitutional “right of applying money under the power vested in Congress to make appropriations, under which power, with the consent of the States through which this road passes, the work was originally commenced.” This right was, however, not to be confused with the idea underlying the bill: that Congress had “a power to establish turnpikes with gates and tolls, and to enforce the collection of tolls by penalties.” If Congress had that power, it would have “the right to take the land from the proprietor on a valuation and to pass laws for the protection of the road from injuries, and if it exist as to one road it exists as to any other, and to as many roads as Congress may think proper to establish.” This would be nothing less than “a complete right of jurisdiction and sovereignty for all the purposes of internal improvement, and not merely the right of applying money under the power vested in Congress to make appropriations, under which power, with the consent of the States through which this road passes, the work was originally commenced, and has been so far executed.” Lest one infer that a state could consent to Congress’s exercise of the power he was saying it lacked, Monroe added that although the states could agree for Congress to spend money “within their limits for such purposes, they [could] grant no power of jurisdiction or sovereignty by special compacts with the United States.”

  Considering the Constitution’s text, Monroe said he neither found such a congressional power enumerated therein nor thought such a power “incidental to some power which has been specifically granted,” including the power to establish post offices and post roads, the power to declare war, and the power to regulate interstate commerce. He also did not think it incidental to the General Welfare Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Preamble’s reference to “provid[ing] for the common defense,” or the Territories Clause. Only a constitutional amendment could give Congress that power. He closed by saying he would relay a lengthy explanation of his views on this subject soon.

  Organized more or less as the veto message was, Monroe’s pamphlet, “Views on the Subject of Internal Improvements,” considered each of the clauses there mentioned one at a time and concluded that it did not give Congress power to do what the bill would have done. Monroe circulated the pamphlet among his acquaintances and sent copies of it to the members of the Supreme Court. He received three answers. Justice Joseph Story told him that as the question might come before the Court, he could not express an opinion on it. Chief Justice John Marshall, on the other hand, told the president of his views that “To me they appear to be generally just” before saying that, “I despair however of the adoption of such a measure”—which seems to leave unclear whether the element of Monroe’s argument he found “generally just” was his argument for Congress to exercise the power he already thought it had or his call for an amendment.5

  However, Justice William Johnson, Thomas Jefferson’s sometime correspondent, wrote Monroe that

  Judge Johnson has had the honour to submit the President’s argument on the subject of internal improvements to his brother-judges and is instructed to make the following report.

  The judges are deeply sensible of the mark of confidence bestowed on them in this instance and should be unworthy of that confidence did they attempt to conceal their real opinion. Indeed to conceal or disavow it would be now impossible as they are all of opinion that the decision on the bank question [McCulloch v. Maryland] completely commits them on the subject of internal improvements as applied to post-roads and military roads. On the other points it is impossible to resist the lucid and conclusive reasoning contained in the argument.