7 “I must tell you now that I have reached the conclusion” et seq.: State Cable, Deptel to London 4426, February 19, 1962, FURS, 1961–1963, pp. 544–545.

  7 “the damaging effect of such disclosure”: Letter, Stevenson to Rusk, February 26, 1962, ibid., pp. 545–546.

  7 “You say that it is not possible”: Letter, Lord Home to Secretary Rusk, February 26, 1962. ibid., p. 547.

  8 “For [the] present I do not believe covert action”: State Cable, Rusk Cable (Secto) 28, March 13, 1962, ibid., p. 553. This was sent “EYES ONLY” for acting secretary George Ball.

  8 “a program designed to bring about the removal of Cheddi Jagan” et seq.: State Department Paper, “Possible Courses of Action in British Guiana,” March 15, 1962, ibid., pp. 555–558, quoted 557–558.

  8 “We do not intend to be taken in twice” et seq.: Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, March 17, 1962, ibid., pp. 558–564, quoted p. 563.

  9 “an independent British Guiana under Burnham”: Memorandum, Arthur Schlesinger to President Kennedy, June 21, 1962, ibid., p. 572.

  11 “Man for Cuba”: Richard Helms with William Hood, A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency (New York, Random House, 2003), pp. 196, 205, quoted p. 196.

  12 “an advocate of extremist measures” et seq.: CIA, SNIE 87.2–62, “The Situation and Prospects in British Guiana,” April 11, 1962. CIA, Freedom of Information Act Release (hereafter cited as FOIA), Case EO1994-00324 (declassified October 10, 1997). Note that there are substantial differences between this release and the earlier rendition of this document the CIA provided for compilers of the FRUS volume on Guiana. Among the material deleted from the FRUS version were items regarding Jagan’s political position and the observation that Burnham “has a reputation for opportunism and venality. His racist point of view, so evident in the past, forbodes instability and conflict during any administration under his leadership.” Also missing: Burnham’s “recklessness and impulsiveness are notorious and could at any time overrule his judgment.”

  12 “I agree that the evidence shows”: Schlesinger June 21 memo, op. cit. But in this paper the White House aide actually says, “Burnham is so impressed by his own importance and self-analysis of popularity” that he was unlikely to make common cause with the United Force Party, while in A Thousand Days he writes that Burnham “appeared an intelligent, self-possessed, reasonable man, insisting quite firmly on his ‘socialism’ and ‘neutralism’ but stoutly anti-communist,” who “seemed well aware that British Guiana had no future at all unless its political leaders tried to temper the racial animosities and unless he in particular gave his party, now predominantly African, a bi-racial flavor” (p. 713). The latter statement implies some willingness on the part of Burnham to work with the UF which, not being African, would accomplish exactly what Schlesinger wanted.

  12 “In particular, I think it is unproven that CIA knows how to manipulate”: Memo, Bundy to Kennedy, July 13, 1962, FRUS 1961–1963, v. 12, p. 577.

  12 “Does CIA think they can carry out a really covert operation”: Memo, Schlesinger to Kennedy, July 19, 1962, ibid., p. 578.

  12 “would provide opportunity for”: State Cable (not sent), drafted August 1, 1962, ibid., p. 579.

  13 “I think you know about the most interesting development here”: NSC, Memo, Kaysen to Bundy, October 5, 1962, John F. Kennedy Library, John F. Kennedy Papers (hereafter abbreviated JFKL:JFKP): National Security File (hereafter abbreviated NSF): Meetings and Memoranda Series, box 320, folder: “Staff Memoranda, Kaysen, 8/62–12/62.”

  14 “It moves, moderately”: McGeorge Bundy, “Weekend Reading, January 26–27, 1963.” JFKL: NSF: Meetings and Memoranda Series, box 317, folder: “Index of Weekend Papers, 1/63–3/63.”

  15 “It was clear that the President regards British Guiana”: CIA Memorandum, “White House Meeting on British Guiana,” June 21, 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, v. 12, p. 604.

  15 “a country with a communist government in control”: State Department Cable, Deptel 6918 (London), ibid., p. 606.

  15 “would create irresistible pressures in the United States to strike militarily”: State Department, Memorandum of Conversation, June 30, 1964, ibid., pp. 607–609, quoted p. 608.

  16 “actually testing support for the eventual formation”: CIA, Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, “British Guiana,” March 17, 1964, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library: Lyndon Baines Johnson Papers (hereafter LBJL:LBJP): NSF: Intelligence File, box 5, folder: “British Guiana Special File.”

  17 “No matter what I try to do” et seq.: Delmar Carlson, Memorandum of Conversation, May 25, 1964, FRUS 1964–1968, quoted p. 864.

  17 “You don’t know Burnham”: Department of State, Cable (CIA Channel), June 28, 1964 (declassified February 4, 2005), LBJL:LBJP: NSF: Intelligence File, box 5, folder: “British Guiana, Special Folder.”

  17 “a dialogue with Jagan might conceivably cool down the . . . security problem”: NSC, Memorandum for the Record, British Guiana Meeting, June 30, 1964,” July 2, 1964, LBJL:LBJP: NSF: ibid.

  17 “I’d stonewall for now”: McGeorge Bundy Marginal Note on NSC Memorandum, Chase to Bundy, “British Guiana,” July 31, 1964, LBJL:LBJP: NSF: ibid.

  18 “secured international assistance” et seq.: Untitled, Undated Paper (between August 17 and 24 according to other evidence), LBJL:LBJP: NSF: ibid. See CIA, Memorandum, Karamessines to Bundy, “British Guiana,” August 28, 1964, which appears to comment on this paper. Ibid. A Jagan government official passing through Washington from Canada in early September saw U.S. officials and mentioned a specific report that the government had evidence the United States had been helping Burnham’s party as of October 1963. The official’s trip to Canada suggests that Jagan indeed did take action on the policy recommendations in the anonymous paper cited above.

  18 “it is tough to do so” et seq.: Department of State, Cable, September 11, 1964, ibid.

  18 “in a deniable and discreet way”: NSC, Gordon Chase–McGeorge Bundy Memorandum, October 17, 1964, FRUS 1964–1968, v. 34, p. 884.

  18 “a new victory for the station British Guiana”: Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (New York: Bantam Books, 1976), p. 418.

  19 “We misunderstood the whole struggle”: Quoted in Weiner, “A Kennedy–C.I.A. Plot Returns to Haunt Clinton.”

  20 “Great White Case Officer”: G. J. A. O’Toole, The Encyclopedia of American Intelligence and Espionage (New York: Facts on File, 1988), p. 171.

  23 “Studio Six Productions”: Antonio J. Mendez with Malcolm McConnell, The Master of Disguise: My Secret Life in the CIA (New York: William Morrow, 1999), pp. 279–282.

  2: THE COLD WAR CRUCIBLE

  34 “personal snooper”: Letter, Harry S Truman to Sidney Souers and William D. Leahy, reprinted in Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York, Pocket Books, 1974), pp. 362–363.

  35 “additional services of common concern” et seq.: National Security Act of 1947, Section 102. This law has been widely reprinted. See, for example, William M. Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 1984), pp. 128–130.

  35 “I reviewed this sentence carefully”: Clark Clifford with Richard Holbrooke, Counsel to the President: A Memoir (New York, Random House, 1991), p. 169.

  36 “I’m tired of babying the Soviets”: Letter, Harry Truman to James Byrnes, reprinted in Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decisions (New York, New American Library, 1965), pp. 604–606.

  36 “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic”: Winston S. Churchill Speech at Westminster College, 1946, in Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis (New York, W. W. Norton, 1977), quoted p. 191.

  37 “may come with dramatic suddenness”: Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, Viking Press, 1951), quoted p. 387.

  38 “huge quantities” and “we believe this would be an unauthorized use of the funds” et seq.: CIA, Memorandum, Houston to Hillenkoetter, September 25, 1947. Declassified document in author’s possession.

  39 “if the President, with his Constitutional responsibilities”: Lawrence R. Houston, Letter to the Editor, New York Times, July 26, 1982. In connection with this disclaimer by the former CIA general counsel, the reader should be aware that the views Houston expressed to successive directors of central intelligence—which will be shown later in this narrative—differ markedly from his argument in 1982, after retirement. In fact, in both 1962 and 1969 the general counsel rendered legal opinions identical to this one in 1947.

  40 “this political warfare thing”: CIA, Memo, Hillenkoetter to Aide, June 1948, in Michael Warner, ed. The CIA Under Harry Truman (Washington, D.C., CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), p. 203.

  40–1 “the overt foreign activities of the US government must be supplemented by covert operations” et seq.: National Security Council, NSC 10/2, “National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects, June 18, 1948, reprinted in Leary, Central Intelligence Agency, pp. 131–133.

  3: THE SECRET WARRIORS

  45 “preventive direct action”: Peter Grose, Operation Rollback (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 2000), quoted, p. 124.

  45 “Wiz,” “Ozzard of Wiz” et seq.: David A. Phillips, The Night Watch: Twenty-five Years of Peculiar Service (New York, Atheneum, 1977), pp. 25–33.

  47 “the Bold Easterners”: Stewart Alsop, The Center: People and Power in Political Washington (New York, Harper and Row, 1968).

  52 “Reality methodically and pitilessly destroyed”: K. V. Tauras, Guerrilla Warfare on the Amber Coast (New York, Voyages Press, 1962), p. 93.

  54 “secret operations, particularly through support of resistance groups”: CIA, “The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence” (Dulles–Jackson–Correa Report), January 1, 1949 (declassified June 3, 1976), p. 131. Document in author’s possession.

  56 “I feel I’ve spent three days chewing cotton”: Tom Bower, The Red Web: MI6 and the KGB Master Coup (London, Mandarin Books, 1993), quoted p. 172.

  57 “the correct channels in Europe”: William E. Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1978), p. 91.

  4: “THE KIND OF EXPERIENCE WE NEED”

  59 “a clinical experiment to see whether larger rollback operations would be feasible”: Anthony Verrier, Through the Looking Glass (New York, W. W. Norton, 1983), quoted p. 76.

  59 “whenever we want to subvert any place”: Kim Philby, My Silent War (London, Granada Books, 1969), quoted p. 142.

  60 “an exploratory action”: Michael Burke, Outrageous Good Fortune (Boston, Little Brown, 1984), p. 140.

  61 “more a rallying point than a valid basis for a political revolution”: Ibid., p. 42.

  61 “He was like Talleyrand”: Nicolas Bethell, Betrayed (New York, Times Books, 1984), quoted p. 59.

  61 “My friends state that they would prefer not to approach the visa division”: Ralph Blumenthal, “Axis Supporters Enlisted by U.S. in Postwar Role,” New York Times, June 20, 1982, quoted p. 22.

  62 “a purely internal Albanian uprising at this time is not indicated” et seq.: CIA, “Strengths and Weaknesses of the Hoxha Regime in Albania,” September 12, 1949 (declassified January 31, 1978), Harry S Truman Library (hereafter HSTL): Truman Papers: President’s Secretary’s File (hereafter PSF), box 249, folder “Central Intelligence Memos 1949.”

  62 “place the maximum strain” et seq.: National Security Council (hereafter NSC): “United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe,” NSC-58, September 14, 1949, paragraphs 37, 42, reprinted in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds. Containment (New York, Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 211–223.

  63 “Are there any kings around”: Ralph Blumenthal, “Axis Supporters Enlisted.”

  63 “the settlement of differences”: CIA, “Current Situation in Albania,” ORE 71-49, December 15, 1949 (declassified July 5, 1980), HSTL: Truman Papers: PSF: Intelligence File, box 256, folder “ORE Reports 1949 (60–74).”

  64 “We’ll get it right next time”: Verrier, Through the Looking Glass, quoted p. 77.

  64 “We were used as an experiment”: Bethel, Betrayed, quoted p. 160.

  64 “in the end it was not possible to do without overt air and military support”: Blumenthal, “Axis Supporters Enlisted.”

  64 “welcomed”: E. Howard Hunt, Undercover (New York: Berkeley Books, 1974), p. 95.

  64 “it’s all over?” et seq.: ibid.

  65 “washerwomen gossiping over their laundry”: Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men (New York, Simon and Schuster/Touchstone, 1996), quoted p. 42.

  67 “like a tame act at a circus”: Paul Borel interview, Washington, D.C.

  68 “OPC and OSO personnel”: Joseph Burkholder Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior (New York, Ballantine Books, 1981), p. 63.

  68 “my dish of tea”: Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1979), quoted p. 4.

  69 “the man who kept the secrets”: Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets (New York, Knopf, 1979).

  69 “I was reminded of how much”: Helms and Hood, A Look Over My Shoulder, p. 116.

  69 “single chain of command”: CIA, DCI Directive, “Organization of CIA Clandestine Services,” July 15, 1952, in Warner, The CIA Under Harry Truman, pp. 460–462.

  71–2 “The Ukrainian people have destroyed”: Pravda, January 25, 1948.

  72 “flare ups” and “sometimes amounted to war” et seq.: Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (New York, Bantam Books, 1976), p. 198.

  72 “Ukraine is fighting for its freedom”: Telegram, Lachowitz to Truman, August 31, 1947. HSTL: Truman Papers: White House Central Files (hereafter WHCFWHCF): Official File, box NA, folder “1029—Ukraine.”

  73 “wholesale lying”: Philby, My Silent War, p. 145; cf. pp. 144–146, 140.

  74 “a large disparate body of Americans”: Burke, Outrageous Good Fortune, p. 155.

  77 “At least we’re getting the kind of experience we need”: Harry Rositzke, The CIA’s Secret Operations (New York, Reader’s Digest Press, 1977), quoted p. 37.

  77 “What did we offer these people?”: John C. Campbell Interview, HSTL Oral History no. 284, p. 206.

  5: THE COVERT LEGIONS

  78 “The president is serious”: Gordon Gray interview, HSTL Oral History no. 167, pp. 51–52.

  83 “it could not think strategically”: Edward P. Lilly, “The Psychological Strategy Board and Its Predecessors: Foreign Policy Coordination, 1938–1953,” in Gaetano L. Vincitorio, ed., Studies in Modern History (New York, St. John’s University Press, 1968), p. 365.

  83–4 “psychological offensive” et seq.: Department of State, “Emergency Plan for Psychological Offensive (USSR),” April 11, 1951 (declassified October 20, 1976), pp. 1, 2, 3, 4, 7. HSTL: Truman Papers: PSF: Subject File, box 188, folder “Russia, State Department Plan.”

  84 Various PSB Plan Titles: HSTL: PSF: Psychological Strategy Board series, passim.

  85 “Look, you just forget about policy”: Gordon Gray interview, HSTL Oral History no. 167, pp. 51–52.

  86 “we are actually participating in Europe”: Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1982), quoted pp. 60–61.

  87 “You’re a marked man now”: Robert Burns, “CIA–Air Force Unit Kept Secrecy,” Associated Press Dispatch, August 29, 1998, 11:09 A.M. EDT, http://pages.progidy.com/military/cia_af.atm

  88 “Besides psychological warfare”: “Peking Says Flyers Admitted Espionage,” Associated Press, New York Herald Tribune (European Edition), November 27, 1954, quoted p. 1.

  90 “Fizzland”: Anthony Carew, “The Origins of CIA Financing of AFL Programs,” CovertAction Quarterly 67 (Spring–Summer 1999), p. 56.

  93 “particularly effective for democratically-run membership organizations”: CIA Study, quoted in Church Committee Final Report, Bk. I, p. 183.

  95 “I had to sign off on all these projects”: Jonathan Kwitney, “The CIA’s Secret Armies in Europe,” Nation, April 6, 1992, quoted p. 445.

  96 “Now we’ll finish off the goddamned Commie bastards!”: Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior, quoted p. 102.

  6: BITTER FRUITS

  100 “what they had in mind”: Roosevelt, Countercoup, p. 107.

  101 “it would be unfair to the American taxpayers”: Cable, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Mohammed Mosadegh, June 29, 1953, in Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change: White House Years, 1953–1956 (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1963), quoted p. 162.

  101 “appropriately enthusiastic”: Roosevelt, Countercoup, quoted p. 10.

  102 “quasi-legal overthrow”: CIA, “Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952–August 1953” (Wilbur Report), October 1969. This document was leaked to the New York Times, which published it in part on April 16, 2000. The history appeared in substantially complete form in Foreign Policy Bulletin, v. 11, no. 3, May/June 2000, pp. 90–104.

  102 “Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadegh”: CIA Intelligence Report, April 16, 1953, ibid., p. 90.

  104–5 Shah at Ramsar: Manucher Farmanfarmaian and Roxane Farmanfarmaian, Blood and Oil: Memoirs of a Persian Prince (New York, Random House, 1997), pp. 290–292.

  105 “The pool was no solace”: Roosevelt, Countercoup, p. 171.

  107 “If we, the CIA, are ever going to try something like this again”: Roosevelt, Countercoup, quoted p. 210.

  109 “the task headed by the CIA”: CIA, Memorandum for the Record, “Guatemala,” September 11, 1953, in FRUS 1952–1954, p. 105. Note that where many scholars refer to the FRUS series by item numbers in their notes, the references here are to pages.