More sharp argument erupted at a Mongoose meeting on October 4. There the attorney general archly said that “higher authority” worried about the meager results and he, RFK, wanted massive activity. John McCone countered that the NSC had been holding the forces back. Bobby Kennedy retorted that, to the contrary, the Special Group had “urged and insisted upon action by the Lansdale operating organization” and that no specified action had ever been rejected at the NSC level. White House squawks were for particular reasons: in the case of frogmen landing in Eastern Cuba, the men had been Americans; in another instance, at the Miramar hotel, the action had been irresponsible. A major strike at Matahambre had been the objective of three failed missions. Lansdale told the group that half a dozen new raids were planned and another strike on the major target would be added. Some talked of mining Cuban territorial waters. The October 4 meeting concluded that “more dynamic action was indicated.”

  General Lansdale approached Bobby Kennedy in mid-October for a renewed initiative centered around Manolo Ray. Only political warfare would trigger Cuban revolt, he reiterated. He appended a scheme to have a submarine surface and fire star shells over Cuba on All Souls Day night, igniting Cuban superstitions, coupled with the CIA spreading rumors of portents of Castro’s fall. Tom Parrott thought this ridiculous—the CIA talking about the Second Coming, saying Christ opposed Castro—he called it “Elimination by Illumination.” In 1975 Lansdale reacted furiously to Parrott’s characterization, claiming he had never heard of the scheme, but in truth the secret warrior proposed this psychological mission in a memo on October 15, 1962.

  A day earlier a CIA U-2 reconnaissance plane flying over Cuba had taken photographs showing equipment associated with Soviet nuclear missiles. This flight had been laid on as a result of reports from Mongoose, but the ensuing Cuban Missile Crisis would sweep away the CIA project. When Dick Helms arrived at Robert Kennedy’s office the morning of October 16 to deal with certain legal matters, Bobby already knew of the photos. That afternoon the Special Group (Augmented) would have evaluated Mongoose to date, a review Helms dreaded, but now the attorney general had to help deal with Soviet missiles in Cuba. Bobby went ahead with the Mongoose meeting to preserve an appearance of normalcy. Every bit as bloody as Helms feared, the review featured Robert Kennedy again declaring the president’s anger and discouragement. Acting for recently married John McCone, in California on his honeymoon, Deputy Director Gen. Marshall S. Carter presented a fresh CIA paper on sabotage. Two CIA Cuban teams were ashore at that moment, and other minor achievements were cited, but the rest was for the future. Bobby liked the CIA paper but insisted he would now begin meeting every morning with Lansdale and the Mongoose coordinators in search of results. In fact the greatest results ever achieved by the CIA project were the emplacement of the agent nets whose reports helped the U-2 spyplanes find the Soviet missiles.

  Beginning that day, Robert Kennedy sat with his brother and others through almost continuous sessions of the ad hoc “executive committee” of the National Security Council (EXCOM). They considered diplomatic approaches to the Russians, an invasion of Cuba, blockade, or bombing of the missiles. Their central problem became getting the Russians to take those missiles out of Cuba without starting World War III. They needed to avoid anything that might provoke a Soviet or Cuban military response. In this context the Kennedys’ constant pushing for actions in Mongoose became inimical to the larger objective.

  The secret warriors had their own solutions for the Cuban crisis. They continued to act in accordance with Bobby’s open orders, confirmed as recently as October 16. At the State Department, Robert A. Hurwitch, assistant for Cuban affairs, wanted exile pilots to bomb the missiles, using unmarked planes for ostensible attacks on oil refineries. Bobby himself, according to some evidence, pondered staging a provocation like the sinking of the Maine at the outset of the Spanish-American War, discussing it with Cuban leader Roberto San Roman, brother of one of the Brigade 2506 commanders, and Rafael Quintero, a CIA commando he met during negotiations to free the brigadistas.

  Task Force W still pursued the Mongoose directive for action and moved to put commando teams in Cuba. The Special Group (Augmented) debated objectives. Finding Russian nuclear storage bunkers had the highest priority. Bill Harvey thought the teams could scout for U.S. invaders.

  At Miami station the situation was thoroughly confused. Ted Shackley had seen a stream of orders for more than a week. His exile teams were on edge. Felix Rodriguez, for example, had been accosted by case officer Thomas Clines and asked to volunteer for a parachute drop to place a radio beacon to guide a bombing raid, then was placed in a safe house without even the opportunity to pick up his wife from work. Sequestered in pre-mission lockdown, the commandos needed surety. Shackley had twenty missions scheduled—nineteen were paramilitary and one for intelligence gathering—utilizing all his teams. The JM/Wave chief begged Langley, sending a long dispatch. Part of it read: “BELIEVE FLUCTUATIONS IN GO AND STOP ORDERS OVER PAST SEVEN DAYS HAVE BEEN SUCH THAT WE ARE SITTING ON EXPLOSIVE HUMAN SITUATION WHICH COULD BLOW AT ANY TIME WITHIN NEXT FORTY-EIGHT HOURS.” The station chief reminded headquarters that his fifty commandos were fully trained, ready to go, and would not remain under control unless Washington made up its mind. “THERE IS IN MY JUDGMENT NO MIDDLE GROUND ON THIS ISSUE.”

  Thus in the middle of the missile crisis, Ted Shackley threw the Kennedys this hot potato, amounting to the “disposal” problem all over again, that very pernicious feature of the Bay of Pigs. And Shackley wanted to go. Admitting he had not considered political realities, that he viewed matters from a nuts-and-bolts perspective, Shackley pumped for a decision. A commando landing at the height of the crisis, with both sides on hair-trigger alert, could have touched off World War III.

  Bill Harvey took the Shackley cable and forwarded it to Ed Lansdale. General Lansdale circulated the text to the Special Group (Augmented).

  Three of the teams had already left in submarines for the north coast of Cuba. Six more were to infiltrate from submarines or drop by air. The others would follow. Exile Rafael Quintero wanted assurances and phoned the attorney general. RFK, facing the horrifying prospect of nuclear war, suddenly ceased being the gung-ho advocate of covert action.

  Bobby Kennedy later recorded an oral history in which he recounts looking into this matter to find that top CIA officials were unaware of the missions. In view of Shackley’s cable, that is not possible. In fact on the morning of October 26 the EXCOM discussed the operations and McCone personally briefed the landings. President Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy both spoke of reorienting Mongoose. In any case, Bobby went to Langley and denounced everyone, especially Bill Harvey. On October 30 the White House halted all Mongoose operations. Lansdale went to Miami to ride herd on Shackley. There was no more talk, as there had been on October 4, of mining Cuban harbors. Director McCone soon packed Bill Harvey off to Rome as station chief, getting him out of the line of fire.

  All this time the exile prisoners from the Bay of Pigs continued to languish in Cuban prisons. Hurt by the embargo in place since January 1961, Castro offered to trade them for medicines, tractors, spare parts, and such things. Desultory exchanges on the prospect occurred into 1962. After the missile crisis, Castro lowered his price while the administration threw its weight behind efforts to raise $53 million worth of medical equipment, drugs, and baby food for the deal. Lawyer James A. Donovan, who had arranged the trade of Soviet spy Rudolf Abel for CIA U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers, negotiated the exchange.

  The final agreement on the prisoner trade was made on December 22, 1962. Altogether 1,179 veterans of Brigade 2506 returned to the United States. In a covert twist to this game, CIA assassination plotters bought a scuba diving suit for Donovan to present to Castro as a gift. At Langley’s Technical Services Division, scientists impregnated the suit with a fungus to trigger a chronic skin disease, and the breathing apparatus with a tuberculosis bacillus. The suit was carried to Donovan by an unwitting lawyer, John Nolan, who learned of the ploy during the investigations of the 1970s.

  “Can you imagine,” recalls Nolan, “I mean, can you imagine? Here is Jim Donovan—the guy who has already done his stuff once, a guy the Other Side trusts—down in Cuba, trying to cut a deal, very tough negotiations, very delicate discussions, everything has got to be above-board because Fidel holds all the cards and the Company is setting Donovan up—not even telling him, keeping him unwitting—to hand Fidel Castro this nice big germ bag.”

  Fortunately the American lawyer, witting or not, took the precaution of replacing the diving suit with one he bought himself.

  Castro returned the prisoners, including twenty non-brigade CIA agents.

  The superpowers eventually resolved the missile crisis at a high level. The Soviets removed their offensive weapons from Cuba; the Americans later dismantled similarly threatening forward-based systems in Turkey. President Kennedy publicly promised not to invade Cuba. As for the covert forces in play, the CIA received orders to reorganize yet again. By the time of the crisis, Richard Helms had already decided on Harvey’s replacement. He needed someone of sufficient stature to overawe field officers and show them their project continued as a priority, someone who knew the inner workings at Langley as well. Helms selected Desmond FitzGerald, the Asian expert. To get Des and avoid the impression that the Far East baron had taken a demotion to lead a mere task force, the Mongoose unit became the DO Special Affairs Staff, and Des simultaneously a deputy chief of the WH Division responsible for Cuban matters. General Lansdale left his post as well, elevating FitzGerald to direct command. To give him someone who knew the players, Jacob Esterline became his chief of operations.

  President Kennedy also revamped White House controls. Instead of Robert Kennedy taking the lead role, the National Security Council became more directly involved. Aspects of the Cuban project figured in EXCOM discussions in late 1962 and early 1963, and in a few sessions of the NSC proper. Thereafter the Special Group (Augmented) handed over its role as prime manager to an NSC “Standing Group” chaired by McGeorge Bundy.

  The Standing Group worked as Kennedy’s utility infielders. In 1962 it had handled the very delicate matter of Katanga and the Congo. Mostly the group supervised routine matters such as policy on Algeria, backstopping negotiations with Spain, plans for nuclear weapons dispersal, or establishing a worldwide network to communicate with manned spacecraft in orbit. Those functions now covered its highly serious assignment directing the Cuba project. Sudden location of Cuba decisions to this obscure NSC appendage may explain why even today the secret war after the missile crisis has received little attention.

  One question was policy toward the Cuban exile brigade. Castro government statements pointedly feared a new larger, better-equipped exile brigade. The United States denied such a plan, but in fact there was another exile initiative organized by the American military. It created a special Cuban volunteer program in July 1961, though most of the influx took place only after the brigadistas returned. McNamara’s deputy, Roswell Gilpatric, had told the Mongoose meeting of October 4, 1962, that the Pentagon had made progress. When JFK spoke to the brigadistas at the Orange Bowl in December, the army’s Cuba program formed his core element. What to do with the brigade figured at the EXCOM meeting of January 25, 1963. The NSC Standing Group had reviewed the issue the day before. Under the group a Cuba Coordinating Committee handled day-to-day activity. As the issues were summarized for Vice President Johnson by his military adviser, “the basic decision must be made as to whether an invasion of Cuba, directly or indirectly, is to be supported, or whether, in a lesser sense, serious provocations or incidents should be a part of the basic policy. When this decision is made, the disposition of the Cuban Brigade can more easily be determined.”

  Joseph Califano managed the project on behalf of Secretary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance. A special assistant, Califano was serious about the care and feeding of the Cubans. Bobby or Jack Kennedy, it seemed, was on the phone to Califano almost every day about Cuban recruiting. As exile liaison, he dealt with one of the heros of Girón, Erneido Oliva. On the army side, Califano employed two experienced lieutenant colonels, James Patchall for covert operations, and Alexander M. Haig, Jr., to take care of the brigade. Haig found officers who would have merited promotion in any army but others who attained positions in Brigade 2506 on the basis of social standing. These status cases were the hardest. In early 1963 the program took in 200 exiles a week. Almost 3,000 enlisted, and 2,600 Cubans completed U.S. military training. The army leaped at the opportunity to bring in the Cubans, the air force trod slowly, and Bobby Kennedy had to knock the navy into line. As had happened with Quintero during the missile crisis, exiles who disagreed with Califano’s actions often took their cases to Bobby, who did not hesitate to reverse orders, even his own.

  Califano deputized for Vance, who almost never attended, in representing the Pentagon on the Cuba Coordinating Committee, nominally chaired by the State Department’s man but in actuality dominated by Bobby Kennedy. As before, many of the meetings took place in the attorney general’s office. Mongoose merely moved further underground. Joe Califano found some of the proposals bizarre. Balloon leaflet schemes were the least of it; here there were serious suggestions to use radio broadcasts to get all Cubans to turn on their water faucets at the same time, things like that. Attaching incendiary devices to bats, whose timed fuzes would ignite buildings as the bats roosted, was another idea. Notions of parachuting saboteurs trained at U.S. military bases, who if captured would have directly implicated the United States, were only slightly less dangerous. As for the bats, they would have had to be transported by U.S. aircraft. Reflecting later on this period, Calfano decided he had become embroiled in “Keystone Kop capers.”

  On February 18 Vance and Califano, fictive committee chairman Sterling Cottrell, and others met President Kennedy in the Oval Office. Colonel King attended for the CIA. General Krulak represented SACSA. Kennedy sat in his rocking chair, facing the fireplace. Vance presented a paper arguing for a range of actions against Castro. He and Cottrell began arguing over which were appropriate, whereupon JFK stood up and left.

  Independent exile raids remained a problem. In 1962, despite the existence of hundreds of boats that probably carried out thousands of cruises, U.S. Customs, the Coast Guard, and other authorities apprehended exactly four boats and fifty Cubans. Very likely these seizures were intended as lessons to the others to follow the orders of their CIA controllers. In January 1963 Des FitzGerald went to Miami and supposedly urged all U.S. authorities—not just Customs and the Coast Guard but the police also—to crack down on the independents. Yet raids in March twice caused serious damage to Soviet merchant ships, leading to diplomatic protests. In a letter discussed at the NSC on March 29, Secretary Rusk declared, “I am concerned that hit-and-run raids by Cuban exiles may create incidents which work to the disadvantage of our national interest. Increased frequency of these forays could raise a host of problems over which we would not have control.”

  The CIA, refocusing, had almost finished training a new team of frogmen for underwater demolition, and had two paramilitary teams in readiness—in all about 50 exiles with operational experience. As of early April no harassment missions were under way. Propaganda broadcasts into Cuba ran at 270 hours a week, and the most ambitious activity, a “subtle sabotage program,” featured about 50,000 pieces of mail per month sent anonymously to Cubans from throughout the Hispanic world encouraging resistance or defections. Agency subsidies to Cuban political groups continued at a rate of $250,000 a month. Also under way were technological developments—the General Dynamics Corporation had a contract to design a shallow-draft boat for inshore work that would be faster than anything in Castro’s navy—but those seemed nowhere near fruition.

  Des FitzGerald had worries too—the Cuban response to one exile pinprick exposed a CIA mothership in the same area, working with small boats to put operatives ashore. Another time the fidelistas followed some exiles back to their forward base in the British Caymans, seizing commandos and equipment. International incidents and British intervention became complicating factors.

  On April Fool’s Day the coordinating committee demanded action anew. Jack and Bobby convened top officials at the White House two days later to hash out the issue. Both the CIA and Pentagon were present in force: Helms and FitzGerald for the agency, Vance and Califano for the Department of Defense. McGeorge Bundy guarded the president’s interests. Observers included Tom Parrott, Ralph Dungan, and Robert Hurwitch. Prodded by JFK, Des FitzGerald admitted that raids were accomplishing nothing beyond building morale. Kennedy actually didn’t mind that, he said, as long as the exiles stopped the incessant press conferences where they fought for credit. Mac Bundy added that the Special Group had decided the raids were not worth the effort. Bobby revisited escalation—he wanted to know the prospects for larger raids of a hundred to five hundred exiles. Joe Califano could hardly believe what he was hearing. Bobby was obsessed, Califano thought: “The intensity I had admired in his dealing with [Southern politicians on civil rights] now struck me as vengeful.” Both he and Vance left the meeting deeply troubled.

  During April the Standing Group began meeting weekly in the White House Situation Room. Now Bundy plunged into the project with typical élan. Beyond surveillance of Cuba to monitor Soviet forces and weapons, and covert action to damage Castro’s economy, there were new concerns: isolating Cuba from the Free World and countering Castroite subversion. Bundy at least allowed the possibility of improving relations with Castro, but deliberations never went there. Instead Kennedy had the full NSC consider the newest menu on April 20, and four days later Robert McNamara told the group that Castro’s position would only improve if the United States took no additional measures. John McCone followed up, saying CIA projected Castro would be stronger in a year or two. This was the moment to act. The agency had completed fresh proposals for covert harassment and sabotage, already approved by the coordinating committee. Bobby Kennedy proposed the U.S. aim at ousting Castro within eighteen months, causing as much trouble as possible in the meantime. This amounted to Mongoose all over again.