Biafra’s invasion of the Mid-West

  On 9 August 1967 Biafra launched a surprise attack on the Mid-West Region. The Federal Government was taken totally by surprise by this unprovoked foray into neutral territory. Col. Victor Banjo, a close friend and colleague of Ojukwu, led the attack. He was briefed that his objectives were Ibadan and Lagos. He came very close to achieving these. When reaching Lagos he was to make contact with sympathetic people particularly in the Nigerian military. There is some evidence that the prime source of contact was to be through the writer Wole Soyinka, who was due to put Banjo in touch with the military, including Obasanjo.

  When I made a visit to Biafra, and met Ojukwu I also met Banjo, who gave me a message for Obasanjo which said: ‘Let them understand in the West that I am not leading a Biafran Army but an army of liberation, made up not only of Biafrans but of other ethnic groups. Make the governor of the West and other Western leaders understand this. Urge them not to be taken in by any propaganda by the Federal Government about a Biafran plan to subjugate the rest of the nation, especially the West.’ 165

  Shortly after this episode Soyinka was detained, and remained in detention for the duration of the war. Victor Banjo was not Ojukwu’s first choice to lead the Biafran attack into the Mid-West. Unfortunately the man he had chosen to command the invading force, Major Nzeogwu, one of the leaders of the first coup in 1966, had been killed at the start of hostilities. There is evidence that other people had been considered, including Lt-Col. Kalu. 166 The attack that Banjo led was extremely successful. Admittedly he had very little opposition, as many people in the Mid-West were closely related to Easterners and welcomed the invaders. However when he reached Ore he stalled. He was only one hundred and fifty miles from Lagos and there was little to oppose him except Gowon’s small group of five hundred troops, based in Lagos, who were largely used for ceremonial functions rather than armed combat. Accounts confirm that the bridge at Ore and indeed all bridges leading to Lagos had been destroyed. ‘As military governor of the Western Region I instructed that all bridges approaching Lagos should be blown. As a consequence of this I believe that this was the final reason why Banjo’s invasion failed, and why we were able to successfully counterattack.’ 167

  Although a destroyed bridge did make it difficult for the Biafran troops to cross the river, and caused delay, it was not sufficient reason for a complete halt to the Biafran attack. With the attack losing its momentum at Ore, the Federal Government was given the chance to move troops from Nsukka, thus weakening the Nsukka front and stalling the attack on Enugu, to the West. At the same time a new division was formed under the command of Lt-Col. Murtala Mohammed, Gowon’s rival for power and a radical, intent on the destruction of Igbos. This hastily formed 2nd Division was created from some members of the First Division from the Nsukka front and students and prison inmates. 168 This was not the best material for creating an infantry division, and their inexperience and aggressive tendencies were to show themselves throughout the rest of the campaign, especially in unwarranted killings as they counterattacked through the Mid-West, particularly at Asaba.

  From most of the evidence available it would seem that, in spite of Adebayo’s comments, Banjo’s agenda differed from the invasion instructions given him by Ojukwu. Because Banjo was Yoruba and a fairly senior officer in the Nigerian army, he felt he could make contact with some of his army colleagues, including Obasanjo, and arrange a new power structure in Nigeria. 169 This is conjecture, but he could well have had in mind a new order, amalgamating support from the West for the East, including the Mid-West, against the North.

  Soyinka comments:

  I called Obasanjo over a secret telephone. We agreed to meet unaccompanied and unarmed at a petrol station on the road between noncommercial Jericho and Mokola sections of Ibadan. I was to tell him in very bald terms that Victor [Banjo] wanted unimpeded passage to Lagos, that he wished to avoid battle in Western Nigeria – finis! This was the exact message I delivered … Banjo did not act to promote Biafran secession or aid an Ojukwu takeover of power in Lagos. If anything, Banjo felt that he should take over power. I have no doubt whatsoever that Banjo represented the most viable corrective.

  Obasanjo’s response, that I would later transmit to Victor Banjo, was this. ‘Well, tell him I have taken an oath of loyalty to Lagos. There are other routes to Lagos – by water through Ukitipupa for instance. If he makes it to Lagos and takes over, well, my oath of loyalty is to Lagos, and I’ll stand by that. But to let him pass through my Western Command, that would be betraying my oath of loyalty. Whoever is in power in Lagos – that’s the person to whom I owe my allegiance.’

  After my fateful meeting with Obasanjo concluded, I took up residence in the hidden bungalow. It was from this bungalow that I telephoned Obasanjo’s reply to Banjo in Benin, verbatim. I kept up communication with him and his increasingly impatient collaborators in the West. I would ‘phone and exchange notes also with Banjo’s sister, Mrs Ogunseye, then lecturer, Institute of Librarianship at the University Ibadan, in an attempt to assess this warrior’s likely, real intentions, to understand why he remained in Benin playing governor or kingmaker, instead of moving straight to Lagos and dislodging Yakubu Gowon’s government. Banjo had organised cadres of people committed to the ‘Third Force’ standing by ready to support Banjo once he had crossed over into Lagos. The links were widespread and were run by politicians since the West had begun its protests against Federal military presence in the West, decrying it as an army of occupation, and demanding its removal. 170

  Certainly at this stage the Federal Government had only instituted ‘police action’ against Biafra’s secession and not an all-out war. However it seems that Banjo was too late to put his plans into action, political conditions having changed in Lagos, with Lt-Col. Murtala Mohammed successfully pressuring Gowon to adopt a more belligerent approach to Ojukwu and the people of Biafra. Mohammed boasted that he could defeat Biafra ‘in a matter of weeks’. 171 Certainly by then Adebayo, with Awolowo, having failed to convince Ojukwu that secession was not his best option, were prepared to ensure that the necessary revenue was available for the Federal Government to declare an all-out war on Biafra. As Adebayo explained:

  The North was always hopelessly insolvent, and in no position to embark on an expensive war against Biafra. In spite of her military and political aims of defeating and subjugating the Biafran people, without the West’s financial support the Federal Government would not have been financially capable of fighting a successful war. 172

  From Biafra’s position the tragedy of the Mid-West invasion was that her senior army officer corps, including the army commander, had been totally excluded from the planning. 173 The invasion, a daring plan, executed with limited troops but little opposition, was a resounding success, and if Banjo had continued the attack there is little doubt that they would have reached Lagos with little opposition. There were few troops in Lagos and the remaining combat forces were engaged in the drive on Enugu. Banjo took Benin without the loss of a single life; indeed the inhabitants gave the invading troops a jubilant welcome. Once in Benin, Banjo decided to stay there, and would not countenance any contact with his army headquarters in Enugu. He even refused to communicate with Ojukwu. He spent time arguing with Enugu as to who should be the new military governor of the Mid-West. By this time he had also antagonised his field commanders, to the point where he had one of them, Colonel Igboda, arrested. This officer remained in prison until the invading Nigerian force arrived and released him, when he was promptly beheaded. 174 As a consequence of Banjo’s ambivalence over his orders to defeat the Federal Government, Biafra’s fate was sealed. Having reached Ore, the Biafran troops had been in a position to reach Ibadan and then Lagos; it seems likely that Biafra would have succeeded in overrunning the federal administration. Banjo’s dithering stalled the invasion, and once he had been recalled by Ojukwu to Enugu to answer Ojukwu’s accusations that he had sabotaged the operation, the Biafran attack petered out and turned into a rout. Her troops were forced on the defensive, allowing the federal troops to launch an aggressive assault which gave them passage to Asaba and the river Niger.

  Ojukwu’s bold plan to invade the Mid-West had obvious merit. Success would have meant control of an important region for Biafra, and would have given him control over the oilfields, as well as creating a buffer from the West and the North. Added to this was the fact that Biafra could count on sizeable support from people of the region. It was, as events showed, that the military stationed in the Mid-West had divided loyalties. In the event Colonels Nwawo, Nwaji and Trimnel and Lt-Col. Nzelli went to Enugu under suspicion and were held in custody until their loyalty was confirmed and they were absorbed into the Biafran army. Strangely, even the military governor of the Mid-West, Brigadier Ejoor, was allowed to remain at the offices of the British High Commission, in Benin, without interference from the invading Biafran force. He eventually effected his escape and had an adventurous trip on a bicycle to Lagos. Without Banjo plotting to make contact with the West there is little doubt that the Biafrans would have overrun Ibadan and Lagos, ensuring a negotiated settlement, which would have ended the war. 175 Banjo, with plans based on personal ambition, undermined the invasion and ensured its failure. Forsyth comments that Banjo caused the ruin of Biafra. 176 Ojukwu felt that if he had taken charge of the Biafran force when Banjo purposely delayed at Benin, he could have reached Lagos and forced Gowon to resign, and brought Adebayo and Awolowo, with the West, on to his side. 177 However, Biafra’s defeat in the Mid-West determined, first, that it would never again be able to mount a serious invasive attack on the Federal Government and second, arguably, the outcome of the war. Interestingly, the Mid-West invasion had enhanced Ojukwu’s and Biafra’s standing in the eyes of the international community, because it put her in a stronger position to propose a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement. Two other factors emerged: first the international community’s concern that Biafra’s secession might encourage similar movements in other parts of the world. Secondly, because Biafra had managed to buy two, albeit old, B-26 bombers from Europe, which posed a threat to the federal side, Gowon made earnest attempts to persuade Britain and America to sell him planes to counter the threat. Both firmly declined. However, Gowon was determined to resolve this issue and turned for support to Russia, who had no concerns about supporting the federal cause and indeed welcomed their involvement. 178 This second factor put Gowon in a much stronger position when negotiating arms supplies from Britain. In spite of the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s weak political position in Parliament, he and his government were to remain the Federal Government’s main arms supplier throughout the campaign.

  As Gowon stated:

  When I met Harold Wilson at Ikeja airport, at the start of his visit to us, I accompanied him into Lagos, and was able to have an off-the-record conversation. He was keen to point out that he was very committed to his government continuing to supply arms to my government, but that it was very important that this should not be made common knowledge, especially at the forthcoming press conference, and not to be mentioned in any official communiqués which either of us might make. 179

  Ascendant and descendant positions

  Arguably there were two strategic errors made by Gowon over the confrontation between the East and the North. The first was the inability, or indeed unwillingness, of the Federal Government to reassure the Igbo people that their rights as Nigerian citizens would be upheld and protected; indeed it could be argued that this position was further undermined with the economic blockade and the lack of positive support for the East over help for the refugee problem from the North.

  One of the serious blunders of the Nigeria–Biafra conflict was made with regards to the conflict spiral which emerged after the pogroms of 1966. Unlike the leaders in January 1966 who attempted to placate the North, which suffered most from the coup, the federal military regime rendered no apology, took no concrete steps to reassure the Easterners of their security and rights within Nigeria, and gave no meaningful assistance to the massive refugee problem …. Nigeria at the time seemed morally anaesthetized. 180

  Whilst finding the above comments somewhat biased, they are subjectively correct. The author’s comments totally ignore the fact that Gowon’s position on taking power was extremely precarious, and in those early days his role simply did not allow him to be more supportive and conciliatory to the East. He was after all a compromise candidate, and pressures on him from people such as Murtala Mohammed who could challenge his authority were too great. 181 The options at that stage were for him to resign or be deposed, and it is likely that those taking over, probably from the North, would have ensured immediate aggressive action against the Igbos. Secondly, the Aburi Agreement was a grave mistake and led Gowon, under pressure from his advisors and detractors, to renege on it, failing totally to understand that without honouring it a conflict was inevitable between the East and the Federal Government. Of course it could be argued that Ojukwu should have been more placatory and understanding of the sensitivities of the Northern rulers, and should have been willing to compromise. He had had, after all, very close relationships with the North’s ruling elite, many of whom were his friends. This situation stemmed not only from his formative years, because of his father’s national standing and connections, but also from his time in the North as commanding officer of the 5th Battalion of the Nigerian Army, based in Kaduna. There is also the important consideration that during the first coup Ojukwu had proved his allegiance to the Federal Government, and by inference the North. Such was the strength of these relationships that Ojukwu was to have his mother repatriated to Biafra during the war:

  Ojukwu’s mother ran a very successful restaurant in Kaduna. It was a great favourite with all army officers and she was very popular. After the war started she was left somewhat stranded in the North, and Ojukwu was concerned for her safety. He therefore contacted his friend, the North’s military ruler, Lt-Col. Hassan Katsina, to arrange for his mother to return to the East. To hasten her return Katsina laid on transport for her by way of a helicopter. 182

  However by then pressure was put on him by the Igbo people, especially the Consultative Committee of the Eastern Region for self-determination. 183

  The opening stages of the war had seen the Federal forces in the ascendancy, during Gowon’s so-called ‘police action’ period. Not only had they been able to overrun Biafra’s northern borders and capture the university town of Nsukka, but they had come close to threatening Enugu. Indeed it is fair to say that during this initial phase there was nothing to stop them overrunning Enugu. 184 However, it has also been pointed out that Enugu was easily in the grasp of the Federal forces, except that the troops were severely restricted in the supplies of ammunition for their offensive, and it seems that this was the reason the attack on Enugu stalled, giving Biafran troops time to regroup. As far as Gowon was concerned, this was not all-out war but simply a ‘police action’. Gowon felt he could achieve his objective with limited arms supplies and the minimum of loss of life. 185 However, it is fair to comment that at this juncture both sides were testing each other’s strengths and weaknesses. They were embarking on an exercise in which at best only a few officers, from both sides, had classroom experience, from their Mons and Sandhurst days. Even their limited experience in the Congo as part of a peacekeeping force had not prepared them for a belligerent confrontation. A further consideration was that both sides’ equipment for launching a campaign was also limited. It is true that the Federal army was better equipped and that Ojukwu, having been in charge of arms procurement in the Nigerian army before the war, knew the exact armament strength of the opposition. He had also trained some of the newly appointed Federal army divisional commanders and was aware of their strengths and weaknesses. However, the Federal army’s timely pause in the attack on Enugu enabled Biafra to launch a surprise initiative in the Mid-West. Its success until it stalled at Ore meant that Ojukwu found himself and the Biafran army in the ascendancy, and he found that his cause had growing sympathy from the international community. It began to take serious note of Biafra for two reasons. Firstly there were concerns that Nigeria would degenerate into another Congo and that secessionist movements in other parts of the world might receive inspiration. From America’s point of view this was especially true in relation to her concerns in Vietnam. Secondly was the west’s and Africa’s concern over Russia’s support for the Federal cause. 186 However, as Gowon pointed, out he needed an air force to counter Biafra’s ageing B-26 bombers. Ideological influences did not enter his thinking; it was simply that Russia was willing to supply the necessary fighter planes. As events were to prove, Russia’s influence was at best very limited. Her ideologies were of limited interest to Gowon, although the west did not know that at the time, and this new development gave Gowon and his administration greater negotiating power over the supply of British arms. 187 However Ojukwu’s ascendant position was undermined by Banjo’s treachery, allowing Gowon to take the initiative and force Biafra on the defensive.

  International awareness

  The war at this stage did not exactly hold huge significance for the international community. Indeed it can be argued that it was regarded as simply another skirmish between opposing forces in yet another unstable, recently independent African country. The Daily Telegraph in Britain commented in August 1967 that it was surprised that neither the Commonwealth nor the British Government had treated the conflict particularly seriously or with any degree of urgency. It compared Britain’s attitude to Rhodesia where it ‘sabre rattled’, yet did nothing to Nigeria. 188 It was to take an initiative by Ojukwu to motivate the international community to put pressure on both sides to negotiate a peaceful settlement and to take the war with any degree of importance or seriousness. However, it could be argued that in taking this initiative he calculated that the effect would strengthen his position and put him into the ascendant, so that he could assert his county’s independence and gain international recognition for the state of Biafra. He invited the British newspapers The Sun and the Daily Sketch , as well as television crews, to visit the war in Biafra and to report back to their readers and viewers the status of his country at that time. The first pictures to arrive in newspapers in the west were of small ‘pot-bellied’ children, with headlines like ‘Children wait to die’, 189 ‘The land of no hope’, 190 ‘The scandal of Biafra’, 191 ‘Children need milk Britain sends bullets’. 192 These emotive headlines were based on reports by Michael Leapman of The Sun , and Brian Dixon of the Daily Sketch .