I invited Malcolm MacDonald over to Lagos, in the guise of a holiday, but of course in reality he acted as my emissary, keeping the doors open, in an attempt at trying to stop hostilities breaking out between the opposing parties. He travelled extensively between Lagos, Enugu and Kaduna. Of course the whole idea was to uphold the unity of Nigeria. The idea was for him to visit me as a friend and not in any official capacity so that way he was free to visit as many of the interested parties as possible, but not as my authorised representative. 112

  MacDonald seems to have enjoyed a degree of success, or so he thought. After Aburi he told Hunt, the new incoming British High Commissioner: ‘It’s simple, that’s its merit: the constitution is to be further amended to give each region almost total autonomy and in return the East acknowledges the unity of Nigeria and recognises the Federal Military Government with Gowon as its head.’ 113

  The tragedy of Aburi was the ‘backpedalling’ by Gowon’s Military Government in its aftermath. The meeting was agreed with good intentions, but the two sides led by Gowon and Ojukwu had totally different agendas. Cumming-Bruce said: ‘I didn’t attend the meeting but I saw Gowon just before he left for Ghana, and I felt he was in no fit state to take part in the meeting because he appeared to have an extremely debilitating fever.’ 114

  Gowon’s plan was to have an open and frank discussion with his military colleagues in a relaxed and informal manner with no fixed agenda, in an attempt to resolve the various differences and to plan a way forward which would ensure the unity and security of Nigeria.

  Ojukwu had other ideas. He came to the meeting with very clear-cut objectives, fully briefed by his senior advisors who were determined to achieve an agreement which would give the East a high degree of independence. Furthermore, he insisted on the meetings being recorded so that there would be no misunderstanding for the future. In retrospect it would seem that Gowon and his colleagues took an unusually naïve stance on their negotiations at Aburi. One possible explanation is that they had very little real understanding of the anguish and fear which the Northern riots had engendered in the Igbo people. Lagos, where most of the Federal Government was still centred, was very distant and remote from the rioting areas and from the East. It was perhaps this remoteness that fostered a degree of relaxed compromise. 115 Furthermore, the other delegates had limited fear of racial attacks; the Igbos were the race under attack and all Igbos had reason to be concerned for their safety, especially in the North. Even Ojukwu feared for his personal safety, as Adebayo, the newly appointed Western Regional Governor, said during an interview: ‘ Both Ojukwu and I were concerned for our personal safety in the West because of the presence of large numbers of Northern troops, whose loyalty to the new government was questionable, and Ojukwu made no further trips to the West.’ 116

  The fact remained that Ojukwu’s approach was very business-like with clear-cut objectives, whilst the other side had no particular agenda. A further fact was that all delegates insisted on returning to their respective regions at the end of each day, allowing for no relaxed social intercourse. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that Ojukwu’s demands and persuasive arguments gained support from the other members of the meeting. The delegates agreed on a much looser confederation and much greater autonomy for the regions. 117

  At Aburi Gowon’s position was also one of intermediary; in all his negotiations he had to ensure that he carried the North and the West with him, and his position as military head of state was still precarious. His other intention was to ensure that Ojukwu agreed to respect the new military command structure. Indeed it can be argued that Gowon’s main objective was to restore the reputation of the army and to reintegrate it into the country as a whole. He felt that if this was achieved the regional and federal senior civil servants could work out the detail. 118 He simply failed to understand Ojukwu’s essentially intractable position. Ojukwu had no constraints in convincing other parties of his objectives. The Consultative Committee in the East had given him a mandate to negotiate on their behalf. The intention was that the regions would gain a high degree of independence within a Nigerian confederation, strong regions with a weak centre.

  At Aburi it was also agreed that all parties would renounce force to achieve their objectives and finally that ‘any decision affecting the whole country must be determined by the Supreme Military Council, which it was agreed would effectively be a collegiate leadership. Where such a meeting was not possible such a matter must be referred to the Military Governors for comment and concurrence.’ 119 Effectively this meant that if one regional governor did not agree with a proposal that would be the end of the affair. Such a power of veto was going to make governing Nigeria very difficult indeed, but Gowon and his supporters seemed blissfully unaware of such constraints. Two other details from Aburi were to have future and near future resonance. Firstly, there was an agreement that there would be a concerted effort to recruit Yorubas into the army, to address the regional imbalance of ethnic recruits. The effect of this was eventually to help to keep the West firmly in the Federal and, by implication, in the North’s camp. Secondly, there was an agreement to pay Igbo civil servants, especially those on lower grades and those paid hourly, who were now suffering degrees of hardship and who had fled back their homeland, until March 1967. Demands for more support for the East went unheeded and this was to become contentious as the days progressed towards war. However, Ojukwu had achieved his objective and he was to promote the slogan ‘By Aburi we stand’ to the world.

  Tragically, Gowon reneged on the Aburi Agreement after pressure from some Northern emirs and his senior civil servants. Indeed the civil servants pointed out to him that his position was untenable if he kept to the Aburi Agreement, because it granted almost complete autonomy to the regions, leaving very little absolute power at the centre. A further factor had also come into play: the majority of these civil servants came from minority peoples across Nigeria, and they were in no mood to accept the ongoing domination of the three main ethnic groups within the country. Indeed it was pointed out to Gowon that if the country accepted the Aburi Agreement his own tiny ethnic group, the Angas people, would be under threat. The minority groups represented some forty percent of the population and such people were opposed to confederation. 120 This was echoed by an official memorandum submitted by the Acting Secretary of the Federal Military Government to members of the Supreme Military Council, rejecting several of the Aburi decisions on the grounds that they were incompatible with maintenance of effective control over essential matters. There were two major issues. First was the concern for the respective powers of the centre and the regions, and second the power of veto by any regional governor over proceedings of the Supreme Military Council. These issues had been raised by law officers when they met in January 1967. 121 From Gowon’s and his supporters’ points of view agreement in these areas meant that the provision of the 1963 Constitution, whereby the Federal Military Government retained the authority to declare that a Regional Military Governor was abusing his powers, was essential if the federal status of the country was to be retained. 122 From Ojukwu’s standpoint of confederalism this was totally unacceptable. As far as Ojukwu was concerned, the Aburi Agreement had confirmed confederalism, and any movement away from the Agreement would be rejected by the East. 123

  In an attempt to placate the East, a meeting of the Supreme Military Council was called, to be held on 10 March 1967 in the Mid-West Region, in Benin. Ojukwu did not attend. At the meeting the Federal Government promulgated decree 8, which confirmed the extent to which the Supreme Military Council would go to meet Ojukwu in his demands for a confederation, as agreed at Aburi. Although it allowed for extensive internal self-government, it made the point that federal law was superior to regional law. It also stated that if ‘the democratic institutions of Nigeria are threatened by subversion and it is necessary to declare a state of emergency’ this could be sanctioned by the head of the Military Government supported by at least three of the Military Governors. 124 Ojukwu rejected the decree, as did his colleagues in the East, and they confirmed their policy of secession. However Ojukwu did make some effort to keep the Western and Mid-Western regions on his side, through meetings with their respective governors, Colonel Adebayo and Lt-Col. Ejoor, as they in turn attempted to keep the East within Nigeria.

  There is no doubt that Awolowo, Ejoor and myself made every effort to agree to Ojukwu’s demands. It was also apparent to us that both Gowon and Ojukwu were potentially prepared to compromise, but they were both being pressured by forces which were in no mood to be conciliarity. The East felt increasingly vulnerable and were pushing for a separate existence, and the North, through Northern politicians and rulers, were unwilling to compromise, both.’ 125

  Military action was increasingly seen as the only way to bring the Igbo people back into the Federation. Gowon was egged on not only by his Northern colleagues, particularly Col. Hassan Katsina, but also the newly appointed British High Commissioner, David Hunt. Both felt that the Nigerian Army could bring the recalcitrant Igbos into line within two weeks. 126 British policy had always favoured the North, so the High Commissioner’s sentiments were simply following a tradition. Cumming-Bruce said: ‘David Hunt, my successor, who had also been my deputy in Lagos, was very dismissive of the military prowess of the Igbo people. I myself thought they were too clever by half.’ 127

  However, Gowon’s position was still extremely precarious and constrained. It was not until he received confirmed support from his former military superior, now the West’s military governor, and Chief Awolowo, whom he appointed as his finance minister and his deputy, that he felt secure enough to counter secession by the East and to hold the Nigerian state together as a single entity. An alliance with Awolowo took time to achieve. Having been released from prison, Gowon was keen to have his support for his new regime. Without it, and in spite of Adebayo’s corroboration, it is likely that Gowon’s regime would not have gained the backing of the Western region and its necessary financial support. One of Awolowo’s misgivings was that Northern troops remained stationed in the west. On 7 November 1966 Awolowo led a delegation to Gowon, appealing to the Federal Government to remove Northern troops from Lagos and the West. He stated: ‘The consensus of opinion among the majority of people in Western Nigeria and Lagos is that northern troops in the two territories constitute an army of occupation, and their non-removal has virtually reduced the said territories to the status of a “Protectorate”.’ 128

  Indeed even as late as May 1967 Awolowo was still seen to be supporting neither the Federal Government nor the Eastern Region as the crisis deteriorated. In his speech ‘The Four Imperatives’, his third comment was the most controversial:

  [If the] Eastern Region is allowed by acts of omission or commission to secede or opt out of Nigeria, the Western Region and Lagos must also stay out of the Federation …. Before the Western delegates went to Lagos to attend to the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee, they were given a clear mandate that if any region should opt out of the federation of Nigeria, then the federation must be considered at an end; and then the western Region and Lagos should opt out of it. It should then be open to Western Nigeria and Lagos as an independent sovereign state to enter into association with any of the Nigerian units of its own choosing, and on terms mutually acceptable to them. 129

  Awolowo’s confirmed support for Gowon and the Federation’s continuity finally occurred when the Northern emirs and leaders of thought committed to the creation of more states in the country, and urged Gowon to set this in motion. Awolowo had always been a keen advocate of the creation of additional states. Furthermore, he was treated very shabbily by Ojukwu in May 1967, when he and a delegation held talks with him to avert the crisis. Comments at the time suggested that Ojukwu treated Awolowo cavalierly and that he made rude remarks to him. 130

  The Gowon government hoped to benefit from Awolowo’s popularity in two ways, namely by legitimising its own politics in the Western Region and by consolidating the tentative unity of its Yoruba communities which had emerged after Awolowo’s imprisonment in order to prevent further political factionalisation and conflict. Colonel Adeyinka Adebayo, the Western Region’s military administrator, facilitated this process by inviting a large number of former politicians and other opinion leaders from Yoruba communities throughout the Western Region. Appealing to them to overcome past divisions, he suggested that it might be to the benefit of all if the Yoruba spoke with one voice and enjoined those present to elect a leader.

  Proposed by an old supporter and seconded by a former NNDP [Nigerian National Democratic Party] member, Awolowo was chosen as the Asiwaju Yoruba, or vanguard leader of the Yorubas. 131

  With Awolowo’s decision to put his considerable popular support behind the Federation, Gowon’s position was substantially strengthened. Not only did Adebayo, as the West’s military governor, promise substantial financial help, which meant that most armaments were paid for in hard currency, but this support continued throughout the war, in some cases to Adebayo’s detriment. 132

  Less interested in the idea of progress through ethnic nationalism than Awolowo, Gowon’s main ambition was to use state creation, controlled by a more centralised national government, in order to undermine the Biafran project by appealing to non-Igbo citizens of the Eastern Region who wanted administrative independence. Despte these differences, the shared commitment to federalism by Awolowo and Gowon created a political alliance in which Nigeria’s future was decided, to the detriment of Biafra. 133

  However, a new and somewhat unexpected development occurred. Having been encouraged by both the American Ambassador and the British High Commissioner, when he came to power, to hold the state together, Gowon’s position was undermined by both countries’ attitude to the East’s proposed secession. Both Britain and America hoped Nigeria would remain united, but they would offer no positive guarantees to support the Federal Government should the East secede, indeed America stated it would remain neutral. 134 Gowon was extremely frustrated by both countries’ reaction. Paraphrasing John F. Kennedy, he said ‘governments have no friends or enemies – only interests’. 135 Britain’s position was coloured by the outbreak of the Six Day Arab–Israeli war, which closed the Suez Canal and thus potentially limited her supply of oil. Pragmatic over its vested interests, it was probably a sensible policy to offer more ambivalent support to the Federal Government, in view of the East potentially taking control of Nigeria’s oil. The reality was that oil revenues went to Lagos, and as the war progressed, although oil supplies were very limited and the East made attempts, which failed, to hold Shell to ransom over oil revenues, most oil produced reached the Federal Government, and limited exports went to Britain.

  Ojukwu suffered no constraints: not only did he have the support of the East’s ruling elite but he also had popular support throughout the region, because he was seen to be the person who could protect the people from their paranoid fear of genocide by the North. Furthermore, as a people Easterners felt rejected by the rest of the country. Having spread throughout the country through many generations utilising their skills not only for personal benefit but also for the good of the communities in which they settled, they now felt ostracized for little justifiable reason. They also mistrusted Gowon’s Lagos administration, which had been unable to control the Igbo killings and destruction of their property in the North. Ojukwu was able to declare on secession, ‘There is no power in this country or in black Africa to subdue us by force’, 136 and:

  Gowon will hum and haw for sometime. The North will be impatient and start to hare down here with a ramshackle army. Once they cross into Biafra we’ll take the war to them. I have the wherewithal to ensure that what is a large part of the North is completely destroyed and put under the control of Biafra. 137

  Although this statement was propagandist, arrogant and boastful, to a point his comments bore substance. In his previous role in the Nigerian army he had had complete knowledge of its structure, its strengths and weaknesses, and he had the benefit that most Nigerian army officers with technical skills were of Igbo origin and had fled to the East. Also, of the fifty-seven officers commissioned before independence, only five were available to Gowon, while Ojukwu had access to seventeen. 138 Gowon’s lack of trained officers was to cause him and his subordinates unending problems and constraints throughout the campaign, and can be seen as one of the reasons why it took him so long to secure an armistice.

  Boro and Gowon’s twelve-state decree

  The concept of regional independence, within the Nigerian state, was not new. When Lord Lugard was given charge of the country, discussions centred round creating between eight and twelve regions within the country. Chief Awolowo, as leader of the Yoruba people, felt that the country would be better served with a number of regional states.

  Awolowo had reflected on the role of the regions’ political machines in his own political marginalisation in his book ‘Thoughts on the Nigerian Constitution’ (1966), written during his time in prison, and argued for the creation of eighteen states based on Nigeria’s larger ethnic and linguistic groupings to further the development and emergence of Nigeria’s ethnic nations. Beyond such immediate concerns, Awolowo also anticipated that the creation of six states out of the former Northern Nigeria would give progressive politicians, like himself, the chance to undermine the monolithic politics that had characterised the Northern Region under Ahmadu Bello’s leadership. 139