‘Steiner selected the sector on the Enugu to Onitsha road, an area which was to remain in Biafran control until the end of the war.’ 254 He did have limited success in stalling the advance of the Federal Second Division. The Second Division’s commander, Colonel Haruna, admitted that Steiner’s actions along the Onitsha to Enugu road had stopped him joining Nigeria’s two other divisions in their attempt at the final subjugation of Biafra. 255 Steiner also achieved notable success with his commandos at Amansee, Uku and Amieni. Achuzia succeeded in stalling Mohammed’s First Division crossing of the river Niger from Asaba to Onitsha. Achuzia stalled Mohammed three times, and it was not until Mohammed realised the inadequacy of his position that he took his division north, crossing the river clear of Achuzia’s division, and was able to force his way south to Onitsha. Although Federal troops eventually took control of this important Biafran trading town, laying waste to the largest covered market in Africa at that time, with considerable loss of civilian life, the Biafran forces continued to battle with the enemy, and Onitsha was never fully under the control of Federal troops until the end of the war.

  Ojukwu commented on the Federal army’s attempt to cross the Niger, following Biafra’s retreat from the Mid-West:

  I had been an instructor on the staff at Teshi, in Ghana, lecturing on infantry tactics in 1959, and one of my students was Second Lieutenant Murtala Mohammed. One of the questions I set my students was how to attack Onitsha from the west of the River Niger. I recalled Mohammed’s response so knew what sort of approach he would take and was able to forestall his attack. 256

  Indeed such was the tenacity of Biafran troops that the Federal forces were never able to control the entire road from Enugu to Onitsha. The Biafrans kept control of a section of the road of some six to twelve miles until the end of the war. This was to cause Federal forces continual frustration and arguably, because of the number of troops pinned down and deployed at this point added to the longevity of the war. One of the most spectacular ambushes of the war occurred in this area. A large supply column containing munitions and petrol, escorted by two armoured cars, had been sent from Enugu to support Murtala Mohammed’s division at Onitsha. At Abagana it ran into an ambush set up by Colonel Achuzia, who witnessed it, and said the results were spectacular:

  A lucky shot hit the leading petrol tanker and the ensuing flames spread back throughout the column, destroying everthing in its path. All the enemy’s supplies were lost, including all their vehicles and many of their troops. It had a remarkable effect on Biafra’s morale and indeed the remains of the attack were left for visiting journalists to inspect and photograph for the reminder of the war. 257

  An eyewitness account of the state of the Biafran army in late 1968 is given by Stephen Lewis, a Canadian journalist who visited Colonel Kalu, 258 the commander of the important Owerri sector, with headquarters at Oguta:

  The key town of Oguta, just north-west of Owerri a few miles from the strategic Uli airport, and three weeks ago in Federal hands, has been retaken … the Biafrans are in command of every inch; in fact, Oguta serves as Brigade headquarters.

  The Colonel, like his head of state, is, ironically, a product of the best British military colleges. He is soft spoken, contemplative, self-critical, and balanced. In fact, I find the apparent moderation of Biafran leadership quite unsettling; it violates all my pre-conceived prejudices about the nature of the military mind.

  He runs a tight fighting force. This is no rag, bob-tail outfit. Commando units move in and out by jeep with startling precision – armed to the teeth …. At the administrative centre, paper-work is simply and effectively organized. The atmosphere is tough, but not oppressive. Despite the still critical shortages of vehicles, gas, and weapons, morale couldn’t be higher. You can’t help but marvel at the spirit against such formidable odds; the Nigerians do have an inexhaustible armoured military machine.

  Colonel Kalu acknowledges an upswing in Biafran prospects over the last few weeks …. He attributes a large part of it to the slight but steady increase in arms; but feels that the halting of the Federal advance is the overwhelming morale factor.

  The account goes on to record an extremely important comment relating to Biafra’s survival and the optimism shown by many people when interviewed, that Biafran desire for self-determination would finally be successful.

  When you pore over maps with a man like Kalu, the mystery of Biafran resistance is gradually clarified.

  One gross misconception has been put abroad from the start of the war. It is assumed that when a provincial capital falls – like Port Harcourt. Or Aba, or Owerri, or Umuahia – the province falls with it. Nothing could be further from the truth. What was indicative of traditional Europeans patterns of war cannot be superimposed on Biafra.

  In this country, control of a provincial capital usually means control of that capital and not one inch more. Biafrans just move their administrative headquarters a few miles away, with minimal interruption of the war effort.

  To talk, therefore, of a tightening net, based on the capture of certain main centres, is simply to talk nonsense. Much of the hinterland is firmly in Biafran control. It is difficult to talk of identifiable ‘fronts’. The front is incredibly fluid; it changes materially every day. The Biafrans are not squeezed into some ever-diminishing pocket one-tenth its former size (as I was wont to believe not so long ago). You can travel scores of miles in every direction from Umuahia, and get no sense whatsoever of an ‘enemy’.

  It is possible to cross back and forth through federal ‘lines’ with impunity, because ‘lines’ don’t always exist. Even in those provinces where Nigerian troops control the Capital, Biafran admistrators collect taxes, organise the local population and report regularly to Colonel Ojukwu.

  And everywhere there is stepped-up, sophisticated guerrilla resistance. In fact, that’s the kind of struggle Biafra really wants to fight, and is now prepared to fight – an unconventional war. Sharp guerrilla thrust by night; swift commando action and retreat; cutting off vulnerable Nigeria supply lines – these are the very heart of Biafran tactics. 259

  Adekunle’s Federal Third Commando Division made strides to break conformist traditions, but had rather less success than the opposition. His success can mainly be attributed to his abusive and draconian control over his officers and men.

  As he commented, he demanded absolute obedience from his officers and men and gained a reputation as an austere, remote and fearsome divisional commander. As he said by 30 I was a hero in the eyes of the Nigerian people and was known as the ‘Black Scorpion’. He said that he had an absolute love for his training at Sandhurst, and regards his defining moment during training in England when he was introduced to Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother, and was invited to stay at Sandringham. The invitation was never confirmed but the thought by her made a lasting impression on him. In spite of his success as divisional commander he was modest about his achievements. However he is bitter about his dismissal as a divisional commander, to be replaced by Colonel Obasanjo, who he feels enjoyed all the success without enduring any of the the hardships along the way.

  Soyinka comments on Obasanjo:

  but [he] is, basically, a fortunate recipient of the largesse of fate. After all, how many soldiers, after the bulk of a civil war had been fought and won by others, find themselves positioned to receive the articles of surrender from the enemy, thus appropriating the mantle of the architect of victory? 260

  He commented that his dismissal was because he refused to even to consider conversion to Islam, which he says was a condition for him to retain his command. There is little evidence to support this, but there is evidence to support the fact that the Federal Army headquarters were concerned that their divisional commanders were exercising too much independence, 261 were potentially becoming too popular with the population and in the interests of security for the regime, and its attempts to achieve victory, changes were necessary. 262

  As he admitted when he was given the task of recruiting, staffing and training this Third Commando Division, he invited prison officers and ex-prisoners to form the basis of his force – not the best people to turn into a competent fighting force. 263 During the early stages of his campaign he enjoyed a considerable number of successful advances, after he overran Calabar. In May 1968 his division finally overran the strategic town of Port Harcourt, after his capture of Abakaliki. By September he had taken Aba and in mid-September Owerri. It seemed that his advance was unstoppable. ‘He runs an area the size of Scotland with the authoritarian and arbitrary hand of a medieval king.’ 264

  Gowon announced a further ‘final offensive’ to bring the war to an end. The reality was, however, that the war was not in fact running in Lagos’s favour. In April 1968 Biafran troops overran Federal troops at Onne, Arochukwu and Aletu and then proceeded to take back Ikot-Ekpene, Oguta and Enugu-Aku. In October there was a decisive battle at the strategic town of Umuahia, when Adekunle’s Third Commando Division lost two-thirds of its force. By November his lines of communication to Owerri were threatened. The recapture of Owerri was probably the most successful action of the campaign by Biafran troops. Throughout the war, once Biafra had been put into a defensive position, she enjoyed certain strategic advantages. Not only did she know her own topography, she had the support of the local population. Federal troops tended to advance only on main roads and did little to secure surrounding territory during their advance.

  A report written by Col. Scott, defence attaché at the British High Commission in Lagos, commented on the fighting capabilities of the Nigerian army:

  Tactics employed by the Nigerian Army are basically conventional but are poorly executed, ponderous, slow, but nevertheless in the long run they prove effective. This is an infantry war fought at platoon or at best company level, with progress dependent upon the going and the visibility in the various sectors. Units regard a vast expenditure of small arms ammunition (the basic weapon being fully automatic) as substitute for their acute shortage of leaders at the lower level. Effective fire control and conservancy of ammunition are almost unknown throughout the Army apart from in a few units in the 1st Division which are wealthier in junior N.C.O.s and officers. Normally it is the cacophony of automatic weapons with most bullets flying harmlessly high into trees, which carries the Nigerian soldier forward. It has been said that the Nigerian Army, in the advance is the best defoliation agent known.

  The report also passed comment on the fighting qualities of Biafran troops:

  The Igbo soldier has displayed latent military qualities which caused some surprise. This motivation stems from fear for survival which follows the daily tirade of propaganda pumped out by Ojukwu’s information service. In sheer guile he has proved himself adept at infiltration and by doing so, has forced the Federals to use caution in their movements and to expend a disproportionate number of men on purely security and defensive tasks. With the Federal formations acting in isolation and lacking in co-ordination, the rebels tend to turn the traditional disadvantage any force has when operating along interior lines of communication to their advantage. Apparently this fundamental fact has never been fully appreciated by Federal planners, who consistently fail to move their three divisions in concert. 265

  This fact was borne out by the Federal forces’ inability to join up along the main road connecting Onitsha with Enugu throughout the war. As Achuzia said: ‘Because my troops found it easy to infiltrate with theirs, and the Federal’s inability to co-ordinate divisional attacks, it was relatively easy to keep the divisions along the Enugu to Onitsha road apart.’ 266 Owerri proved a typical instance. Federal troops had advanced, following main roads, to Owerri and had successfully secured the town. However, because they made inadequate provision for protecting their flanks over their lines of communication, Biafran troops found it easy to break the Federal supply lines. Biafran troops were able to disrupt the supply lines to Owerri and indeed, much of the time, were able to capture armaments. Thus over a period of weeks they literally laid siege to Owerri leading to a final surrender of Federal troops. The Biafrans, however, were not keen on capturing the Federal troops defending Owerri, so they arranged for a safe passage of these troops, having first relieved them of arms and supplies. Pragmatic as ever, Biafra was in no mood, nor was she able, to feed and look after additional captured Federal troops, hence the decision to allow them to escape. The retaking of Owerri was a great victory for Biafra and a serious setback for the Federal side. 267

  When the war began the Biafran air force consisted of two B26 bombers and a number of French Alouette helicopters. In 1968, following recognition by Zambia, she received two DC-3s from that country. 268 In May 1969 Biafra received a boost in its defence forces with the arrival of five Swedish Minicom light aircraft. According to the terms of their sale, they were delivered on 29 April to an airport in Paris and then dismantled and loaded on to a charter plane which delivered them to Libreville and then on to Uli in Biafra. The planes had been financed by Tanzania, who had officially recognised the state of Biafra on 13 April 1968. Count Carl Gustaf von Rosen, together with a group of Swedish volunteers, with the help of the Biafran air force, put these planes to considerable effect. They were classified as trainers, and although the Swedish Ministry of Trade stated that they were equipped with cameras for prospecting, what the ministry did not state was that they were equipped with 76-mm rockets. During May 1969 the Minicoms raided the airports at Port Harcourt, Enugu and Benin, destroying a number of Nigerian planes. Von Rosen and his team were also successful in attacking the oil refinery complex at Port Harcourt and the Shell-BP terminal in the Mid-West at Forcados. These attacks proved so successful that they had a serious effect on Nigeria’s oil production. They also effectively attacked shipping near Sapele and Warri. 269 It is also interesting to note that according to Sqd-Leader Alfred Anowai, no Minicoms were lost throughout the campaign and they continued to be effective until the end of hostilities. The Biafrans in their usual imaginative way ensured that all these aircraft were safely stored when not on mission. The Biafrans built specially secure hangers for these aircraft into the side of a hill, ensuring their invisibility to Nigerian aircraft surveillance. 270 Von Rosen and his Minicoms represented a good example of how even a limited supply of armaments could have a disproportionate effect in one side gaining a stragegic advantage. Throughout the campaign both sides were constrained by the supply of arms, but because the war was effectively fought as a series of skirmishes and limited engagements, many of short duration, additional armament support could result in either side gaining substantial results. The effect of Von Rosen’s aircraft was to paralyse the supply of oil from Port Harcourt and the Mid-West to Lagos.

  Arms procurement was an ongoing problem for both sides. From the Federal position arms procurement should have been fairly straightforward. It had no constraints on access to the country either by sea, land or air or on her finances, due to ongoing Yoruba support for the war. It had competent administrative support from Awolowo and his ministry of finance, together with Adebayo, the Western military governor’s ongoing commitment to defeating the Biafrans, and initially it had the support of Britain. However, as the war progressed and international pressure reviewed the human cost of the war, constraints were put on the Federal Government. 271 Added to this was the huge appetite the Federal forces had for the wasteful use of arms. 272 Biafra had different constraints, which meant that arms procurement was an ongoing issue throughout the war. Sources of supply in the early stages proved extremely difficult, but as the war progressed became less problamatic.

  Gowon: control and logistics

  Gowon had been elected as a compromise candidate following the second coup, and it took time for him to secure his power base. Although by the start of the war his position had improved significantly, he had massive manpower, logistical and topographical constraints to overcome if he was to successfully challenge the secessionists’ determination to achieve sovereignty. Although initially he declared that the Federal Government’s response to Biafra’s declaration was only to be a police action, following the secessionists’ unsuccessful incursion into the Mid-West he was obliged to expand the size of his army rapidly. Because the majority of the officer elite were of Igbo origin, Gowon was left with a very small group of experienced officers, the majority of whom were his peers in the army’s hierarchy. Because of this, he said, ‘They had had similar military experiences as I had had, mainly during their time as a United Nations support force in the Congo, and I tended to allow them a high degree of responsibility and autonomy for recruitment and expansion of the army.’ 273

  This approach saw the beginning of his style of leaving his commanders with much independence, which was to prove in some cases successful, but in others less so.

  At the start of the war the Federal Government appeared to be militarily superior to Biafra. On the one hand it had most of the original Nigerian army, both in equipment, arms and men. However it suffered from one weakness at the start of hostilities. It had an insufficient number of trained and skilled officers to conduct a war which eventually demanded the expansion of the army from 10,000 men to 200,000 men. Obviously during the course of the campaign it attempted to redress this imbalance, but this proved an extremely difficult task. As Scott pointed out, the 1 st Division was fairly well supported by officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) of sufficient calibre, being the remnants of the original Nigerian army, but the other two divisions relied on newly trained and often inexperienced officers and NCOs. As Adekunle pointed out when he was given the task of creating his commando division, he was obliged to recruit from the student population, prison officers and ex-prisoners. 274