However Ojukwu’s moral superiority was severely tested in the eyes of the international community when a group of Italian oilmen were ambushed, captured and killed by Biafran troops, under the leadership of Colonel Achuzia. Not only did the international community condemn the killings, but extreme pressure was brought to bear on Ojukwu to release the survivors. The western press had reported that the survivors were to be put on trial for espionage and if found guilty were to be shot. As Ojukwu wryly put it: ‘The world was up in arms over the fate of a few white Europeans. The deaths of a few million Africans paled into insignificance.’ 212

  Even the Pope became involved in the affair, writing to Ojukwu, who is a Roman Catholic, and reminding him of his Christian responsibilities. The truth of the story, which perhaps has more credibility, is that Biafra’s army was accustomed to carrying out incursive raids in the Mid-West region, ever since it had so reluctantly retreated from Ore to Onitsha. One of these incursions involved attempts to gain access to the oil-producing area at Kwale, or at least to prevent the Federal authorities benefiting from it. At the time this oil supply was being funded by Shell and being accessed by a group of Europeans including Italians. In the ensuing ambush by Biafran troops, some of the oilmen were shot and killed, and the remainder taken prisoner. As Achuzia said:

  Biafra was particularly annoyed by Shell’s activities in the region because at the start of hostilities Shell’s representatives in the East had been repatriated on the understanding that the company, or at least their representatives, would not involve themselves in oil extraction for either side whilst the conflict ensued. Ojukwu felt very let down by Shell over its breaking their, albeit, gentleman’s agreement. 213

  Ojukwu said:

  A total of eleven charges were preferred against them. Of these they were acquitted on nine and found guilty on two. The two counts on which they were convicted carried, in accordance with our law, the death penalty. They were accordingly condemned. In response to the direct appeal by His Holiness the Pope and the intercession of our friends, I two days ago on June 4 1969, exercised my prerogative of mercy and granted the men a reprieve. We meet today on this solemn occasion, to witness their release….

  There is a significant side-line to the events connected with the release of these men – a situation from which all Africa should draw a healthy and wise lesson. For the lives of eighteen individuals, the entire white population of the world – from east to west, north to south – have risen in impressive solidarity. Even those who for two years of war have actively supported Nigeria in the slaughter of thousands and thousands of black lives in Biafra, have raised passionate voices and made desperate moves. I am not a racist. Far from it. But it is impossible to avoid the need to point these facts and to make appropriate deductions.

  He then went on to propose that friends of both parties get together to facilitate ways of bringing this ‘futile’ conflict to an end. 214

  The Biafran authorities had secured their objective and had blocked this oil access to the Federal regime. Biafra declared that the Italian oilmen had been taken into custody. In reality, according to Achuzia, he entertained them in his officer’s mess and accorded them every facility, including making arrangements for them to attend mass at a nearby Roman Catholic church. 215 The fact was, as Ojukwu said, ‘Rather than wanting to use these captives as scapegoats, they had become more of an embarrassment to us. We had achieved our objective of securing the oil source, and we were keen to see these men repatriated as soon as possible.’ 216

  The incident gives a good example of the international community’s ignorance of Africa and particularly of Nigeria at the time. The perception generated by an avaricious western press intent on generating a salacious story, in order to sell their newspapers, was that savage behaviour over the capture of these oilmen was the norm in this underdeveloped backwater in this unknown and perceived inhuman continent, especially in the light of the Congo conflict. The reality was so different. As Ojukwu commented, in order not to lose face Biafra was obliged to be seen to follow a due process of law, but it had no intention of carrying out any sentences handed down by the courts. 217 Added to which, as Gbulie commented, ‘The Biafran judiciary, a very British-based institution, ensured that the oilmen had received a fair and open trial.’ 218

  However, pragmatic as ever, the safe return of the Italian oilmen was important to Ojukwu, because at the time the incident had done much to undermine his moral superiority in the eyes of the international community. 219

  As the Daily Telegraph pointed out:

  A hideous mistake is probably the best explanation for the now discovered killing of 11 foreign oil prospectors by Biafran troops. But even that seems hard to accept when 13 others are awarded the death sentence. The Biafran leader has warned foreigners employed in the Federal Nigerian economy that they are there at their own risk. He has accused the 18 oil men, who like the massacred prospectors are mostly Italians, of ‘fighting side by side with the Nigerians.’ His reticence about the massacre at the Okpai caravan site and the speed of the announcement of death sentences imply that much less than justice is being done. The Biafran leaders seem, inexplicably, to be running amok.

  In every respect Col. Ojukwu is blundering. A lengthy report has just been published on cases of genocide suffered by the Biafran people. The caravan site massacre shows that both sides have massacred in the heat of victory. He is deeply offending world opinion which has been largely instrumental in aid reaching him when European governments failed to recognise him …. Panic and derangement seem to be his motives. Moreover, as Col. Ojukwu bases all his military hopes on reaching Port Harcourt and controlling Nigeria’s oil supplies again, a policy of frightfulness to those oil operatives whom he captures must defeat his own aims. Initially the Italian and German Governments are seeing what can be done by intercession. Let us hope it succeeds. 220

  The murder, and then the passing of death sentences on the survivors, of the Italian oil drilling team by Biafra had some far-reaching implications, even though the condemned men have now been reprieved. 221

  Ojukwu’s use of propaganda throughout the campaign was, generally, promoted to good effect and to Biafra’s advantage, as will be seen in Chapter 5 on Biafra’s longevity. His public relations organisation successfully used accusations of Federal genocide together with peace initiatives and aid support, whenever they could be focused to put Biafra in a favourable position in the eyes of the international community. Gowon’s attitude to publicity was in marked contrast. He believed in his cause, and therefore as he said being in the right, as he saw it, he would achieve his objective without the need for promotional activity. It was only later in the war that he began to realise the importance of public relations. 222

  Biafran infiltration and intelligence

  The people of eastern Nigeria are great market traders and the war opened opportunities for such traders to exploit business opportunities on both sides of ever-changing and flexible borders throughout the war. ‘Attack markets’ proved a great way of moving goods from Federal to Biafran territory. Although the Federal Government had made a determined effort to undermine the fiscal strength of the Biafran economy by changing her currency in January 1968, rendering useless some £2 million taken from the Mid-West’s central bank back to Biafra during its retreat from Benin, this had little effect on Biafra’s ability to continue cross-border trading through ‘attack markets’. These markets were able to satisfy the demands of people and soldiers from both sides by providing goods and indeed services. Such was the nature of this war that Federal troops especially were disinclined to continue fighting outside of traditional working hours. Fighting would end by dusk and would usually not resume until first light. 223 Indeed as dusk approached both sides would lay down their arms, a local market would be set up and trading for locally produced food and drink for both sides would take place. 224 These ‘attack markets’ were endemic throughout the war and throughout Biafra’s borders, satisfying Federal troops’ demands for food, drink and local women and creating income which helped sustain the Biafran economy.

  The federal soldier presents an easy target as, with his rifle slung carelessly at his side, he climbs a mound of red earth and bellows across the Aba River where it separates the two Nigerias:

  ‘ My brother!’

  A hundred yards away on the far bank, a small group of ragged Biafrans appear under a clump of palm trees and answer his call. Federal officers and men amble up to join their comrade as he begins his 30 minute dialogue with the ‘enemy’. Then the Biafrans drift back into the jungle, having agreed to return later with homemade gin, or ‘hot drink’ to exchange for beer, cigarettes and food. The Federals return to their trenches where they suck oranges to the serenade of Biafran drums. 225

  At the end of the first batch which was sold faster than we had expected, we made so much profit that I realized why many people went over to what we called in those days ‘Ahia Attack’ [attack markets], to survive the war. Bold people disguised themselves and went close to the frontiers between Nigerian and Biafran lines to buy such commodities that were not found in our own enclaves and these were the people who made money. The disadvantage was that many lost their lives or their virtues in that attempt. 226

  Cross-border infiltration to the Federal camps by young Biafrans was also commonplace. Ojukwu had instigated the setting up of the Biafran Organisation of Freedom Fighters (BOFF). 227 Within this organisation young boys were encouraged to take part in military training and form an effective boys’ guerrilla movement working behind enemy lines. Ben Okafor, who has recently written a play about the war called Child of Biafra , stated:

  I was 13 in 1966 when the war came and was at school. Indiscriminate bombing started soon after the war began, which caused all schools to be shut in the East. We left Onitsha when the Federal army attacked the town, in the family car (Dad was a recently retired assistant commissioner of police) and so were considered fairly well off in those days. We took very few possessions with us and went to my maternal grandmother’s home at Ogbunike, mid-way between Onitsha and Awka, on the road to Port Harcourt. We were there for over a year and all lived together as one large extended family. We all had our jobs to do, such as gathering wood, collecting water and going to the nearby market for food on a regular basis. After Enugu fell we found life more difficult, and my Mum helped our position by cooking for government people who lived nearby. She also went back to Onitsha and collected her few possessions including jewellery, which she proceeded to sell piece by piece to enable her to buy food for the family.

  The bombing encroached on our home at Ogbunike, making my dad fearful for our safety. This annoyed me and encouraged me to get involved. So I joined the army. Every day unknown to my parents I would walk to a nearby army camp for training, having joined a boys’ company. The training consisted of learning how to use small arms, disarming people and what information to collect once behind enemy lines. This action had been going on for some time, it was easy for us young boys to go behind enemy lines and allow ourselves to be captured. We would then be taken on by the enemy as houseboys, doing all the menial tasks. All the time our job was to gather sensitive information about the troops we were working for. As soon as we felt sufficient or important information had been collected we would simply disappear and return to our home base.

  By the end of my training I had been promoted to 2 nd /Lt. Shortly after my company was told it would be shipped out to infiltrate the enemy and gather information. My rendezvous with my company was set for midday the following day. I went home to tell my parents. They were very upset, as was most of my community who had all gathered in the village square when they heard the news. Eventually my dad said I could go and gave me a £5 note to help me if I needed to get back home. The next morning as I’m about to leave to meet up with my company, my mum implores me not to go. The effect of this was to delay my departure so by the time I got to the rendezvous the others had already left and I was told to report back next day. The following morning my sister and I heard that my company with other companies had been rounded up by Nigerian troops, they had had their eyes gouged out and were then sent back to Biafra.’

  He then recounted how, at the end of the war, he was witness to mass rape by Federal soldiers: ‘The Federal soldiers took over the town where I was living, with my sister, and proceeded to round up all the women. I saw women being abused in a most horrible fashion. My sister was lucky to escape.’ He also stated:

  When the war was over I walked back to my home town of Onitsha. When I got there I asked about some boyhood friends, and was told about one boy in particular, who, in a group, had been rounded up by Federal troops, and taken to Fege, a suburb of Onitsha. Here the older and taller boys were singled out and shot. 228

  As de St Jorre states:

  Discipline, was always on a razor’s edge in the Second Division, weakened and looting and wanton destruction followed another inexcusable atrocity. The soldiers massacred 300 or so of the few inhabitants who had dared to stay, including several local leaders and a number of woman and children, in Onitsha cathedral where they had gathered to pray. This was as senseless and brutal as the Asaba killings.

  These killings had been carried out by the Second Division at Asaba during their advance across the Mid-West region to the River Niger. 229

  The Biafran Organisation of Freedom Fighters (BOFF) was established as independent groups surrounding Biafra’s borders; at any one time there would be twenty to thirty of these groups acting independently from each other but from a central command. The boy soldiers, up to the age of 16, having received their military training joined detachments within the BOFF movement. Each unit had boy non-commissioned and commissioned officers and worked behind enemy lines. They would infiltrate Federal army units and be recruited by the Federal soldiers as boy workers within the unit. They would spend several days, in some cases weeks, within the enemy camp gathering intelligence. They were welcomed by the Federal troops, not suspecting in the war’s early days that they were spies and infiltrators, because the troops had constant demand for menial help, whether helping in the kitchens preparing food, acting as general factotums for officers or indeed in some cases waiting at table at company and battalion dinners. It is likely that many Federal soldiers were aware that many of these boys were from the East or indeed the Mid-West. Initially, it is unlikely that the troops appreciated the significance of this infiltration. To Federal troops these boys were simply useful recruits who helped them to make life more bearable. However these boy recruits were able to gather intelligence with regard to troop movements and troop positions on a large scale, and the Federal authorities became increasingly aware that the enemy was continually able to predetermine their movements. Suspicion centred on the influx of an ever-changing group of young local boys. The Federal forces were determined to put a stop to their ability to secure confidential information, and there are several recorded incidents of atrocities carried out on these boys to curtail stolen intelligence. Some of them were interrogated by Federal troops and then had their mouths cut open and were returned to the Biafran side as a deterrent for other boy recruits. Eventually, on orders from Ojukwu, the recruitment of boy soldiers and their infiltration into enemy territory was discontinued. 230 BOFF, however, proved to be an effective guerrilla force for Biafra, as James Eneje commented in an interview:

  We operated in small groups which were virtually independent of each other and fairly self-sufficient. I feel that by the end of the war there were between 20 and 30 of these groups surrounding Biafra. At the end of the war none of us in our group could understand why the war was brought to a sudden end. As far as we were concerned we had been very successful in infiltrating enemy territory and had caused much disruption and had been successful in pinning down large numbers of Federal troops. 231

  The promotion of ‘attack markets’ and cross-border trade was to remain a feature of the war and did much to help sustain the Biafran population, helping to foster the belief that eventually Biafra would achieve its objective. Integration was undoubtedly aided by the fact that the war was fought in the East and confusion as to which side people were on was endemic, borders and boundaries remained fluid throughout the war and because of the East’s topography people simply carried on their daily lives, in the countryside, often under conditions of great hardship and duress, whoever notionally had the upper hand militarily in their area. Arguably this had advantages as well as disadvantages. On the one hand it created a source of essential supplies and intelligence gathering, which worked positively to support Biafra. On the other hand the fact that people could cross the ever-changing border with relative ease meant that the war turned against Biafra through loss of territory and resources, and also meant that Biafran people could give up the fight for independence and integrate into Federal-held territory. Achuzia gives a good example of infiltration when he spoke of needing some intelligence on Federal troop dispositions. ‘I simply donned the insignia of a lieutenant-colonel in the Nigerian army and visited a company of Nigerian troops.’ The troops accorded him respect as a senior officer, gave him details of their situation and attack plans. He then made his way back to his own lines and altered his plans accordingly. 232

  Ojukwu: control and supply

  One of Biafra’s main weaknesses, which arguably did more to undermine her right to self-determination, was the lack of co-ordination and communication within the state through all the functions of government, filtering across all strata of Biafran society. It resulted in a lack of trust between government, the people and the army. The seeds of this distrust probably stemmed firstly from the fact that as the war progressed there was suspicion that people from minority ethnic tribes within the East were ambivalent about their support for Biafra, and secondly from the fact that Eastern Nigerians and the Igbo people in particular are the most egalitarian and democratically-inclined people to be found anywhere. 233 The perception by Biafra’s people of the army after its apparent defeat at Ore and subsequent retreat through the Mid-West, established the notion, which was to become endemic throughout Biafra, that the country was infiltrated by saboteurs. Therefore local towns and villages took it on themselves to institute teams of vigilantes, under the guise of a local militia, to secure road crossings and other strategic points. This led to many unfortunate incidents where Biafrans challenged Biafrans under the guise of protecting national security. Ojukwu as leader seems to have done little to disabuse this sentiment and it led to many incidents which damaged the unity of Biafra, and had an undermining effect on her ability to prosecute the war successfully. This caused mortal damage to Biafra’s survival, and the very body whose job it was to defend the survival of the fledgling state, the army, was constantly undermined. Not only did the army have to defend Biafra against encroaching Federal troops, but it had to counter a civilian population who were suspicious of it, especially its officer corps. It was felt to be a breeding ground for saboteurs, in the light of Banjo and his colleagues’ treachery. There was suspicion that officers trained in the pre-war Nigerian army had divided loyalties. It could be argued that if the civil administration had given greater support and cooperation to the army the outcome for Biafra could have been very different.