EPILOGUE

  By spending a year travelling and visiting all the major centres throughout the country, it is striking that there is little to remind the visitor of Nigeria’s civil war. True there is the national war museum at Umuahia, which is indeed a remarkable assembly of armaments that were used by both sides during Biafra’s struggle for independence. They are well looked after, as is the surrounding area, but it is disturbing that according to the curator the museum receives very few visitors and is severely short of funds for maintenance, and there are no thoughts of expansion. To the visitor it seems a forlorn assembly of metal, sited as a memorial to a long-forgotten piece of history, although that is maybe how the authorities thought the war should be remembered. However, throughout the rest of the country there is a dearth of war memorabilia; indeed even the national museum in Lagos makes scant reference to the war. It focuses on Nigeria’s history and heritage, as it should. Much significance is given to all the heads of state since the country’s formation, and pride of place seems to go the bullet-ridden motorcar ridden in by the murdered military ruler Murtala Mohammed.

  The country makes no further reference to the war. There are no memorials to the event. Little seems to be taught in schools about the war, as is evident from interviews with teachers and past pupils. It seems as though a certain air-brushing of the event has occurred in the minds of the population and throughout the topography of the country. Of course it is arguable that memorials and preservation of the past is not an activity much indulged in in Nigeria, and the consensus among interviewees would confirm that. However it also true to say that many of the interviewees when probed, are very emotional about their experiences during the war. Essentially, it seems that Gowon’s slogan of ‘No victor no vanquished’, has been a popular sentiment with the majority of Nigerians since the end of hostilities, and has continued in this vein to the present.

  In Eastern Nigeria, however, in discussion with many Igbo people, it is apparent that the people are disillusioned with their government and treat it with due disdain. As Professor Sydney Emezue commented little has changed since the British left and the military came to power. 511 The North is still in charge and her influence forms the centrepoint of the all-powerful NPC political party. The country seems to be a one-party state. The main concern for Easterners, however, appears to be that the country still lacks a national consciousness. As Chief Jerome Udoji commented in 1996, thirty years after the war: ‘A country without national consciousness … torn apart by cleavages of tribe and ethnicity; … with frequent religious riots … [and] widespread corruption … is a country where the governed have lost hope and confidence in the government.’ 512

  The Biafran War created conditions for Nigeria to come of age as a nation. It enabled it to assert her independence from the colonial power. For the duration of the war it had for the first time to become controller of its own destiny. It lost its dependence on the colonial power, initially because of Britain’s refusal to supply the arms, particularly fighter planes and bombers, to subdue the rebels. It therefore had to look to other nations for support. Russia in particular filled a gap. This did not mean that Nigeria was in danger of becoming a client state of Russia; it was simply being pragmatic, in spite of Britain’s misgivings. It demanded arms to finish the job of subduing the rebels and it found support from Russia, and indeed from whatever source would support its needs to bring the conflict to a successful conclusion. 513

  This war had a number of distorted images and facts. Firstly there were very few major military engagements, but there were a series of hard-fought but minor battles, which the media from both sides intentionally sensationalised and exaggerated, to the point that myths and impressions developed which have misrepresented the war over the years. This does not denigrate the seriousness of the conflict, as indeed there were many heroic actions carried out by both sides. But there is evidence that the essential character of Nigerians as a collective of peoples kept on surfacing throughout the campaign. Their natural sociability was a regular occurance: ‘September 1967, two sides in Biafran war declare truce to watch Brazilian team Santos, starring Pele, play two matches.’ 514 Secondly the numbers involved would appear to have been seriously distorted. The number of those killed in the July-September 1966 Northern riots, as portrayed and promoted by the East, seem to have been incorrect. The figure of 50,000, as suggested by Ojukwu, was a serious exaggeration. Even he admits this today, but justifies it because he was trying to bring attention to the Igbo Northern atrocities. 515 The fact that they did indeed occur is borne out by newspaper reports and pictorial evidence at the time. The same is true of the numbers of people escaping from the North to the East. The number of 1.5 to 2 million refugees does seem to have been an exaggeration. The most informed opinion would confirm a figure of 150,000:

  The Eastern Regional Government called on all refugees to register at special offices set up throughout the region; these offices were under the control of a British Civil Servant, a Mr Savile, who told Mr Parker [British Assistant High Commissioner, in Enugu] that the total registered was 150,000. This is the only solid and official figure in existence. According to Mr Parker the authorities manipulated it in the following way. First they doubled it ‘because only about half the people who could have registered did so’ (though it could be argued also that some people who were not refugees registered in the hope of benefit); then finding 300,000 an insufficiently impressive figure, they assumed falsely that all those on the register were men, made the assumption that all these men were married and had an average of three children, multiplied by six and produced a figure of 1.8 million. This of course was always rounded upwards: I remember with amusement Ojukwu saying to me at our interview in March ‘and then we have two million refugees – no, I must not exaggerate, 1.8 million.’ Two million became the classical figure, then ‘over two million’. 516

  Finally the numbers killed or dying during the war again seem to have been exaggerated, especially by aid agencies and the international press. Numbers are very hard to substantiate, but both Achuzia and Adekunle have put a figure of 50,000 as war casualties for both sides, and suggested that 30,000 were the number of fatal casualties. 517 The other figure, which is very hard to substantiate, is the number of civilian deaths through the war and through disease and malnutrition. Both Oxfam and Save the Children 518 feel 2 million is untrue, and Professor Murray Last makes the compelling comment that after the war the numbers of children in the East of educational age were very much at pre-war levels. 519 Arguably, therefore, a comment that ‘the total casualties were about 100,000’ is more plausible. 520

  The final feature which became increasingly apparent was Gowon’s desire throughout the campaign to seek a compromise solution and his unwillingness to obliterate the Igbo people. This is borne out by his own comments and also by some of his subordinate officers and the western press. 521

  In 1974 most of the Biafran detainees who had been involved in the war were released: Colonel Nwawo, Lt-Colonel Nwajei, Majors Okonkwo, Asoya and Ademoyega, Captains Gbulie, Udeaja, Okonkwo and Isichei, Lieutenants Okocha, Amuchienwa, Oyewole, Nwokocha, Ikejiofor, Onyefuru, Egbikor and Azubuogu, and Second Lieutenant Ngwuluka; all were dismissed from the army. Interestingly, Colonel Achuzia was not on the list and he remained in prison until 1980. Captain Gbulie has recently been notified that he will receive his army pension. 522 In 2009 it was confirmed that Lt-Col. Ojukwu was to receive and had accepted his army pension from the Nigerian Army. Colonel Achuzia confirmed his disapproval over this action. 523

  As a footnote to the story, in Lagos the newspaper the Daily Sun published the following announcement: ‘It has been announced that army pensions are to be paid to Nigerian soldiers who fought on the Biafran side. A gesture by the new president Umar Musa Yar’Adua thirty seven years after the end of the war.’ 524

  Arguably this war was a conflict between northern Nigerians who have a strong Middle-Eastern culture and religion stretching back several hundred years, and eastern Nigerians: a pragmatic people who had readily grasped European ideas, education and religion. However, crossing these two main cultures was western Nigeria who were ambivalent in their support for either of the two main groups. Overlaying this was a thin veneer of British upper-class attitudes to ruling subjective people. When the British left, they left this thin veneer of rule to the only group who could offer a heritage of class and subservience similar to their own. Therefore this brittle thin veneer of ruling power was always going to find it difficult to control a people as divergent and different as the Nigerians; and so it proved. The result of the war ensured that this thin veneer of power retained control, but with the backing of military force, leading, even to the present, an oligarchic power structure consisting of a one-party state, where the focus of power is still with the original ruling elite as left by the British, but always supported by the military. The divergence of the two main groups which created conditions for the conflict have not been put to rest, and the losers are the Igbos. Despite Gowon’s proclamation of ‘No victor no vanquished’ the ongoing reality has been very different, and the undercurrent of dissent and disquiet with the ruling oligarchy is never far from current day-to-day life.

  Travelling from Lagos to Enugu in 2007, the author reached the river Niger early one morning and found the bridge closed and guarded by the military. On enquiring for the reason, he was told that a state curfew had been imposed on Onitsha, the great Igbo trading town on the Niger’s other side. Several days later, in the company of Igbo friends, the discussion came round to the reasons for the curfew and the comment was that a group of Igbo politicians had flexed their muscles against the ruling party and were being brought into line with the status quo. Their view is that the Igbo people, ever since the January coup of 1966, have always been subjugated by the ruling party, which is still controlled by the North.

  POSTSCRIPT

  ‘No victor no vanquished’ was the slogan promoted by Gowon’s administration at the war’s conclusion and arguably the Igbo people should have had their position secured as a major contributor to the Nigerian Republic. However certain factors ensured that this was not to be a reality. The North had defeated her recalcitrant neighbour and since the war there has been a political determination that no other part of Nigeria would be allowed to challenge the authoritative power of the North. Therefore, considering the period from the end of hostilities to the present, constraints have been imposed on the East to secure the North’s ascendant position. Looking at three main areas relevant to a county’s successful development and sustainability, politics, education and economics it would seem that restrictions have been imposed on the Igbo people, in all these areas.

  The creation of twelve states by the Gowon administration set in train a process by which the north could exercise political control over the rest of the country. Together with the unashamed use of oil revenues by the North’s ruling party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), it secured sufficient wealth to ensure an ascendant position outside its home territory. It became dominant in the East and even in the West, until the West threatened secession. This saw the establishment of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the successor party of the Action Group (AG) in the West. However, in an attempt to gain political control over the PDP, due to lack of finance and the fragmentation of Eastern Nigeria into more states, the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA), the successor party to the Nigerian People’s Party, stood little chance of gaining a majority of the popular vote, within the East let alone the rest of the country. Furthermore, since the war the military has remained the guardian of the North’s dominance. Whenever this has been threatened the army has assumed control, giving rise to a series of military dictatorships.

  During the war much infrastructural damage had been done to the East’s educational establishments, lack of finance and the North’s focus on funding to bring its educational levels up to those in the Southern Nigeria, ensured that re-establishing the East’s pre-war academic excellence was very slow in being restored. Indeed many teaching posts were awarded to Yorubas and expatriate Indians in preference to Igbos. Underfunding and restricting Igbos into the teaching profession was detrimental to education, which had a negative impact on development in the East. This state of affairs has continued to the present. Furthermore, teachers’ remuneration in the East is often three months and more in arrears. 525

  Economic prosperity has also played its part in constraining the rise of the East again, although arguably in a most subjective manor. Although Igbos were and often are better qualified for the job, the North and to a lesser extent the West generally seem to secure the top jobs, especially the country’s public utilities, and large corporations. These appointments gave people the opportunity to accrue considerable wealth. Most of this wealth was retained for the benefit of the individual and his extended family. It was also used to extend political influence. As few appointees came from the East, and even fewer were of Igbo origin, little benefit went in supporting political parties in the East.

  Furthermore, most major infrastructural development has been focused outside the East, which has meant that the East has been unable to take advantage of community wealth which accrues from such development.

  It has been Nigeria’s determination to fragment into thirty-six states which has been the main reason for marginalising the Igbo people. Twelve states have now become thirty-six and it is no surprise that of the six geopolitical zones formed, the Igbo people only have influence in one of these, the South East, and there only over four states, while the North holds sway over nineteen states. The imbalance is obvious in view of the fact that the country’s wealth, mainly generated from its oil production, is distributed fairly evenly to each state. This has meant that attempts by the APGA, the East’s main political party, to gain ascendancy in Igboland, let alone in other parts of Nigeria has been frustrated, through lack of funding. This position has been exacerbated, as stated, by the lack of Igbos controlling the country’s major corporations and industries, allowing them to accrue wealth, which could be used for political benefit, as has been the case in the North. Even the position of the country’s presidency has been denied to an Igbo, in spite of some Igbo politicians attaining the governorship of some Eastern States. Arguably this will be the case for at least the next sixteen years, in view of the fact that Goodluck Jonathan, who is not an Igbo, and comes from the Southern state of Bayelsa, has been elected as president, and should he secure a second term, and a Northern candidate serves as president for a further two terms, which is the convention, then an Igbo will not have the opportunity to stand for president for the foreseeable future.

  Following the West’s attempt at secession, the ACN, a successor party to the Yoruba-dominated Action Group, with support from the country’s president, Obasanjo, and the writer Wole Soyinka, saw the rise of the ACN, over the PDP. This gave rise, in the East, to the formation of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (Massob), which has attempted to secure political ascendency over the PDP in the East. Also, one of its objectives has been, and is, to secure independence for Biafra. To date this has proved a forlorn hope. It is hard to imagine the East’s lack of control over its own destiny changing much in the foreseeable future. There is a limited amount of discussion on the internet about Biafra and its claim for independence, and Massod seems fairly active in this area, but the will and resource seems to be lacking to have much positive appeal to most people who live within the old boundaries of Biafra.

  The recent presidential election, which internationally has been seen as the fairest in the country’s post-independence history, bodes well for the country’s future. The incumbent president, who comes from the south, was re-elected with an overwhelming majority, in spite of the fact that arguably it was the turn of the North to have a Northern President. It has also just been announced that the new army chief of staff is an Igbo. This is the first Igbo to be appointed to this sensitive post since 1960. In January 2006, the then president, Obasanjo, visited Armichi, in Anambra State, Eastern Nigeria. Out of the four reasons for his visit, significantly one was ‘to thank the people for the role the people of the town played in the unfortunate civil war, and their contributions in the peace and reconciliation of the country after the war.’ 526 Arguably, therefore, the country does seem to be moving, albeit very slowly to reconciliation with the Igbo people. This will be particularly true if the newly elected president Goodluck Jonathan is able to contain corruption.

  The Igbo peoples are irrepressibly optimistic and talented, they will always find ways round their disadvantaged position, and although they have had to suffer restrictions and control by the North since the end of the war, they have continued to excel in many walks of life. The only tragedy has been that the bulk of Ojukwu’s people have been unable to enjoy even some of the riches and benefits accruing from Nigeria’s only real source of income, oil. As Senator Uche Chukwumerije said during an interactive Senate press corps session, ‘Although the civil war ended almost 34 years ago, Igbos are still treated as a conquered people. They are still being marginalised.’ 527 Perhaps this will change as Nigeria, wanting affirmation and support from the rest of the world, realises fair distribution of the country’s wealth for the wellbeing for all her people, not just a select few, is paramount to a sustainable and fair society.