How realistic was Biafra’s determination to achieve sovereignty?

  There were a number of reasons for Biafra’s confidence that it would achieve its objective. They can be divided into two. First was the fact that initially Eastern Nigeria had access to and control of the country’s nascent oil industry, as well as having good port facilities and extremely fertile land, and most importantly the support of the people for the seceded state. Secondly were a series of reasons which consecutively gave Biafra confidence that it could achieve its objective. First was the state of the opposition’s army, second was an audacious invasion, third was Biafra’s overt use of propaganda and publicity, fourth was the strength and consistancy of the humanitarian support it received, fifth was the ongoing supply of foreign arms, supported with its own armament production, and sixth was Gowon’s reluctance to destroy the Igbo people.

  Initially, control of Nigeria’s oil industry played its part in giving Biafra confidence that its sovereignty could be sustained. Although oil had not achieved the significance it was to find in the future, it played an important part in providing foreign exchange, and in the country’s ability to sustain a healthy trading balance for exporting and importing goods and services. The evidence, though not conclusive, would point to Biafra’s attempts to secure funds from the French, through Rothchild’s Bank. 489 The land also played its part in giving support to Biafra’s sustainable independence, providing the necessary arable and protein products to sustain a healthy and growing population. Support by its people was, of course, the paramount consideration, but more important was the large numbers of educated people within its economy who could offer their skills in almost any field for the sustainability of Biafra. However, the fact was that the oil quickly lost its signifance as a source of foreign currency once the Federal forces had invaded and taken control of Bonny Island and Port Harcourt. As the Federal forces made increasing inroads into Biafran territory, limited land access meant that the provision of food became much more problematic, and as they overran the minority ethnic areas within the region, so the support by these people for the nascent state diminished. These actions nullified major reasons for Biafra’s confidence in gaining its sovereignty. However, the second set of reasons then took priority. From interviews held with many Eastern participants in the war, there is common agreement that they all gave them confidence that Biafra would achieve its objective, but to varying degrees. 490

  Ojukwu, Gbulie and Achuzia, all commented on the perceived weakness of the Federal forces, who, they felt, were in no position to wage a successful war against Biafra. In their opinion Biafra had more qualified officers, and was better able to recruit supportive Easterners than were the Federal authorities, in spite of reverses during the opening stages of the war.

  The chronic shortage in the Federal forces (now totalling about 70,000 in the Army and 1,000 in the Navy according to a reliable source who should be fairly well informed) was shown by the fact that when 500 freshly trained reinforcements were moved down from Makurdi into Enugu they were commanded by a corporal. 491

  As they all admit, initially there was a shortage of arms, but this was gradually remedied by fresh imported supplies, their own ingenuity at producing arms, like the very successful ‘Ogbunigwe’ anti-personnel mine and the Federal forces’ habit of retreating and leaving behind arms which were then used by the Biafrans. 492 Unquestionably, Biafra’s invasion of the Mid-West and its successful penetration as far as Ore in the West gave the country supreme confidence that it was on the verge of total victory. Because of Banjo’s perfidiousness, this resulted in Biafra’s retreat back to the river Niger, and its confidence was severely shaken. However, although Federal forces made inroads into Biafran territory from the south, Biafra was able to maintain a strong defensive position, and indeed often successfully attacked its foe.

  Biafra’s position was strengthened by its ongoing and successful use of publicity, through its agency Markpress, which not only created awareness throughout the international community of the plight of Biafra’s population, but gave it access to aid on an unprecedented scale, both in armaments and humanitarian support. From the middle of 1968 its position strengthened again. Following its recognition by a number of African nations, France offered it more determined support, and although this fell short of giving it official recognition, it continued to give substantial supplies of arms, until the end of hostilities.

  In a conversation dated 17 September 1968 between Mr Tickell of the British Embassy in Paris and M. Joel le Theule, the French Secretary of State for information, over French support for Biafra, Tickell reported:

  I asked who had laid the framework of the General’s thinking about Biafra. M. le Theule recalled our previous exchange on this subject and said he had been interested to trace the origins of General de Gaulle’s very strong feelings. So far as I could tell, they followed from a discussion he had had with M. Houphouet Boigny, the President of the Ivory Coast, who had subsequently given the General a paper on the subject. M. Houphouet Boigny was obsessed with the southward movement of the Moslem and Arab population of West Africa and presented the Biafrans as a sort of Christian rearguard of high intelligence and ability who were threatened with racial extinction. M. le Theule said that the General had been able in extraordinary fashion to communicate his feelings about Biafra to the French as a whole. As public opinion polls well showed … the French felt even more strongly about Biafra than Czechoslovakia …. I asked whether M. Foccart or M. Debre was responsible for carrying out French policy over Biafra. M. le Theule said that he knew nothing about M. Foccart’s role and was sure that M. Debre was responsible (Professor Wahl said afterwards that M. Debre had recently told him that French policy towards Biafra was entitrely General de Gaulle’s. Professor Wahl had no doubt from this conversation that M. Foccart was effectively in charge under direct instructions from the General). 493

  These facts gave Biafra confidence that it would achieve its goal. Indeed, arguably, it is reasonable to comment that pressure from the international community would eventually oblige Gowon and the Federal authorities to agree to Biafra’s independence, albeit within a Nigerian confederation. Indeed Gowon’s own Christian and ethical stand determined that he had no wish to see the annihilation of the Igbo people. 494

  Undoubtedly there were times when Biafra came close to achieving permanent sovereignty. The invasion of the Mid-West came close to being a total success, which would probably have resulted in a settlement confirming Biafra’s right to exist. Even that failure did not diminish its determination to confirm its independence. Support from the international community gave it belief in its independent destiny, which would probably have been confirmed if France had given it the official recognition it so determinedly sought. Ultimately, however, the balance of support from the international community increasingly favoured the Federal authorities, and this determined that Biafra’s objective would be denied.

  Why we support the Federal Government. Our aim is to do everything possible to restore peace, stability and prosperity in Nigeria, but we must do this in a way which keeps us on good terms with the Nigerians and their rulers. This is a Nigerian and African problem first and foremost. Nevertheless we have a great deal at stake in Nigeria. Shell BP have sunk at least £250 million in Nigeria …. Our other investments are worth about £150–£175 million, and we have an export trade worth £90 million a year …. The whole of our investments in Nigeria … will be at risk if we change our policy of support for the Federal Government. The French would be glad to pick up our oil concessions if they could. 495

  This statement, arguably, confirms why Biafra would ultimately be denied its right to self-determination. The old colonial power simply had too much at stake to allow Biafra its independence, and the underlying force of this argument meant that in the final analysis the pragamatic power of trade would not allow a recalcitrant region the right to self-determination, if it risked the loss of assets.

  What caused the war’s longevity?

  Possibly the single most important factor which determined the length of the conflict was Biafra’s creative use of propaganda. This was carried out with a high degree of success through its agency Markpress. A telling comment on this agency was made: ‘Every day produced numbers of good, hot, news stories. They were not often true; but they were always colourful and sensational.’ 496

  Initially Gowon’s approach was very different: ‘The Federals began with the idea, very congenial to Gowon, that the truth would prevail. Whenever they announced any thing it was always long after the event and consequently of no interest to the press.’ 497 Gowon admitted that it was Biafra’s unashamed use of publicity that so often gave it the moral high ground in the conflict. As he commented, he was too naïve at the time to appreciate this, and it was only later in the war that the Federal Authorities made more effort to promote their cause to the international community, through the medium of propaganda. He spoke specifically of Biafra’s attempts through the media to accuse the Federal Authorities falsely of a determination to commit genocide on the Igbo people (discussed later in this chapter), and how damaging this was to the Federal Authorities in the eyes of the international community. 498 Coupled with Biafra’s use of propaganda was the international support, in the form of arms and humanitarian aid, given to both sides. In the final analysis both appreciated that without external support they would not succeed in their objectives.

  Initially, at the start of the conflict, there was arrogance on the part of both participants that victory would be achieved quickly and with ease. Ojukwu regarded the Federal army as easily defeatable:

  Everyone knows it is not possible for what remains of the Nigerian army to make any successful attempt on the East …. Jack [Gowon] would never dare attack him [Ojukwu] …. I think it is about time I sent my troops to Lagos to clear up the mess there. I can do it easily; I only have to give the order. 499

  The Federal army thought that victory over the Biafrans would be immediate: ‘Victory was forecast in days rather than weeks. In the North Colonel Katsina sneered at the Biafran “army of pen pushers” and forecast a swift victory as the largely northern Nigerian federal infantry marched in.’ 500

  Both sides were quickly disabused of their opinions. In spite of this Biafra was singularly determined to achieve its objective of sovereignty. It made extensive use of propaganda to gain international support. This support revolved around a series of attempts to broker a satisfactory peace settlement, and foreign aid. Furthermore, Biafra’s innate resourcefulness also played an important part in its survival, and helped create the war’s longevity.

  Of the nine attempts at achieving a negotiated settlement all proved to be failures, mainly because both sides had incompatible objectives and neither side was willing to compromise, because Biafra’s sovereignty was non-negotiable and the Federal Authorities were committed to the East’s return to the Federation. However, all attempts at a peaceful settlement helped to sustain the length of the war, because they gave each side the opportunity to explain their cause to the international community and this tended to increase or decrease international support, depending on either side’s status at the time. Foreign aid was of course paramount for both parties, 501 but Biafra was able to convince an ever-cynical world of the rightfulness of its cause, especially in the light of a starving and increasingly disadvantaged population, so support from the international community increased, either with arms or humanitarian support. Once de Gaulle had stated that Biafra had the right to determine her own destiny, French support for the beleaguered territory, whilst with no official sanction, became ever more overt:

  On 31 July 1968 a French Government statement declared: ‘The Government believes … that the present conflict should be resolved on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination.’ 502

  On the basis of the data which is now in the hands of certain Western Governments, the lifting capacity of the arms airlift from Libreville to Biafra is not less than 60 tons a day. 503

  The supplies of light automatic French weapons and the ammunition to go with them are technically being taken from the stocks of the Gabonese Army. However, it is clear that the replenishment of these stocks comes from France. 504

  It is also reported that each night French registered planes with French pilots fly from Libreville in Gabon to ‘Biafra’ carrying a mixture of arms, ammunition and food. 505

  Because Biafra had lost its sea access after the fall of Port Harcourt, this support had to be airlifted into the landlocked country, and increasingly the humanitarian aid was mixed with armament support. This factor in itself supported Biafra’s survival and encouraged the war’s longevity. Conclusively it was these factors acting in sequence and together which ensured the longevity of the war.

  Was genocide a myth or a reality?

  Arguably, there was little substance to Biafra’s accusation that the Federal Authorities were intent on committing genocide on the East and specifically on the Igbo people. However after the second coup there was a period when determined efforts were made by the North to attack Igbo people, many of whom who had settled in the North. Ojukwu accused Gowon of being unable to control these attacks which went on unabated for several months. Indeed Gowon admitted his inability to bring these attacks under control. The verbal evidence and pictorial accounts bear out that these uncontrolled riots led to many Igbos being maimed, losing their lives and losing their property. Ojukwu, however, took every opportunity to exaggerate the numbers of people killed, and he was to use this in an ongoing attempt to discredit the Federal Government, using the word genocide as a pretext to prove the Gowon government’s intention to kill the Igbo race. It would seem that propaganda was used to promote the idea of genocide, firstly to instil it in the Biafran people, in order to strengthen their resolve to defend their homeland against Federal forces, and secondly to convince the international community that annihilation of the Igbo race was the Federal Government’s intent. So persuasive did this argument become that Gowon felt obliged to counter the accusations by appointing an independent international committee to determine the truth. The outcome of this investigation confirmed: ‘The word genocide is completely unjustified.’ 506

  There was, however, a further report commissioned by Biafra and carried out by an international commission of jurists in 1968, which did confirm acts of genocide by Federal troops against people from the East. 507 Unsurprisingly, both findings did come across a number of isolated incidents where a degree of uncontrolled killing of innocent Easterners had taken place. One report considered these incidents genocide and the other did not. Looking at both these reports the conclusion was that the word genocide was unjustifiably used and that unlawful killing might be a more apt description, especially in the heat of battle or where troops lacking discipline behaved barbarically. The only other piece of documentary evidence regarding genocide was produced by Biafra’s Directorate for Propaganda, in November 1968. It lists reports of genocide, from members of Britain’s parliament, monitored reports from world radio stations, publications from foreign journalists and statements on genocide by independent foreign observers. On examination almost all the comments are based on unsubstantiated reports, without any witnesses being present at the time. Many are subjective and very biased and arguably should be treated with a high degree of suspicion. 508

  What impact did the two leaders have on the conflict?

  Both men had spent their formative years during the closing days of colonial rule and were imbued with a sense of Britishness from their upbringing, their schooling and their careers in the army. Ojukwu had, by his own admission, political ambition based on the rule of law and democratic government, but he found himself charged by the Ironsi regime with ruling and administering a developing territory which had a well-run administrative and legal sytem and a large degree of autonomy within the federation. 509 Arguably his brief was to run an established country, within whose boundaries were a mix of ethnic tribes dominated by the Igbo people. Gowon’s brief from the Ironsi regime was to run the army, a challenging opportunity, given the unrest within its ranks following the first coup. However for a young man it was an opportunity to make his mark in his chosen field, which under normal circumstances would probably have paved the way for him to achieve the ultimate position of responsibility within the military. Arguably that was the extent of Gowon’s ambition, indeed as he commented, the opportunity for him to take charge of the country was totally unexpected and he would have been happy not to have had that responsibility if a more suitable candidate had been proposed and accepted by the army’s rank and file. As he said, at the time he was the only acceptable person to take charge. 510

  Both men were ambitious in totally different ways, but arguably both had at heart the protection and well-being of the Nigerian state, albeit from totally different perspectives. This meant that although initially both were determined to forge a way forward that would have ensured the security of the state and of all the people, as ensuing events unfolded, their differences gradually became apparent, until they no longer felt able to compromise. Discussing this at length with both of them has led the author to feel that, although they were both clear in their respective objectives, each had respect for the other’s position. Neither Gowon nor Ojukwu show any animosity towards other today, indeed they both still refer to each other by their first names. Arguably, therefore in spite of the tumultuous war which ensued, Nigeria was fortunate to have two leaders who conducted their campaign with a high degree of Christian ethics. It seems that the two men, chosen by default not by design, exercised restraint on their forces and compassion for their foes, in spite of their mutual determination to achieve their respective objectives.