Colonial state generates a colonial posture. This posture automates a series of complexes which remain with the African long after the colonial stimulus has ceased to have direct contact. The continuation of these complexes is seen in a state of mind which permits colonialism as a reflex. During this period the remoteness of the stimulus is often misinterpreted as nonexistent, thus generating a false sense of security in the minds of Africans recently out of bondage. The stimulus exists, its virulence undiminished. In fact what happens is that the imperial power at this time, finding itself undisturbed, conserves energy, spreads its contagion, prepares the ground, and concentrates all its efforts toward the achievement of its main objective – that of economic exploitation. 443

  He was, he said, of the opinion that Gowon’s assumption of power was ‘de facto and not de jure’ and therefore his position was untenable, especially since the whereabouts of the former Supreme Commander was unknown, and he urged Gowon to arrange a meeting to establish who in fact should take on the ultimate responsibility. 444 Questioned on whether or not he should have been that person, he refused to be drawn on the subject. Even today Ojukwu gives the impression that if he had taken on the responsibility, the series of events which then ensued would have been very different. However he was hardly well positioned to challenge Gowon’s assumption of power, in the light of the serious unrest occurring throughout the army at the time. Ojukwu remained firmly in the East, where he ensured that there was no military disorder, in spite of the fact that most of the battalion of troops stationed in the East at the time were from the North. However, the effects of the subsequent attacks on Igbos in the North made him realise that ‘Firstly it was imperative that Gowon exercise control and quell the desire by Northern politicians to stop them inciting mob rule to attack and kill Northern Igbos, and secondly that there had to be a period when the regions should adjust to the new reality of regional discord.’ 445

  Looking in retrospect at the situation, Ojukwu was disingenuous over Gowon’s position. Although Gowon talks lightly of his assumption of power, the reality was that that his position was extremely precarious, in Lagos at Ikeja barracks. It was at Ikeja that the drama of what action should be taken to control the country was played out. Gowon admits that although he had been ordered by Brigadier Ogundipe to take some loyal troops to Ikeja to restore order, the fact was that although the troops there were prepared to listen to him, they were in no mood to compromise and were intent on encouraging the North to secede from the Federation. As Gowon pointed out:

  For three days events at Ikeja really did determine which direction the country would take and that the power of the country was firmly in the hands of this small group of soldiers at Ikeja. The soldiers there were simply not prepared to obey orders from the army’s remaining hierarchy but were prepared to listen to and eventually agree the argument that in order to bring the country under control a compromise was imperative. 446

  Gowon said that this line of thought eventually gained majority support and he reluctantly took control.

  Having gained agreement that Gowon should assume the role of head of the armed forces and de facto head of state, with considerable support from the American Ambassador and the British High Commissioner, and getting agreement from the Northern politicians and Northern rulers that secession was a disastrous course of action for the North, the army rank and file was brought under control.

  Gowon contacted me for support. He told me that he was just a simple soldier and had no political ambition, but he wanted guidance on how to proceed. It was at that point that I decided on the policy of discouraging the North to secede, and I thought I would be successful because of my personal relatioships with the Northern Emirs. 447

  However the violence against the Igbo population continued in the North, and Gowon found bringing this violence under control almost beyond his power. In his impromptu address to the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference on 3 October 1966, he reacted to the Northern tragedy:

  Certainly there has been damage. I think that is what we never seem to admit when there is something like that. There is damage and I am very, very sorry about it. I regret it and I am doing everything I can … As I said, for God’s sake, don’t lose hope. If we are alive and if we are determined, we can get this country back to its proper shape. I am determined to do that even if it means my life. I give you my word for it …. To our Eastern friends, for God’s sake please don’t lose hope. Let us try and see what we can do to mend up what has happened. Give me a chance and I am quite convinced I will be able to do something very shortly. 448

  Although this impromptu speech confirms the sincerity of the man, which is arguably one of his great strengths, and was to feature constantly throughout the war, it hardly instilled confidence in those being attacked, killed and maimed, as Ojukwu confirmed. At this stage during this eventful time Gowon and Ojukwu held regular telephone conversations, and from the interviews I held with them they both confirmed their sincerity in wanting to ensure that Nigeria remained one entity. This approach, with the support of Malcolm MacDonald, the British intermediary, laid the foundations for informal talks between Gowon and the regional military leaders, which were held at Aburi.

  Both Gowon and Ojukwu confirm that these talks were successful and produced a compromise. Ojukwu is adamant that the agreement allowed for the regions to disengage from each other and exercise greater autonomy. As he said, he essentially gained agreement that Nigeria would become a confederation. The transcripts show that Ojukwu had put in much effort and produced a logical plan of action to allow for regional divergence within a national state. They also show that the other members of the meeting agreed to Ojukwu’s proposals. The real failure of the Aburi Agreement was the fact that Gowon, whose power at this stage was not secure, was persuaded by his senior civil servants that the arrangement concentrated too much power in the four regions and left little authority at the centre of the Federation, and it was this fact which made the agreement unworkable. Ojukwu comments that if all the parties had stood by the agreement, secession would have been unnecessary, and a war would have been avoided. 449 From conversations with both Ojukwu and Gowon comes confirmation that they deeply regret that they did not take more care and consideration in leading both of them down a path where the inevitable result was a clash of arms.

  How they dealt with the war as leaders

  Ojukwu’s style of leadership was to refer to his Consultative Assembly. It is interesting to note that when he was appointed by General Ironsi as Military Governor of the Eastern Region, the political regional assembly was disbanded, and Ojukwu, after the second coup, was able to develop a consultative group through which the people in the region could express their views. There were twenty-nine divisions within the region and each was asked to nominate four representatives as well as six elected delegates and added to this were forty-five representatives elected from teachers’, lawyers’, farmers’ and most importantly market traders’ associations. This group was known as the Consultative Assembly and together with the advisory Council of Chiefs and Elders was regarded as Biafra’s parliament. Ojukwu consulted with this group over every major issue during the war and on most occasions followed their wishes. However, he also formed an Executive Council which met weekly, and it was this body which wielded the country’s executive power. 450

  As Ojukwu commented, his aim was to create a democratically elected system within Biafra. 451 This would point to Ojukwu’s desire not to run a military dictatorship, but to institute a meaningful democracy. Arguably, this is borne out by the fact that the Consultative Assembly was consulted at each stage as the East considered secession as its only option, and that nearly half of its members were from the non-Igbo minority. This also demonstrates that when it came to deciding on secession, Ojukwu’s government had the overwhelming support of the minority groups. 452

  When the war started, both sides were ill-prepared for a long confrontation. Gowon’s approach was that it was simply a police action to bring the recalcitrant East back into the fold. Ojukwu’s and Biafra’s agenda was to secure the country as a sovereign nation, recognised by the international community. Within Biafra it was felt that this would be easily achieved. However, as Ojukwu commented, it became very obvious shortly after hostilities broke out that the country’s aspirations would not be achieved simply by seceding. As he said, in the light of the disastrous reverses during the opening stages of the conflict at Nsukka, dramatic action was called for, either to subjugate the Federal Authorities, or at least put Biafra in such a strong position that all parties would agree to Biafra’s sovereignty. 453 This was the background to the Mid-West invasion. Although Victor Banjo was not Ojukwu’s first choice he was considered a good candidate to lead the invasion, firstly because he was a close friend of Ojukwu, and secondly by being Yoruba, providing he remained loyal to Biafra, he would be able to negotiate on her behalf in the West through mutual colleagues, to achieve a satisfactory result. Unbeknown to Ojukwu Banjo’s plans were totally at odds with his orders, and as described in Chapter 3 the invasion although a resounding success, and as Achuzia commented, ‘Lagos and Ibadan were ours for the taking’, 454 resulted in a disorganised retreat by the Biafran Army. Ojukwu was distressed by Banjo’s duplicity, having put great trust and faith in his ability to achieve the objective. However, it transpired that there was a further agenda which appeared in sequence with the failed invasion, and that was a planned coup to oust Ojukwu and achieve a peaceful settlement with the Federal Authorities. How extensive the plans were is a matter of conjecture, but it proved to be the one and only time that there was a planned rebellion against Ojukwu:

  At 0600 hours on 19th September 1967, Majors Ifeajuna and Alele paid me a visit at my tactical headquarters …. Having gone to bed only two hours before I was pretty angry to be awakened at that time of the morning …. Major Alele first asked me if I would like to see the war end immediately. I said yes without hesitation. He revealed that he and his group had been in touch with the British and American government officials who had a peace formula for ending the war.

  According to Alele, the only condition demanded by these two countries was the replacement of Ojukwu …. he ended by saying that Ojukwu had to be told to step down …

  I thought the whole story exciting … I pointed out that the whole affair … would amount to a coup d’état … I was about to go to my headquarters at Nkalagu when I was summoned to state house by Dr Ibiam and Mr Mojekwu … I told them about the visit of Majors Ifeajuna and Alele. It appeared as if I had hit the main point, for I could see quite easily the bright glow of joy and relief in their eyes and faces …

  I did not know for certain that Ifeajuna’s peace plan was in effect to topple Ojukwu until I heard the news that those involved had been executed for attempted coup. 455

  The effect of this attempted coup was to undermine the confidence the Biafran public had in their army and particularly their trust in the officer corps, especially those officers who had served in the original Nigerian Army before the war. As a result, throughout the remainder of the war there was a general paranoid fear of saboteurs, all emanating from the public’s distrust of the officer corps. Ojukwu was seen to be above criticism and his status and position rose in the public’s confidence, after his attempted overthrow. However, the affair did lead to the replacement of the head of the army, not because of his involvement in the coup but because he was seen as an unsuccessful army commander. There is also no doubt that following the coup Ojukwu’s attitude to the army changed, and often throughout the remainder of the war he was seen to sideline the army and its hierarchy in favour of specially selected groups who came under his direct authority. When asked, he confirmed that the coup had undermined his confidence in the army’s loyalty to him and Biafra, hence his use of Steiner and other mercenaries and the indomitable Joe Achuzia, and other trusted colleagues from whom he felt he could demand absolute loyalty.

  Gowon’s style of leadership during the war was different from Ojukwu’s. Although both leaders faced similar problems and challenges, their scales of operation were different, and whilst Ojukwu’s had greater immediacy, Gowon had the luxury of being able to take a more objective view of the war. However, Gowon had the constraint of continuing to convince the people that victory was achievable within the near future. He conducted all his military command and control from Dodan Barracks at Ikeja, and his style was to keep in touch with his military commanders on a regular basis by telephone:

  He is a man who believes in Government by telephone. If you are able to go upstairs from the drawing room in Dodan Barracks you will see the telephone room from which he controls Nigeria. In this little bare room, not more than 20 feet by 10 he sits alone for much of the time with ten telephones and three wireless sets. By this he keeps in touch with each field commander and with other vital levers of governmental power. He believes that it was by the use of the telephone that he has succeeded in dealing with the crisis in Nigeria’s history. In January 1966 he rallied the loyal commanders and warned Ojukwu in Kano to be loyal, by the use of the telephone. 456

  As he commented, it was not his job to interfere with their own commands and he therefore gave them a considerable amount of leeway in executing their own objectives. This approach to leadership leads to the view that Gowon showed weak leadership and was unable to control his divisional commanders:

  Day by day he revealed himself a very weak man and a man of indecision. A few instances will suffice to demonstrate the weakness in the character of Gowon. During the war years it was common knowledge in military circles that Gowon was completely unable to control the three divisional commanders responsible for the actual fighting in the field. There was no co-ordination between the three divisional commanders and each one acted entirely independently of each other. As a matter of fact, elements of jealously crept in among the three commanders and each one resorted to decisions and actions that would impair or jeopardise the progress and prospect of success of the others. Such reprehensible conduct was known and reported regularly to Gowon. But throughout he did nothing to coordinate the activities of the three commanders or call them to order …. Otherwise how could anyone ever explain the fact that the man who could be said to rank next to Gowon … during the war years never once visited the front throughout the the two and a half years of civil war? Not only this, this same man was known to have occupied himself at the time with reading for a law degree on part-time basis in the University of Lagos. Gowon knew of this but was too weak to call Major-General E.O. Ekpo to order. 457

  However his leadership style is interpreted, he was intent on conducting the war as humanely as possible, and he introduced a ‘Code of Conduct’ for his army. 458 The code commented that the troops were not fighting a war against a foreign enemy, nor were they fighting a religious war or jihad, and that they must remember that they would come up against soldiers who were formerly their comrades in arms and that in the future they might resume that position. The document comments that the aim of the offensive is simply to subdue Ojukwu and his ‘clique’. It detailed how to treat civilians, prisoners of war and foreigners and also property, especially churches and mosques, and finally went on to state how a high standard of loyalty, discipline and patriotism was demanded and that troops would behave humanely. Finally it reminded the army that Africa and the rest of world was witness to the war and they would watch to see how well the task was achieved. When questioned about this document, Gowon said that he had had first-hand knowledge of how chaotic conditions could become, because of his experience during his time in the Congo, and that he was determined that his army would not behave in the way that troops had done during that disastrous clash of arms. 459

  The pressure on Gowon, firstly to convince many of the people to retain an interest in the war and secondly to secure a sustainable victory, was immense throughout the campaign. His problem was that for most ordinary people on the Federal side the war was simply too remote to particularly effect their day-to-day lives, and he was obliged, as he said, to keep people’s interest by confirming that victory was in sight. His problem was, as he readily admitted, that his quarrel was not with the Igbo people but with Ojukwu and his close advisors. Initially, before the start of the war, when he had assumed power his relationship with Ojukwu was friendly, indeed they spoke regularly on the telephone and referred to each other as Jack and Emeka, they joked about the old days and the girlfriends they had known, but later as Ojukwu and the East secured more arms he became more arrogant and less friendly towards Gowon, who naturally took exception to this. By 1968 Gowon’s attitude to Ojukwu had changed dramatically. He ‘felt him wicked and that he was up to many tricks’. Fundamentally, Gowon, who has a firm belief in loyalty and straightforwardness, felt that Ojukwu did not behave like an officer and a gentleman. As he confirmed, loyalty and honour were instilled in him from an early age; he commented ‘You are British and I learnt my dealings and experience with the British … you must understand what loyalty is. ’ 460 Because he had no grievance against the Igbo people he continually felt that he should constrain his army over too much aggression towards its foe. This dichotomy, as he said, effected and constrained him throughout the war. It restrained him from defeating Biafra by force of arms, his preference, as he said, ‘was to achieve a negotiated peaceful settlement’. 461