This book has investigated and attempted to answer five major questions. Firstly, why should a country endowed with so much optimism, economic potential and a rich and diverse energetic population have allowed itself to be dragged into a conflict which outwardly could only be to the detriment of the country’s development and its people? Secondly, how realistic was Biafra’s determination to achieve sovereignty? Thirdly, what caused the war’s longevity and why did it take so long for the Federal Government to subdue the recalcitrant region? Fourthly, was genocide a reality or a myth? Fifthly, how important were the two leaders to the conflict?

  However two important features occupied the thoughts and comments by the international press of the day. First was copy documents confirming that Biafra had offered to sell oil and other mineral resources to Rothschild Bank in Paris, in return for a substantial consideration. 474 No documentary proof could confirm this transaction, and in interview Ojukwu refused to be drawn into a conversation about the copy documents, but he did confirm that France had been the mainstay in supporting the supply of arms throughout the war. 475 It seems, however, that whatever the truth about the Rothschild documents, intensive negotiations had been going on with potential supporters and arms suppliers even prior to the war. Colonel Achuzia confirmed that he and colleagues had been to Europe in search of necessary arms and ammunition to conduct a war as early as October 1966. 476

  I think it would be worthwhile recording that the first large-scale arms delivery to the East arrived in October 1966. It was Czech small arms and light machine guns, shipped from Szeczyn, in Poland. 477

  The second feature was the proposed land corridor. During the later stages of the war this became an important consideration for some aid agencies and the Federal Administration, but was totally rejected by Biafra. The reality, which appears not to have been grasped by the international media, was that the proposed land corridor went straight through the centre of land which formed a strategic part of the remainder of Biafra. At the time it was a disputed piece of territory which Biafra was intent on holding, therefore any move which weakened her attempts at retaining this territory were bound to be disputed. It seems that there was a fundamental misunderstanding of the position of this proposed so-called ‘mercy corridor’ which however well policed by the international community would have increased Biafra’s vulnerability and her insecurity, and therefore was never going to gain approval from Biafra.

  The scheme proposed by the Nigerians was intrinsically an absurdity, being based on a shipment of supplies to Lagos, thence by 1000 mile journey to Enugu then ‘corridor’ into Biafran-held territory. They did not mention of course that they could not use the direct road route of roughly 300 miles only from Lagos to Enugu because they did not control it throughout the Mid-West or between Onitsha to Enugu. The Biafrans objected to the ‘land corridor’ south of Enugu because they relied on broken bridges and other obstacles for defence and feared that the Nigerians in the field would take advantage of the passage of relief convoys to penetrate Biafran defences. The idea of a ‘neutral zone’ on either side of the corridor road was an absurdity to anyone with even a moderate knowledge of the country unless controlled by a large neutral force well-equiped with air reconnaissance, the provision of which was not suggested. 478

  The problem of relief and how to get it to those most at risk exercised all parties throughout the war, but became a cause cèlébre after the fall of Port Harcourt, which created a land-locked Biafra. This meant that all outside support had to be airlifted into the country, and as the war progressed the Federal Authorities became increasingly obsessed with the idea that much military aid was being airlifted into Biafra with the humanitarian aid. Their obsession was justified, and evidence comes from pilots’ reports confirming that often the only way humanitarian aid could reach Biafra was in aircraft chartered to carry arms. 479

  Why was there a conflict?

  Undoubtedly the meeting held in Aburi by Gowon and his military colleagues was an opportunity for the new leaders, following the second coup, to settle their differences and compromise over what had become an extremely intractable problem. It is also true that the creation of Nigeria by the British was an arbitrary decision, taken at a time when Britain’s concern was protection for her West African trade rather than the indigenous people. A further consideration was the divisive rule exercised by the British over Nigeria. The political development also led to the tragedy of identifying the political parties with ethnicity rather than with popular mass appeal. Finally and most importantly was the nepotistic and oligarchic style of government which not only engendered favouritism rather than promoting ability but, more importantly, corruption.

  Although they met as colleagues and brother officers and with great familiarity at Aburi, many of them, especially the military regional governors, had positions other than their own interpersonal relationships to consider. For example, Adebayo and Katsina were constrained by their regional and underlying ethnic responsibilities. It is easy to forget that until the first coup the Western Region had been in political turmoil, and following that coup, the Northern Region had seriously considered breaking from the Federation. It had involved Cumming-Bruce in much persuasive diplomatic pressure, to convince his friends, the emirs and sultans, not to secede. Gowon, who on his own admission, had little idea as to how to control and govern Nigeria, was grateful at this early stage in his assumption of power, to accept Cumming-Bruce’s advice to keep Nigeria united. 480 At the time, following the first coup and Ironsi’s unifying decrees, which seemingly undermined the North’s position of power, she felt isolated, for the first time in the country’s history, from the rest of Nigeria. Furthermore, as Adebayo commented, in view of the North’s ambivalence about remaining in the Federation, the West was also considering its position. As the economic centre of the country, the Western Region, together with Lagos, had every reason to suppose that it would achieve economic success and prosperity without the encumbrance of the other regions, especially the North. As Adebayo said, the North had always been an economic drain on the West, and in view of the traumatic conditions at the time there was gathering sentiment in the Western Region for greater autonomy and distancing from the rest of the country. 481 Ojukwu’s position was even more pressing. Firstly, as he readily admits, he was the only member at the Aburi meeting who had political ambitions. However, his involvement, following the second coup, had been marginalised because of the events which unfolded at Ikeja. Not only was he not consulted, but also he disagreed with Gowon becoming the new military head of state, because, he argued, there were other more senior men within the army who should have assumed that responsibility. Indeed at Aburi he confirmed that he had spoken to Ogundipe by telephone, and confirmed that if Ogundipe had stated on air that he had taken over the government, Ojukwu would have affirmed his support for him. 482 He disingenuously forgot that during the days following the second coup, the government of Nigeria had virtually ceased to function and was in danger of totally breaking down, leading to a state of anarchy. Gowon at that point in time was simply a compromise candidate for the post of military head of state. Secondly, and most importantly, following the second coup the North had embarked on the systematic destruction of Igbo life and property in the North. This had led the people of Eastern Nigeria as a whole, and the Igbo people in particular, to fear collective genocide by the Hausa-Fulani people. This fear was very real, as confirmed by accounts and pictures of the atrocities carried out in the North. 483 It led to a natural feeling that Eastern Nigeria was better placed to separate from the rest of Nigeria. Indeed Ojukwu’s main argument at Aburi was that each region should move away from the others, with greater regional autonomy. As he commented, his objective at Aburi was not the disintegration of the Nigerian state but an agreement on confederation with greater regional autonomy. Indeed to this day he remains a firmly committed Nigerian nationalist. As far as he is concerned the seeds of secession were sown only because of the intransigence of Gowon and his administration and the Northern rulers. 484

  Gowon and Ejoor looked at the whole problem from a different perspective. Both men shared a love and respect for the Nigerian Army, and as Gowon commented, one of his main concerns was to see the unity of that army restored and maintained, 485 although he admits that at the time of Aburi this was an extremely difficult objective to achieve. However, his other main concern was to pull Nigeria back from the brink of anarchy and total disintegration. In this he had the support of the ex-colonial power. For his part Ejoor, as military governor of the Mid-West Region, not only supported Gowon in his objective but also was also concerned for the survival of his region. At Aburi both men were extremely keen to see compromise achieved. Arguably this is exactly what happened in Ghana: a compromise was agreed but very much in favour of Ojukwu’s objective. It was agreed, as the transcripts prove, that the regions should move apart, with a high degree of autonomy, forming a confederation rather than a federation. Ojukwu could argue legitimacy, and feel certain of his position because after the first coup, Ironsi appointed him to the military governorship of the Eastern region. He took on the responsibilities of a region which already had a high degree of autonomy, and was still run much in the style established by the British during the formation of Nigeria. The tragedy of Aburi was that Gowon simply reneged on the agreement. Arguably he had little choice. Pressure from his own senior civil servants, who pointed out that the agreement left him with little centralised power, as well as their own consideration for their own minority ethnic backgrounds, led him to compromise over Aburi. Many of his senior civil servants came from small indigenous groups, and they could see that greater autonomy by the four regions would lead to the denigration of the smaller ethnic groups in Nigeria. Isaac Boro’s attempt to form individual states in the Delta region was an extension of this real fear; a fear which even today proves an intractable problem. Furthermore, the North, having agreed to stay in the Federation, could see their oligarchic power being threatened should Nigeria become a confederation with greater autonomy for the regions.

  Nigeria’s formation was an arbitrary decision taken by Britain at a time when Europe was vying for control of trade in Africa. There was limited consideration for the peoples contained within those boundaries. Britain’s concern was for the protection of her trade, which at that time was centred round palm oil. Frederick Lugard had been appointed by Chamberlain to command Sir George Goldie’s defence force, formed to counter rivalry from other European countries especially the French, and to quell insurgency from non-compliant local rulers. He was eventually appointed Governor of the Northern Protectorate of Nigeria. He had witnessed the workings of indirect rule from his time in India and found that such a system was equally applicable in his Northern Territory, where there was a well-established hierarchical order, and he was able to couple Britain’s suzerainty over and together with this rule. Where local rulers refused to cooperate he simply replaced them with people who would support Britain through the process of indirect rule. When he became Nigeria’s first Governor-General in 1901 his attempts at extending this type of rule to other regions ended in failure, especially in the East where people simply refused to accept the imposition of so-called Warrant Chiefs. Lugard and the British administration had failed to appreciate the great ethnic distinctions and divide between the many peoples of Nigeria.

  The divisive rule exercised by the British over the diverse people of Nigeria can also be seen as a contributory factor in engendering distrust and hostility between the various ethnic groups, and can be considered an underlying cause of the war. Although they were able to rule in the North because of a compliant hierarchy, they inadvertently laid the seeds of dissension and discord because of their support for the Northern hierarchy’s traditions, customs and way of life. This led to an extremely unbalanced educational infrastructure. British rule in the North actively discouraged the spread of evangelical Christianity, which had been the source of western education in the southern part of the country, especially in the South East. Consequently as the country developed under British rule and after independence many senior roles were filled throughout the country and especially in the North by people from the South. This infiltration of people from southern Nigeria, particularly Easterners, into many aspects of Northerners’ lives led to a general resentment of these people who felt that they were being exploited. It can be seen as the root cause of civil rioting leading to the death of many Easterners in the North, together with the destruction of their property, culminating in the Northern riots from July to September 1966. Two further actions confirmed that the North resented the intrusiveness of Southerners, especially Igbos. First was the fact that during the lead-up to and following independence, rather than encouraging Nigerians to assume roles formally taken by Europeans, the North actively sought to keep Europeans in many of the roles rather than see them being taken by Igbos and Southern people. The North realised at the time because of their ill-developed western education, there were simply no suitably qualified Northerners to assume many of these roles, and rather than see Southerners occupy positions they allowed Europeans to continue in these roles. Second, with regard to the army, a determined effort was made to recruit Northerners into the officer ranks. However, again this proved problematic, basically because Northerners suffered a lack of western educational opportunities, and many potential recruits to the army found the entry requirements simply beyond their academic abilities. In order to ease this problem the standards of entry were lowered to accommodate these candidates. This led to much resentment from better educated officers who had been subject to more stringent educational standards. The final area which should be considered with regard to regional divisiveness was the way people from the South who settled in the North found themselves segregated from Northern mainstream society and encouraged to live in their own areas, called Sabon Garis. It may well be that many of these people found it more conducive to live segregated from the host people, but the fact remains that when there was racial tension the perceived cause was easily identified in the Strangers’ Quarters.

  In the 1940s during the early period of emerging Nigerian national political awareness, together with the formation of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), attempts were made to ensure that politics would be a national affair and would gain support from all people rather than become ethnically divisive. Indeed before the Richards Constitution of 1945, Nigerian politics was based on unification towards a centralized state and the realisation of a common nationality. 486 Unfortunately the constitution allowed for the creation of regional councils in the West, East and North, which in retrospect have been criticised for introducing ethnicity into Nigerian politics. Because the Igbo people were the first ethnic group of Nigerians to embrace western education they found themselves in great demand to fill clerical vacancies in government administration and within the railways as workers and storekeepers, and because of population and land pressure they migrated in large numbers throughout the country. For their mutual benefit these people formed themselves into societies to promote education within their ranks and extended families. By 1944 these associations had developed into a national body with the formation of the Pan-Igbo Federal Union, with Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe as president.

  At the same time, Yoruba students in London formed the Egbe Omo Oduduwa and although initially a cultural organisation it soon became politically orientated and was to lead to the formation of the Action Group, which initially was only interested in securing Western Regional interests. Indeed in the first general election of 1951–2, although the NCNC won seats in the West, the results for the Action Group and the Northern Peoples’ Congress were decisively supported in their own respective regions. Although the NCNC continued in its policy of achieving a unitary Nigeria, the other two parties were determined to promote their regions. This was especially true of the North who had had little integration with the South and who feared Southern domination.

  The Macpherson Constitution of 1948 allowed for popular elections in all three regions, resulting in the ethnically dominated parties being elected in each region, and this gave weight to national politics being conducted on ethnic lines. By 1959, in the final national elections before independence, Nigerian politics had decidedly assumed the mantle of ethnicity and racial divisiveness. All three parties gained majority support from their regional origins. Even the NPNC, which had started out as a national unitary party, became dominated by support from the Igbo heartland. This politically ethnic divide helped foster notions of ethnic segregation and state separation within the Nigerian federation.

  Arguably the British, under their rule, had encouraged loyalty to the establishment with rewards for lucrative government contracts for indigenous people who were compliant and supportive of the colonial regime. Indigenous political development was gradually taking place, but on ethnic lines, as previously noted. However, control was firmly held by Britain through the services, and the indigenisation of the civil, military and police services was only gradually and slowly promoted. There was of course much competition from Nigerians to gain acceptance into these services, especially in the upper echelons. Having achieved these positions of perceived power and success, the traditional responsibility of supporting an extended family of relatives, friends and supporters was considered mandatory. Thus the indigenisation of these positions encouraged favouritism, bribery and corruption. Furthermore, the British had always rewarded their expatriate workers with generous remunerations and perquisites, far in excess of those paid to Nigerians of equivalent rank. This led to much resentment among the indigenous. However, once independence came Nigerians could reward themselves with the same emoluments accorded to expatriate workers. 487 Generous housing, vehicle and travel allowances became the norm. This situation was obviously acceptable to the few who enjoyed these benefits, but to the masses it was simply an unfair distribution of wealth. Independence was supposed to have brought benefit to all Nigerians, not just a few. The elite were increasingly accused of corruption. Nigeria’s media became increasingly vitriolic over this perceived abuse of power. The evidence would point to this being one of the main areas of grievences amonst the young and well educated, who could see their opportunities of advancement being held back by the few who were in positions of power and influence and who were seen to be enriching themselves at the expense of the ordinary Nigerian citizen. 488 It was this that confirmed the popularity of the first coup, which in retrospect can be seen as the first practical step towards the country’s disintegration and the start of the civil war.