At the London Conference, 4 August 1953, a joint memorandum, on central-regional powers under a new constitution, issued by the NCNC (National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons, changed in 1962 to National Council for Nigerian Citizens) and AG (Action Group) stated:

     1.  Nigeria should have a constitution which is Federal in character;

     2.  The Federation should have three Regions as at present; (but it is believed that in a self-governing Nigeria the Federation should consist of more than three Regions to be determined by a Constituent Assembly). 140

  In 1958 the Willink Commission 141 had recommended that the Niger Delta be given special attention for separate development. 142 Indeed in 1960 the Niger Delta Development Board was established, but it failed to help development in the area. Isaac Adaka Boro became a political activist whilst a student at Nsukka University, and formed a group with like-minded students from the Niger Delta region; all were Ijaws. They were frustrated by the lack of development in the Delta region. With the help of Samuel Owonaru and Nottingham Dick, they created an organisation called the Niger Delta Volunteer Service, whose objective was to disassociate itself from the recently formed Nigerian military government under Ironsi. 143 With the objective of creating a separate state within the Delta region, the Delta Volunteer Service succeeded in taking over parts of the region and proclaiming an independent state. It lasted for twelve days. Boro and his associates were arrested, tried and condemned to death for treason. Whilst they were in prison the second coup occurred, bringing Gowon to power. Rather than carrying out the court ruling, Gowon commuted Boro’s sentence; indeed he pardoned him and offered him the opportunity to fight for the Federal Government against the East. Boro, who had long felt that his people were subjugated by the Eastern Igbos, accepted the opportunity and joined the Nigerian army with the rank of major. Boro’s action had the effect of making Gowon and his senior advisors decide on a policy for the formation of twelve states within the country. Two of those new states were within the area where Boro and his followers had campaigned for independence, Rivers and Cross Rivers States.

  Colonel Achuzia says:

  The idea for creating twelve states first came to the Gowon regime’s mind following Boro’s failed attempt at creating an independent Delta region, his subsequent trial and conviction and then release by Gowon. I feel this was a masterstoke by Gowon affecting the future course of the war, and it addressed two of his objectives, one that it would undermine the East’s power base and two that it would help his administration’s power base by giving support to more minorities within the country. 144

  However the formation of twelve states and the Federal Government’s declaration of a state of emergency on 27 June 1967 were followed by the Eastern region declaring itself the Republic of Biafra, and seceding from the Federation on 3 June 1967.

  Military strengths and weaknesses

  This was a war fought with modern armaments and technology, and controlled and led on both sides by Sandhurst- and Mons-trained men, who had all been comrades in a very close-knit community, the Nigerian Army. They had been taught all aspects of conducting military campaigns as learnt and perceived by European and Western societies. However the war was also contested by ill-educated and generally illiterate people who had little understanding of the modern independent state of Nigeria, let alone a war fought in European style with fairly up-to-date equipment, and who were still living a traditional way of life, often as subsistence farmers living in obscure communities, as they had done for generations. They were suddenly awoken into the harsh reality of a modern and ruthless war for which they had little understanding and for which they were totally unprepared. This fact was to have a strong bearing on Biafra’s invasive success through the extensive use of ‘attack markets’. 145

  James Eneje, who was a member of the Biafran Organisation of Freedom Fighters (BOFF), says:

  Attack markets were very popular with Igbo people because they gave us the opportunity to conduct cross-border trade in goods which were becoming increasingly scarce in Biafra. The other point to make is that both sides found such markets useful and therefore they could carry out their business relatively immune from military attacks from either side. 146

  However, with a people still largely bound to a traditional way of life, it also meant that rumour-mongering to create fear and foster superstition was rife. The emotive word ‘saboteur’ was to have a morally undermining effect on Biafra’s willingness to win the war. Coupled with this was the fact that the East consisted of a heterogeneous population: Biafra comprised about twelve million people, of whom seven million were Igbo. Five million were from other ethnic groups such as Efiks and Ibibios. As the idea of secession began to gather acceptance with the people of the East, it culminated in a meeting of the consultative assembly, a representative body of all peoples from the Eastern Region, giving the Igbo elite a fully supportive mandate to declare the sovereign state of Biafra. 147 However in view of the Federal Government’s declaration of twelve states, Biafra’s other ethnic groups were always going to have the potential to undermine her power base. Indeed this became apparent in the early stages of the campaign when the federal forces overran the Mid-West and attacks were made on Calabar and the Delta area. The peoples of these areas became ambivalent in their support for Biafra as a nation. In spite of surviving for nearly three years, the minority ethnic support was virtually to disappear and it was left to the indigenous Igbo people to hold the battered nation together. By the end the only area left of Biafra was a depleted Igboland.

  The armies of both sides had to undergo a rapid programme of recruitment and training. Often these recruits came from people who were more accustomed to a traditional and rural life than a life imbued with all the trappings of modern western technology. The Nigerian army was a British invention, created as a defensive and ceremonial force. It was not an offensive armed force. Admittedly some 30,000 Nigerians had volunteered for British Crown service during the Second World War, but by the time of the Nigerian Civil War most of these men had retired, and although some volunteered to serve again, on both sides, during the conflict and were a valuable asset to both armies, most of them were beyond serving age and were not combat troops. Because of the two coups virtually the whole senior army corps had been killed. In fact there were only two senior officers left, a brigadier and a full colonel. Ogundipe, the brigadier, was to serve as Nigeria’s High Commissioner in London and Adebayo, the colonel, was appointed as military regional governor of the West, so neither took an active part in the war on either side. The remaining officer corps consisted of very inexperienced young lieutenant-colonels, a few of whom had witnessed live operations as part of the United Nations peace-keeping mission to the Congo, but they still had had no combat experience. The remainder, ranked major and below, had never seen active service. Some were lucky enough to have received their officer training either at Sandhurst or Mons. ‘Mons focused on turning out platoon commanders, whilst Sandhurst interested itself with the attitributes required of generals.’ 148 This was to have a bearing on both sides’ ability to win the war.

  Most Biafran officers from the original Nigerian Army were Sandhurst-trained who focused on being generals. They were pleased to accept the kudos of successful attacks but were nowhere to be seen in the event of failure or reverses. They would indeed make hasty retreat back to their headquarters. 149

  A very few had attended staff college in Britain, India or Canada. Many of the officer corps, especially those with a technical background, were Igbos who had made their way back to the East to offer their services to the Biafran army.

  In total the Nigerian army consisted of just under 10,000 men, made up of six battalions, of which one was stationed in the East. There was also an artillery regiment, and support staff to run the army. It was notionally of divisional strength. Of the officer corps Nigeria could count on one hundred and thirty-eight officers, and Biafra ninety-three. 150 The Federal Government planned to wage the war against Biafra in four phases. It was to be over within one month. The capture of Nsukka and Enugu was seen as the priority, followed by Ogoja and then Abakaliki. The first area command, consisting mainly of Northern troops from Kaduna, was to be the fighting force, and was to start its attack on Biafra’s northern borders around Nsukka, and the second area command, based in Ibadan, was earmarked for the defence of the Mid-West. The Lagos garrison, a mainly ceremonial force, was for the defence of Lagos. This was the state of the Nigerian army and of its plans to bring the ‘police action’ to a quick conclusive victory at the start of the war. On top of this the Nigerian navy was detailed to blockade the East from the sea, in order to stop the importation of goods, armaments and food to the breakaway region. Lagos also sanctioned an embargo on all international flights to the East without her permission, doing her best to discredit the secessionist territory in the eyes of the international community. However in order to curry favour with its overseas allies the Federal Government continued to participate in efforts at finding a peaceful solution. Arguably this was one of the constraints, which hindered Nigeria from conclusively defeating Biafra in purely military terms. The peace process continued unabated throughout the war. Indeed as one former Nigerian army officer pointed out, throughout the war the army always knew when an attempted peace process was being negotiated because the supply of arms would be severely restricted: ‘We always knew when peace negotiations were in progress because there would be a severe shortage and rationing of arms and ammunition.’ 151

  Biafra’s military position was arguably even more disorganised and precarious. Notionally its army consisted of one battalion, stationed at Enugu. Even before the start of hostilities Ojukwu, in agreement with Gowon, had arranged that all Northern soldiers stationed in the East be repatriated to their homes. In order to protect themselves they were allowed to retain their rifles and their ammunition, on the understanding that these would be returned once they reached their homeland; this never happened. This situation left the Biafran army depleted of men and arms. However it did have the nucleus of a trained officer corps, although they were mainly technically qualified, but it was very short of infantry-trained officers. Although its one battalion had been denuded of arms she did have a limited stock of armaments. There is evidence that it had sent emissaries abroad before the start of hostilities to buy arms. However these efforts had had limited success; indeed one aircraft supposedly carrying arms for Biafra crashed over Cameroonian air space, much to the embarrassment of the East’s administration. The East denied that the arms were destined for Enugu.

  Efforts were made before the war to secure arms from overseas. With some colleagues we travelled to Europe to buy arms and were reasonably successful in achieving this. When the war started Ojukwu took charge of the stocks of arms, but he had a habit in being so restrictive in their supply that often the lack of arms had dire consequences on our ability to sustain attacks, and led to some notable failures. However as the war progressed arms became much more available, partly because we became much better at capturing the enemy’s arms. During attack they would often up sticks and run away leaving their arms and ammunition behind. The other thing was that as the war continued so we seemed to get much more support from France for arms. 152

  I think it would be worthwhile recording that the first large-scale arms delivery to the East arrived in October 1966 [nine months before the start of hostilities]. It was of Czech small arms and light machine guns, shipped from Szeczyn, in Poland. These were the arms with which the Biafran army was fitted out …. by October 1966 Ojukwu already entertained the idea of secession. The communist countries originally favoured or were prepared to support Ojukwu, and didn’t change their minds until 1967, probably in June or July when the Federals approached Russia. 153

  By May 1967 further arms had been imported into Biafra, and she was able to form two new battalions, the 9th and the 14th , consisting of university and secondary school students. There is now further evidence to show that even before the start of the war the East had set up a militia force, based round Port Harcourt, although initially it did not receive the support of Ojukwu, who felt that it would have too strong political connotations. The business community around Port Harcourt had instigated it in order to protect the area against an aggressor. With the assistance of Lt-Col. Ogbugo Kalu, a regular Sandhurst-trained officer from the Nigerian army, a force numbering some 5,000 men was recruited and thoroughly trained in infantry warfare. Added to this was the fact that a major electrical component manufacturer, run by Joe Achuzia, in Port Harcourt, was ordered by the East’s military government to turn its expertise over to arms production.

  Achuzia had an extremely colourful and successful career. He originally trained in Manchester, as an electrical engineer. Finding himself in Britain at an age when he was obliged to do National Service, he joined an infantry battalion, only to find himself, after training, posted to Korea; this was at the height of the Korean War. He appears to have acquitted himself extremely well. According to him he received a field commission, and became expert in infantry warefare. 154

  Army archives show no record of a 2nd Lt. J. Achuzia, but according to Major-Gen. Thompson, Achuzia’s commission was possible though unlikely. Whatever the truth, the fact was that this experience was to prove invaluable for Biafra, and arguably was the reason for him becoming a war hero during the Biafran War. At the end of the Korean War Achuzia found himself in captivity in North Korea. When he finally returned to England, he and some English colleagues went to Port Harcourt, in Eastern Nigeria, and set up an electrical component manufacturing company. The company prospered, and according to Achuzia’s English wife, Josephine, the family lived in style in Port Harcourt. Achuzia was held in some regard by Ojukwu; not only was he asked by him to turn his factory over to manufacturing arms, but Ojukwu asked him to supply timed bombs to be driven to Lagos and detonated. Achuzia duly supplied the bombs, and drivers were detailed to take them to Lagos. Unfortunately, when the drivers reached Lagos with their destructive cargo, they abandoned their vehicles and one bomb detonated outside a cinema, in Yaba, Lagos, killing many people, including Igbos. A further plan to send a boat loaded with timed bombs and sail it into Lagos harbour was abandoned when it was pointed out to Ojukwu that such a move would probably flood large areas of Lagos. Through his father Ojukwu had large property holdings in Lagos. However, these cavalier attacks on Lagos made Gowon realise how vulnerable Lagos was to amphibious attack. 155

  Gowon said:

  I heard about rumours of an amphibious attack, and they prompted me to carry out an aerial reconnaissance to look for a more secure capital for the Federal Government. I chanced on the small community of Abuja, positioned fairly centrally in the country, and well away from the coast and thus not subject to sea-borne attacks. 156

  Although the infantry-trained militia were regarded dismissively by members of Biafra’s regular army officer corps, once the war started, and Biafra realised it was in need of all the armed help it could get, the militia was eventually integrated into the regular army. Interestingly, once Port Harcourt had set up a militia, other towns in the East started to follow suit. It is evident, therefore, that Biafra was able to organise a defensive army fairly quickly, albeit with limited arms. 157

  Biafra also quickly formed ‘directorates’ for the consistent and controlled flow of supplies. There were directorates of food, petroleum, transport, clothing, housing, propaganda and many others. This put Biafra on a planned and organised war footing which was to prove, especially in the early days, far superior to that of the Federal Government, whose position, although in theory far superior to its adversary, in practice was constrained. It was severely short of trained officers, and the men under their command had no combat experience. Its army also had severe logistics and communications problem. Although it had a reasonable supply of arms, its soldiers were extremely wasteful in the consumption of ammunition, believing that shooting aerial foliage would cause noise and alarm and therefore defeat for its enemy. 158 As noted above, as the war progressed Gowon also had the very unnerving habit of ordering restriction on arms supply during peace negotiations, of which there were many, all abortive.

  The opening stages of the conflict proved disastrous for Biafra. In the early hours of the first day, in Nsukka province, Nigeria’s northern sector, 1st Division successfully attacked Okpo and Igbo Eze districts and overran the area. By 12 July they were within twelve miles of Enugu. ‘I was second-in-command of a freshly formed infantry battalion, 7th , which was under the command of Lt-Col. Adigbo, who came from Brass. Adigbo had no working knowledge of Igbo, and this made it extremely difficult for him to communicate with his troops.’ 159 Biafra, being short of arms, retaliated with smoke bombs. Colonel Madiebo commented: ‘My view at the time was that if Enugu fell the war was virtually over and lost, and having started fighting the people of Biafra did not want an abrupt end’. 160

  A counterattack under the leadership of Lt-Col. Madiebo was eventually launched, which succeeded in stalling the enemy at Obollo Eke. Nigerian troops, having exhausted their ammunition within thirty minutes of the counterattack, were stunned into confusion when attacked by very limited Biafran mortar fire. 161

  The commander of the Biafran army, Brig. Njoku felt incredibly frustrated because of his failure to convince Ojukwu of the need for additional arms to help stem the onslaught. 162 The lack of faith and trust between senior Biafran officers was to be an ongoing feature of the war. Deep suspicion was also engendered between the military and the civilian directorates. One of the issues was that Ojukwu was the only military person on his advisory council; this meant that his civilian advisors were often out of touch with the needs of the army. They were more intent on securing their own positions than helping Biafra to achieve a victory. 163 This led to ongoing shortages of all the army’s needs throughout the war, from food and clothing supplies to arms and fuel supplies. These shortages were to occur at crucially important times of the campaign and can be seen as one of the reasons why Biafra eventually sued for peace. 164