The biafran war 1967 197.., p.4

  The Biafran War (1967-1970), p.4

The Biafran War (1967-1970)
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  Education also played its part in Lugard’s efforts at indirect rule in the South. Missionaries had encouraged the growth of education in the South and had promoted further education in Britain for their brighter protégés; indeed the freed slave Samuel Crowther, who later became Bishop of the Niger, was an early example. 29 Lugard’s attempts at indirect rule were somewhat thwarted by western-educated people who questioned Britain’s presence in the country, such as Herbert Macaulay, the grandson of Bishop Crowther and founder of the first nationalist party in 1923. 30 Indeed in the East, where there had been no heritage of chieftain rule, there was a history of democracy emanating upwards from the villages, and indirect rule was found to be very difficult. Lugard appointed government chiefs, known as warrant chiefs, in the areas. These were anathema to the Igbo people, who conclusively rejected them.

  1913 saw the amalgamation of Nigeria into three administrative areas: the crown colony of Lagos and the Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria. Initially from this period, especially in the South, a gradual political consciousness and unity developed. Southerners were especially adept at absorbing western-style education, and this meant that a new professional class of people came into being, outside of tribalism. By being mainly excluded from the European administration, but indoctrinated with European ideals of political freedom, this class became politically aware in the new country, indeed questioning the very reason for European presence in their country. Embryo nationalism was created following protests in 1908 over the imposition of a general rate to fund new water schemes in Lagos. 31 The most outspoken critic of the British presence in Nigeria came from the aforementioned Herbert Macaulay who, on 24 June 1923, formed with his colleagues the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). Its initial aims sought municipal status and self-government for Lagos, together with plans for national compulsory primary education, as well as secondary education facilities and the Nigerianisation of the civil service. Opposition to Macaulay and his party mainly came from students at King’s College Lagos, who formed the Lagos Youth Movement in 1934. This movement was strengthened three years later with the arrival of Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, who had trained in America and had successfully run a newspaper in the Gold Coast for three years. However, these early political aspirations centred on gaining political power at town council level. It was not until 1944, when Britain and America signed the Atlantic Charter, which confirmed the right of self-determination by people for control of their homelands, that political awareness took on a greater national and nationalistic fervour. In 1946 under the terms of a new constitution, a national legislature, together with three regional assemblies, was brought into being. 1945 saw the first meeting of the National Council of Nigerians and Cameroons (NCNC), with Herbert Macaulay as president and Nnamdi Azikiwe as secretary. Interestingly Macaulay was a Yoruba and Azikiwe an Igbo. The NCNC was not a political party as such but represented all people who had an interest in Nigeria obtaining internal self-government within the British Empire. 32 However, tribal unity in the South was to be short-lived. The Yoruba elite increasingly felt that the party, the NCNC, was being dominated by Azikiwe and his Igbo supporters, and 1951 saw the formation of the Action Group Party dominated by Yorubas from Nigeria’s Western region. At its inaugural meeting it sought to ‘bring and organize within its fold all nationalists in the Western Region, so that they may work together as a united group, and submit themselves to party loyalty and discipline’. 33 In order to establish itself as a serious political party it was prepared to use all modern methods of political party discipline, but, and most importantly, it also enlisted the support and help of all the traditional Yoruba leaders. This effectively made it an ethnically dominated party. With the establishment of the Action Group led by Obafemi Awolowo, within the Yoruba-dominated Western Region, and the NCNC led by Nnamdi Azikiwe and mainly supported by Igbos from the East, Nigerian politics took on a distinctly regional and ethnic style. This was confirmed when the Northern leaders established the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) led by the Sardauna of Sokoto. Indeed following the agreement of the Macpherson Constitution, 34 which allowed for popular elections in all three regions, the establishment of Nigerian politics on ethnic lines was confirmed, with each mainly ethnic party being elected within each region. The North was to make its ethnicity even more divisive when Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, became premier of Northern Nigeria and promoted a ‘Northernization Policy’, whereby appointments to the Northern Nigerian Civil Service were to be given to qualified Northern Nigerians in preference to other Nigerians, and where there were none available then Europeans were to be employed. 35

  In the federal elections of 1954, it was therefore hardly surprising that the NPC won an overwhelming majority in the North, but, surprisingly, the increasingly Igbo-dominated NCNC won a majority in the West and the East. In the regional governments each dominant party continued in power with their leaders as regional premiers. With a scene increasingly set for ethnically divisive regional politics, the Nigerian constitution was revised to allow for greater internal self-government within the regions, and by 1959 all three regions enjoyed a large degree of internal autonomy, thus exacerbating divisive regional and ultimately national politics. The final federal elections in 1959, prior to independence, saw the NPC in the north win 142 seats out of 312, the NCNC from the east win 89 seats and the Action Group from the west win 73. Coalition government was to be the nature of Nigerian national politics. After much party manoeuvring the NCNC felt it would be able to control the Hausa North by cooperating with their predominant party, the NPC, rather than working with the Action Group from the West.

  Post-independence

  The post-independence period was dominated by the other two regions’ fear of the power of the North, and also by the realisation that political power meant absolute power both legally and economically, by political wrangling within one of the major parties and finally by patronage and corruption. Furthermore, a rigged census did much to damage the integrity of the first administration. The break-up of the Action Group party, and its fragmenting into two parties due to ideological differences, and the jockeying for power, also undermined the electorate’s confidence in their political masters. By independence the country was only a federation in name; in reality it was a country of semi-autonomous regions ruled by political parties who enjoyed enormous patronage and power. In the East and West the parties, with their power of patronage, secured absolute support, especially from the emerging middle-class professionals. Each region, which meant each regional government, had control over the regional banks and the marketing boards and many other economic activities; this meant that jobs, marketing board licences, loans and government contracts were given to party supporters, and to members of government ministers’ extended families. Secession was never far from regional government thought, especially in the North. Minority interests were ignored and draconian methods were used to quell unrest. Elections were rigged; violence and anarchy were openly tolerated. Not atypical of the times was the man who appeared in court on a charge of intimidation and on being asked by the judge for his profession, replied: ‘A daily paid thug, sir’. 36

  Under British rule, the loyalty of the elite members of the indigenous population had been rewarded with lucrative government contracts, but the bulk of commercial activity remained and was to remain under British and European control, even after independence. Also, prior to independence, there had been great discrepancy between the terms and conditions of employment for expatriate and local employees doing the same job. Post-independence, the indigenous employees, now finding they were in control, awarded themselves the same perquisites as had been taken for granted by the expatriate community. However, because much of the commercial power of the country remained firmly in British and European hands, most of these jobs were in the public domain, and as under the old colonial system, when they had been awarded to loyal elite indigenous servants, these were now awarded to the extended family and the party faithful who supported those politicians in power, but the ‘national cake’ had been seriously diminished. Therefore the power and patronage of the political parties and leaders took on a new significance. The British, being concerned for their commercial investment in the country (after all that was their raison d’être for being in the country in the first place), concerned themselves with ensuring that they left the country in a ‘safe pair of hands’. Although they had had no control over the make-up of the country’s population, it was seen to be to their great advantage that the North, being the most populated area, would have the largest presence in the federal assembly and therefore would be likely to control the first post-colonial government, albeit with coalition partners. 37 The North and its rulers were considered by the British to be more quiescent, amenable and supportive of Britain and her post-colonial role in Nigeria. Ever since Lugard’s time, when he had instituted indirect rule, the British had relied on the support of the North’s leaders in return for a large degree of autonomy. When Britain departed she left the country in the hands of the Northern-dominated NPC, with Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as Prime Minister, but, because of the democratic rules, this was within a coalition with the NCNC and its leader Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, who accepted the role of Governor General. The third national party, under the leadership of Chief Awolowo, found itself in opposition to the other two main parties, and took on the role of the official opposition. Awolowo led his party in parliament and delegated leadership of the western government to his deputy Chief Akintola, who took on the role of premier of the Western Region. This however created an imbalance as far as the Western Region was concerned. It was felt that the ‘national cake’ was unfairly in the hands of the two parties who were in government and that the official opposition was missing out on patronage. Indeed having gained power the two parties in government were keen to see that the status quo remained. It was at this point that Chief Akintola as the Western Region’s premier sought a political alliance with the ruling NPC.

  As Eskor Toyo, the veteran trade union leader, so aptly put it, in a pamphlet entitled Nigerian Soldier Peace and Future:

  Here were two groups of Yoruba feudal and capitalist leaders. The first led by Akintola wanted the Action Group to join the Federal Government of Balewa in order that the Yoruba Chiefs and businessmen might share in the Federal ‘chop chop’. Why should that Federal ‘chop chop’ or the ‘national cake’ as the capitalists call it, be enjoyed only by the Ibos and the Hausas and Fulanis? Why should Awolowo allow this to happen? 38

  The second group led by Awolowo did not want to join the Balewa Government merely to share in the Federal ‘chop chop’ but wanted to expand the Action Group in the other regions, build up its power among the people, use it to unseat the NPC-NCNC coalition government and grab the whole of the Federal ‘chop’. This line would need more patience; it would require fighting for more democracy so as to reach the people especially in the former Northern Region and carry them along. But in the end would yield more profit. Why, after all, must the capitalists of Nigeria and their professional and intellectual supporters and leaders with their more modern and progressive outlook share power as minor partners with the conservative emirs, the conservative obas, and other ‘elders’ in the Yoruba land and elsewhere? Why should the capitalists, led by the Action Group, have all the power in their hands? So reasoned the Awolowo faction of the Action Group. Since the feudal emirs did not want to yield their power over the common people in the former Northern Region to the Action Group, and since the Ibo business wealth grabbers of the NCNC and their intellectual and professional allies similarly would not permit the far-sighted Yoruba business wealth grabbers and their professional and intellectual allies organized in the Action Group to capture their empire in the former Eastern Region from them, the NPC and the NCNC joined hands together and helped Akintola to split the Action Group and try to crush it, as it was impossible for him to capture it or to stay in it. 39

  The crisis came to a head in 1962 when Awolowo gained support from the executive of his party, the Action Group, and asked for the resignation of Akintola as premier of the Western Region government, and whom the party charged with maladministration, anti-party activities and gross indiscipline. 40 This followed Awolowo’s attempt to steer the party in a socialist direction which Akintola and his conservative allies were set against. Also, Akintola wanted the party to be part of a national government, rather than, as Awolowo wanted, a party strong enough to determine its own destiny, and through popular and national appeal, form its own government. Unfortunately Akintola refused to resign his premiership; this resulted in physical uproar in the regional house of assembly, culminating in the Federal Government declaring a state of emergency in the West and replacing the Action Group government with its own administration. At the same time an enquiry was instigated into the mismanagement of public funds by the Action Group. Interestingly and surprisingly, although the Coker Commission found that indeed government money had been used for the benefit of the Action Group, Chief Akintola was exonerated from the misuse of public funds. However, the arrest of Awolowo along with other senior members of the party, who were charged with attempting to overthrow the Federal Government, was most damaging for Nigeria’s fledgling democracy. The results were a distinct attempt by the coalition Federal Government, of the Northern and Eastern parties the NPC and the NCNC, to discredit Awolowo and to destroy the credibility of his Action Group party. Not only was Awolowo forced to defend himself, because his defence lawyer was not allowed into Nigeria, but the evidence produced by the prosecution was flimsy, dubious and full of contradictions. 41 Sadly Awolowo was found guilty and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. Far from destroying his political career he became a martyr in the eyes of his Yoruba followers, who not unreasonably felt threatened by the seemingly unstoppable power of the North with its Eastern ally.

  In the meantime, this turn of events allowed Akintola and his supporters from the Action Group to form their own breakaway party the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), and to begin overtures to the Northern NPC in order to achieve their policy of a national government. The 1962–63 census crisis culminated in Akintola and his new party being able to form a coalition with the ruling NPC. The census was of great importance to all political parties because population numbers from each region determined how many seats would be awarded to each region in the federal parliament. This was an extremely sensitive issue where Nigerian politics were concerned, given the ethnic divide of the country and its political divide on regional lines. The census showed a 200 percent rise in the population within a decade. 42 This figure was so obviously inflated that the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Abbakar Tafawa Balewa, ordered a recount. Sadly, the second count did not fare much better and more importantly the new figures showed that, if the NPC party were to gain the majority of allocated seats in the North, it could form a government in the federal parliament, without the support from one of the other political parties from the other two regions. This was totally insupportable as far as the government’s Eastern Region partner, the NCNC, was concerned. However, Balewa declared, ‘I am advised that my acceptance and publication of these figures is final’. 43 Being unacceptable to his coalition partners, it resulted in the break-up of the government alliance between the NPC and the NCNC.

  The census debacle was quickly followed by federal elections in which the NPC sought a new and potentially compliant partner in the form of Akintola and his new NNDP. Not only had Awolowo’s downfall enabled Akintola to form a new party but it had opened the way for him to achieve his ambition of forming a national government. Furthermore, the census results had created conditions where the North was prepared to make overtures to him, to the detriment of the East’s NCNC. As the leader of the NPC, the Sardauna of Sokoto stated ‘even if my party fails to get the required majority in the next federal elections, it will definitely not enter a coalition with the NCNC …. The Igbos have never been friends of the North and never will be.’ 44 The Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) was duly formed between the Sardauna’s NPC and Akintola’s NNDP. It is also interesting to note that at this point the new Nigerian National Alliance also attracted support from the Delta Region, in the East but outside of Igboland, in the form of the Niger Delta Congress and the Dynamic Party. 45 Not to be outdone over this new alignment in Nigerian politics, the NCNC formed an alliance with the Action Group to create another new party, the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). Opposition Northern and Middle Belt parties also joined this new Southern alliance.

  The ensuing federal elections were fought in the most brutal manner. Each party used all and any means to ensure that they were victorious. Physical attacks were not uncommon, and the police were used regularly to intimidate opposition candidates. Tribalism and ethnicity entered the arena in a conclusive way. Not only had the Sardauna of Sokoto denigrated the Igbo people, but his party’s election methods in the Northern region used trumped-up charges and arrested, and in some cases kidnapped, opposition candidates. Having control of the election machinery and feeling threatened that they, the UPGA, could potentially lose seats in the East, they refused to take part in the election. The result was a victory for the NNA, but the UPGA refused to admit defeat. So serious was the stalemate that the Igbo president of the federation, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, was prevailed upon to nullify the election. Indeed both sides considered taking members of the police and armed forces into their confidence in order to take control of the federation. There is evidence that Lt-Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, the future leader of the breakaway state of Biafra, had approached Dr Azikiwe with a plan for the UPGA to take over the country with military support. 46 Finding, that as president of the federation, he did not have the authority to order the army to support him in nullifying the election, Dr Azikiwe asked the NNA to form a government. Interestingly, and probably by way of compromise, two NCNC elected members who were close to the new NNA government were brought in as ministers. However the election, in spite, or because, of the East failing to take part, had confirmed the ascendant and potential stranglehold position of the North in Nigerian politics. It also confirmed the divisive, tribalistic and uncompromising nature of the country’s politics and showed how narrowly the country averted a total breakdown and reversion to regionalism and potential secession. Both sides had contemplated secession during the campaign. 47 These actions had also brought the military into the political arena for the first time.

 
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