In all there were nine attempts by the international community to broker peace, all of which ended in failure. The challenge for the negotiators, as in most wars, was that initially both sides treated peace negotiations as yet another way to achieve their respective objectives; many peace negotiators failed to appreciate this. Arguably it was this main fact that led to so many failed attempts to secure a peaceful settlement. As Ojukwu commented, ‘The bargaining position of any of the peace negotiations was determined by our military position at the time.’ 299

  The two sides’ positions were also seemingly intractable. The Federal Government’s demands were that Biafra should give up its right to self-determination and return to the Federation. It should accept the twelve-state structure, and the old Eastern region should be one of three regions, East Central forming mainly the heart of Igboland. Biafra took the view that its sovereignty was not negotiable and that its independence was permanent. Although from time to time there were minor variations to these opposing demands, both sides negotiated from these positions until the end of the war.

  The first organisation which, under pressure from Biafra and support from Ghana, took an interest in brokering a peaceful settlement was the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). However, one of the OAU’s founding principles was that it did not interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign member nation. Nevertheless it did offer to appoint a consultative committee of six member states, which visited Lagos but not Enugu. Unsurprisingly, the committee reaffirmed its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states and therefore came firmly down on the side of supporting the Federal cause. This caused Biafra Radio to comment: ‘By deciding to consult only one party to the dispute, the mission has demonstrated its lack of objectivity and doomed itself to failure.’ 300

  At this early stage in the war neither side was in a mood to compromise, each feeling that their respective cause was justified, and each strong enough to win. However, the OAU was seen by Biafra as a biased agency which would not support their cause, and by other countries as an inadequate medium through which to negotiate a peaceful settlement.

  A major breakthrough came early in 1968. The Federal Government asked Arnold Smith, the Secretary General of the Commonwealth, who had been contacted by Gowon, if he could negotiate a peaceful settlement which would keep Nigeria’s sovereignty intact; an almost insurmountable task, in view of Biafra’s demand to retain its right of self-determination. However, at this time Biafra was, arguably, on the defensive. Its army had retreated back to the river Niger not, it should be added, because of pressure from Federal troops, but because of its lack of leadership, following Banjo’s decision to renege on his orders. Furthermore, Onitsha was being attacked by Federal troops and, importantly, Nigeria had changed its currency. The currency change, discussed later in the chapter, initially had a severe impact on Biafra’s economy and its ability to conduct the war. Up until this time both sides had traded in a common currency. This new situation left Biafra in an increasingly vulnerable position. So arguably, at this stage, negotiations for peace, therefore, appeared an attractive proposition. Three of Ojukwu’s most important and trusted advisors, Michael Okpara, former premier of the Eastern Region, Kenneth Dike, former vice chancellor of Ibadan University and C. C. Mojukwu, Ojukwu’s uncle and home minister, were prepared to agree to a confederated Nigeria, providing there were guarantees for the Igbo people. Unfortunately, the Federal Government’s attitude had hardened since the start of hostilities and it was in no mood for compromise. Furthermore it seems that Biafra was in reality simply trying to improve her international standing and to gain more outside support. To a point she seems to have been successful. Whilst negotiating a peaceful settlement, Mojukwu was also in France arranging for a supply of arms. 301 Not only was Biafra successful in negotiating a new supply of arms but in April 1968 through persuasive negotiations it received official recognition from a succession of African states. Tanzania, Gambia and the Ivory Coast formally acknowledged the existence of Biafra, to a large extent because of their frustration at the Federal Government’s inability to secure a compromise peace internally. All of them were concerned with Igbo survival rather than the East securing victory over the Federal Government. Unsubstantiated evidence would seem to point to many other African countries having sympathy for Biafra’s cause, and their inclination being to recognise her. 302 Even Niger and Sudan, although predominantly Muslim, showed sympathy for Biafra’s plight, seemingly because of Ojukwu’s personal friendship with both leaders. 303 A view from the time lucidly expressed recognition for Biafra:

  It was not an approval of the political choice of Eastern Nigeria to secede. This was made clear by the fact that the first recognition did not come until months after secession. It was the magnitude of the war and the enormity of the suffering produced that made the leaders of these countries revolt against the method adopted by the Nigerian Government to solve the problem …. Like secession itself, [it] was more a reaction against than a decision for. Like most acts born of reaction it produced unexpected counter-reactions. Not only did it encourage the ‘hawks’ on the Biafran side to unnecessary intransigence as far as peace negotiations were concerned, it also provoked in the Nigerian government an increased determination to make nonsense of, by military means, whatever gains Biafra might have scored diplomatically. 304

  The Kampala peace talks, under the chairmanship of Arnold Smith, took place in May 1968. Each side had a contrary focus. The Federal Government was intent on its troops capturing Port Harcourt, an event which would arguably lead to Biafra’s military collapse. On Biafra’s part, having been recognised by four African states, with others showing considerable sympathy, it firmly believed that by this action the international community would acknowledge the status it was determined to achieve. The Federal Government offered the Igbos the opportunity to return to the confederation, with some safeguards but little else. This indicated its ascendancy on the battlefield at the time: it had overrun much of Eastern Nigeria, was in control of its major towns, including Enugu, and had control of much of its natural wealth, especially oil. Biafra insisted on a ceasefire, an end to the blockade and withdrawal of all troops to pre-war positions. The talks lasted for six days, but because of both sides’ intransigent positions, they had little chance of success. Although the Kampala talks failed, both sides, especially the Nigerians, were under pressure from the international community to seek a negotiated settlement, and from the middle of 1968 the Organisation of African Unity took a focal role in these negotiations, under the chairmanship of the Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Selassie. On this occasion Ojukwu made a personal appearance at the peace talks in Addis Ababa. However, his speech did little to appeal to any OAU representatives and indeed may well have undermined support for Biafra’s cause. Ojukwu was intent on trying to put Biafra on an equal sovereign footing with Nigeria. The problem at this stage in the war was that neither side was in a mood for compromise. The Federal Government still felt that it was militarily in the ascendancy and, because President De Gaulle had spoken of the necessity for Biafra to confirm its own identity, this implied that France would shortly recognise Biafra as an independent nation.

  The annual OAU meeting in mid-September in Algiers saw a renewed effort at establishing a negotiated peace. At this time Gowon was intent on one of his final ‘big pushes’; he said, ‘ I felt that our forces were strong enough to finish off Biafran resistance once and for all.’ 305 With that objective in sight he felt he could persuade the OAU that the Biafran cause was lost, and gain majority support for his position. His problem appears to have been one of poor communication with his commanders. Adekunle had enjoyed a degree of success in South Eastern Nigeria, near Aba, but his counterparts in the North East, around Onitsha, and the North West, around Enugu, were still hopelessly pinned down by the Biafrans led by Colonel Achuzia. Biafra, fully aware of the Federal army’s precarious positions, exploited this claim to the full at the OAU meeting, in the knowledge of France’s ongoing support. However, the conference finally resolved to support the Federal Government’s cause and demanded that Biafra give up its sovereign status. What followed was probably a defining moment in Biafra’s fortunes, and, arguably, would eventually become one of the factors which ensured its collapse.

  On 7 September 1968, in the Hotel Napoleon in the Avenue de Friedland, Paris, a crucial meeting took place between representatives of Jacques Foccart, General de Gaulle’s special African envoy, and senior Biafran delegates, including Nnamdi Azikiwe, Nigeria’s former president, Michael Okpara, former Eastern Nigerian premier, Kenneth Dilke, the vice-chancellor of Nsukka University and Francis Nwokedi, a senior Biafran diplomat. At the meeting the French representatives explained the level of French support for Biafra, for the present and the future. Although it offered substantial continuing aid no official recognition would be forthcoming until other African nations confirmed their recognition of Biafra. Arguably, this was a defining moment for France in the Biafran war, which effectively confirmed its ambivalence. Debatably, the motivation for France was that if the Federal Administration defeated Biafra then it would find its influence over the Federal Republic weakened. The result of this was that the delegates, apart from Nwokedi, felt that the time had come to open more accommodating negotiations with the Federal Government.

  Unfortunately, Ojukwu was in no mood for compromise and his influence meant that the delegates’ plans of moderation were moribund. Nnamdi Azikiwe felt, however, that the time was opportune for offering compromise and settlement with the Federal Government. Together with Ralph Uwechu, he abandoned his support for an independent Biafra and was to spend the rest of the war campaigning for a reunited Nigeria. His influence, following his change of mind, should not be underestimated and it can be argued that from this date the seeds of disenchantment with Ojukwu within the small ruling political elite were sown, and Ojukwu’s political power base was irretrievably undermined. 306 On 16 February 1969 Azikiwe proposed a fourteen-point peace plan. In it he suggested ‘international mediation and not regional conciliation’, and that because America had followed a neutral policy throughout the campaign, it should move that the Security Council of the United Nations should constitute a committee to seek ways and means to bring the conflict to a conclusion. His sixth point suggested that he was in favour of a united Nigeria:

  That the Security Council should obtain acceptable assurance from Biafra of its unqualified acceptance of the principle of the creation of states, provided it accords with the wishes of 60% of the inhabitants of the area or areas concerned, without prejudice to the future modification of the present 12-state structure, as far as Port Harcourt is concerned. 307

  He also confirmed, however, that if political union between Nigeria and Biafra ensued, that it did so within the Aburi Agreement. This was a possible sop to Ojukwu and his Eastern colleagues, since Gowon’s rejection of the Aburi Accord had been a major cause of the war. He also reaffirmed that should a plebiscite confirm support for an independent Biafra, then the United Nations should support this. 308

  In September 1969, the sixth conference of the OAU met in Ethiopia; this time there was a resolution:

  appealing solemnly and urgently to the two parties involved in the civil war to agree to preserve, in the overriding interests of Africa, the unity of Nigeria and accept immediately the suspension of hostilities and the opening without delay of negotiations intended to preserve the unity of Nigeria and restore reconciliation and peace that will ensure for the population every form of security and every guarantee of equal rights, prerogatives and obligations. 309

  However by then the international community were focused on providing consistent and organised relief for Biafra’s increasingly beleaguered population; at the same time neither side was willing to compromise and make determined efforts at negotiating a peaceful settlement. There was one final effort at a peaceful settlement in December 1969, made by an extremely persistent Haile Selassie, who proposed to both sides two rather different versions of a basis for arranging a truce leading to a peaceful settlement. In retrospect it was a rather naïve approach at this late stage in the war. His hope was that once talks started, the gulf between the opposing sides could be bridged. Unfortunately, on the evening of the peace meeting Ojukwu broadcast on the radio a speech which obliterated all hope of a peaceful compromise. In it he said that Haile Selassie had assured him that the meeting would be under the auspices of neither the OAU, nor of previous resolutions passed by that organisation, and he confirmed that Biafra would not be forced to surrender its sovereignty in order to restore the integrity of one Nigeria. Biafra would regard such a move as unconditional surrender. This speech totally undermined the Emperor’s compromise position, and it also confirmed the Federal Government’s unwillingness to countenance any meeting with Biafra under these preconditions.

  Arguably, peace negotiations were a useful tool in Ojokwu’s armoury to help him to secure confirmation of Biafra’s sovereignty; his unwillingness to compromise confirmed that such negotiations would not help him to achieve his objective, but undoubtedly they helped Biafra to keep its cause in the international arena and offered opportunities to help sustain the war, and thus were a cause of its longevity. Ojukwu played on international sensitivities to good effect. Not only did this factor increase his faith in Biafra securing her independence, but they helped to engender further attempts at negotiated peaceful settlements, hence the number which took place.

  Not only was international concern and pressure brought to bear on Gowon to seek a peaceful settlement, but his own humanitarian and Christian spirit also played its part in his attempts to forge a peace. As one of his officers pointed out: ‘We always knew when peace negotiations were in the offing because the supply of arms and ammunition would dry up.’ 310 Throughout the war Gowon attempted to confirm his desire for a peaceful settlement, which is why at the end of hostilities he proclaimed the slogan of: ‘No Victor No Vanquished’. 311

  Even as late as November 1969 he was still hoping for reconciliation with the Igbos:

  He prefers to wait for Biafra to run up the white flag. Throughout the front, empty beer bottles outnumber the spent cartridges in the trench litter. At the forward line of 16 Commando Brigade, the officers relate with increasing gusto how the roof of battalion headquarters was blown off in a Biafran air raid. The story is more than a month old but it suffices as nothing else has happened since to break the monotony …. Lagos has decreed that the army must do no more that hold its own, striking only when the Biafrans strike first. 312

  Unfortunately at each attempt at a peaceful settlement, both sides took it in turn to be intransigent, depending on which side had the military advantage at the time of negotiations. However, it was the international concern for a negotiated settlement which helped to foster ongoing attempts at agreement and which inadvertently ensured that, whilst they were pursued by all parties, the war would continue in its longevity.

  Biafra’s resourcefulness

  Biafra was fortunate in having a well-organised regional civil service and part of an efficiently-run national police force, as well as an organised judiciary, and a well-established banking system. All functioned well and were part of the successful running of the regional government before the conflict. These agencies continued to run efficiently, but under wartime constraints, throughout the period and helped to ensure that Biafra functioned as an orderly state, and contributed to her longevity. Even two years into the war there was still evidence of the smooth and efficient running of the state:

  In the week I was in Biafra a new coinage was issued, the postal service was operating normally – taking four days from any part of the country to another …. The Africa Continental Bank reopened four branches in new locations (following the fall of Umuahia the seat of Government and the last sizable town in Biafra) bringing its total to 26, which includes a bureau de change at Ulli Airport. And the court of appeal established after six months of war in December 1967 was preparing for its next session …. The civilian nature of life, even in Biafra at war, is everywhere evident: arms are not carried even by the soldier, except at the front. Road blocks are, in the main, manned by uniformed police, often even by smart policewomen. There is no curfew and no restriction on movement. The army itself has the character of a citizen’s rather than a militant force. Its officers seem to regard war as a subject for urgent study and practice, rather than a permanent way of life. 313

  There had been attempts under the Ironsi regime to centralise the civil service into a unitary arm of government, under Decree 34, 314 but due to the second coup and his overthrow, little had been achieved in this direction and the civil service remained an arm of regional government. When a military government had been formed following the first coup in January 1966, General Ironsi had appointed Lt-Col. Ojukwu military governor of the Eastern Region. When he arrived in the region he was fortunate in having a fully functioning state under his control, and although he took his orders from the ruling military government in Lagos, because of the way the country had been governed before and during its short-lived democratic period, the regions were semi-autonomous and remained so. 315 As Ojukwu commented: ‘And for three-quarters of a century now, Biafra has been ruled as a single political unit; so that the vast majority of the population have grown accustomed to the fact of the uniqueness of the political entity which we now know as Biafra.’ 316