The grounds for a second coup were essentially laid as a result of Ironsi’s prevarication over prosecuting the leaders of the first coup, his attempt to unify the country’s civil service through decree 34, and an increasing perception that the first coup had been an Igbo-inspired insurrection. By May 1966 communal riots against the Igbo population in the North had broken out and unrest in the army’s Northern troops was still prevalent. Indeed Ironsi had to order the police to quell the May riots rather than allow the involvement of the army. The army unrest culminated in the coded call sign of ‘Araba’, which simply means ‘divide’ and had been used in the Northern May riots. 418 It seems that the second coup had been planned within the army to remove Ironsi and was scheduled to coincide with his visit to Ibadan. At the same time fighting broke out in the garrison at Abeokuta, where Igbo officers and soldiers were killed. Major Danjuma and Lt Walbe were detailed to arrest Ironsi which they did and, according to Danjuma, he ordered that Ironsi be taken to the nearby Bida Prison and held there pending an official enquiry over the issues. Unfortunately other troops in Danjuma’s detail, being highly suspicious of Ironsi’s ‘ju-ju’ powers, had him stripped and, disobeying orders, took him and Fajuyi, the Western Military Governor, and Ironsi’s host, into the bush where they were shot. Danjuma was extremely distressed at this turn of events as he showed during his recent interview; he confirmed to the interviewer that during this traumatic exchange he received a telephone call from Gowon demanding that there should be no more bloodshed. 419 When questioned about his telephone call to Danjuma, Gowon said that he simply could not remember, 420 in spite of the fact that Ojukwu makes comment about it in his book. 421 However, he did state that in his position as the army’s Chief of Staff it was his duty to attempt to quell unrest and stop further bloodshed. 422 According to him, he was then asked by Brigadier Ogundipe and Colonel Adebayo to take a troop of loyal soldiers to the Ikeja barracks and attempt to quell the rebellion there. Again there are conflicting reports as what transpired at Ikeja, but suffice to say that after protracted negotiations lasting three days, during which time the baton of leadership passed to various people, Gowon said that he was finally persuaded to take charge, being the only candidate who could restore order and whose leadership the majority would accept. 423

  Ojukwu’s background

  Ojukwu’s upbringing and background are in contrast to those of Gowon; his was one of privilege and advantage, albeit in the confines of the small elitist group of Nigerians and expatriates in Lagos at the time. Although both men are of similar age, whose formative years were experienced during the closing years of colonial authority, so that aspects of colonial rule touched them both, Gowon’s relationship with the colonial power centred round his religion and education, whilst Ojukwu’s centred round initially his awareness and then his knowledge of those in colonial control, from the Governor-General downwards. These included important Nigerian politicians of the day, from Azikiwe, a future president, to Awolowo, the leader of the Action Group, as well as the Northern rulers, including the Sardauna of Sokoto, arguably the most important and senior politician in the immediate post-colonial period. This meant that even from an early age politics and political involvement were important features in his life. His father, Sir Louis Ojukwu, who was one of the first Nigerians to be honoured by the crown, was an extremely successful businessman. He came from Nnewi in Eastern Nigeria and had built up his business empire from small beginnings, having been an employee of the United Africa Company, and then branching out on his own. By the time Emeka Ojukwu was born, Ojukwu senior was a very well-established businessman, having sold his transport business at a very auspicious time and at great profit. He had put his wealth into property and development projects, and had become involved with and closely connected to many of the substantial expatriate companies investing in Nigeria after the Second World War. One particular company with which he had a close relationship was Costain, a British civil engineering business which had ‘bribed its way, as was the custom at the time’, into ensuring that it was awarded substantial development projects within the country. ‘In order for my father to obtain contracts he had to travel to Nigeria not with a suitcase of clothes but of money.’ 424

  Ojukwu senior’s relationship with Costain, especially with John Whiter, the managing director, grew, and he was eventually invited to join its board of directors. Whiter and he became close friends and with his friend Azikiwe they were invited to visit his home in England.

  When Louis Ojukwu and Nnamdi Azikiwe used to come to London my father would always accommodate them in Dolphin Square, at the time it was the largest apartment block in Europe and was owned by Costain. This was the early days of television and Azikewe and Ojukwu were always provided with the latest television receiver in their apartment. They would happily while away many hours watching television or indeed a blank screen due to limited broadcasting in those days. Another memory I had was of the two men playing tennis at my family home, but dressed in their traditional long robes. 425

  The intimacy between the men and their families grew, and when it was time to consider Ojukwu’s education, because he was considered a bright boy he, together with his sister, was sent to England under the guardianship of the Whiter family. He commented that his first impression of England was that he felt ‘completely lost in a sea of white faces’; this as he said created in him a desire for self-reliance and self-sufficiency. 426 Prior to this in 1940, he was sent to the Catholic Mission School and then to King’s College in Lagos, an institution with an excellent reputation, modelled on the British private educational system. Once in England he was sent to Epsom College, where he proved himself an adequate pupil and good sportsman. From there he gained a place at Lincoln College, Oxford, initially to read law, which much against his father’s wishes he changed to modern history – Sir Louis had wanted a lawyer in the family. He received a very privileged education, similar to Gowon’s in content, but much more elitist. During this time he was very much dependent on the Whiters for a home, so not only did he receive an extremely good English education, but he also enjoyed the privilege of a very English middle-class upbringing. Again unlike Gowon, whose family funds were very limited, the young Ojukwu could indulge himself because of his father’s great wealth. With the background of a good English education, access to the family money and an interest in politics, he chose to join the Nigerian civil service and although he had hoped to be posted to the North, because of regional bias for employing indigenes the North was for Northerners, and he was sent to the East, to his homeland. Unlike Gowon who had had to assert himself from an early age to achieve his position, Ojukwu was almost able to claim by right of birth his position in the elite of Nigerian society, although with due credit to him he did not elect to join one of his father’s companies, where position, status and success would almost have been guaranteed. Indeed on one occasion in the Whiter household, he proclaimed that there would be uprisings and a war in Nigeria and that he would eventually become king, such was his confidence and arguably his arrogance. 427

  He was to spend two years immersing himself in Igbo life and learning to understand the people, their aims, ambitions and fears. It was this, as he said, which stood him in good stead when he was asked by General Ironsi to become the East’s regional military governor, and when he was the leader of the breakaway state. 428 There is perhaps an anomaly, considering that he led the East in its attempt to seek sovereignty, when in fact he confirms through conversation that he is a great Nigerian nationalist, and this was shown in his next career move. 429 He confirmed that the East was too narrow and restrictive for his ambition by joining the army, giving him more opportunity to be involved at the centre of the Federal state as the country came closer to independence. 430 Unlike Gowon, he did not go to Sandhurst, but was sent to Eaton Hall from where he emerged as a Second Lieutenant. By 1961 he was posted to Teshie in Ghana, to lecture in military tactics and military law. By 1963, after further training in England at the Joint Services Staff College, he returned to Nigeria and was appointed Quartermaster General, the first indigenous person to hold this post in the Nigerian Army.

  At the time of the first coup he was serving as the commanding officer of the 5th Battalion, stationed in Kano, where it is an interesting fact that, with support from the Emir of Kano, he ensured that there was no rioting in the Kano district and that the area remained unsullied by the coup. As he commented, he had no involvement in the coup, indeed he was early in declaring his loyalty to Ironsi’s new administration. ‘Because I was considered far too much of an establishment figure the coup leaders did not confide their plans to me.’ 431

  His loyalty to Ironsi was rewarded with his appointment as Military Governor of the Eastern Region, alongside Ejoor, Katsina, Fajuyi and Gowon, who were each appointed to vital positions to help stabilise Nigeria’s fractured state. They formed a group of young men who had very limited experience of positions carrying such power and responsibility to help to run and administer a country destabilised by the first coup and its abandonment of democratic government. Ojukwu, however, unlike his colleagues, had the distinct advantage of having spent time and gained experience in the East in the civil service there, and he was now able to put this experience to good effect. However, one aspect in the early days of his appointment was his efforts at persuading Igbo refugees from the North, who had fled to the East because of persecution following the first coup, to return to the North. He bitterly regretted this in view of the subsequent outbreak of killings of Igbos in the North as reprisals by Northerners against the actions of the first coup, and Gowon’s inability to control this after his election as the country’s leader after the second coup. 432 Ojukwu commented that in his new position, although he had the responsibility of running and controlling the Eastern Region, he was still treated by Ironsi very much as his subordinate, inferring that although Ironsi had awarded him this position Ironsi was very much in command and regarded him as simply one of his junior officers. Gowon made similar comments about Ironsi. 433

  Both men had therefore achieved meteoric rise in their chosen professions. In the same year, 1963, Ojukwu became Quartermaster General and Gowon had been appointed Adjutant General. Both positions were the first to be held by Nigerians. They both held battalion commander appointments and both saw service in the Congo. Circumstances then opened up new opportunities for them which, under normal conditions, they would have been denied. Thus Gowon’s appointment as Chief of Staff of the army gave him, as he said, a most rewarding opportunity where he had the effective control of the army, but this was to be the pinnacle of his army career. From the time he assumed control and responsibility as head of state, his military career was over, as he said, and from then on politics played an increasingly important role in his life, although this was to return partially during the war when he assumed the role of commander in chief of the Federal forces. He admitted that a political role was not of his choosing and he would have relished the opportunity to remain a soldier in his beloved army. 434

  Unlike Gowon, Ojukwu’s ambitions were being fulfilled: at 34 he was in effective control of the Eastern Region and after his humble role as a junior civil servant in the East, he was now able to put right the wrongs as he saw them when last in the region, and set about minimising the endemic corruption. Circumstantial evidence points to success in this area. 435 Furthermore, having grown up in a political atmosphere his new role was beginning to fulfil his ambitions in that direction.

  An interesting appraisal is given of Ojukwu at this time by the British High Commissioner, David Hunt:

  Power he has now got in full measure and he is clearly enjoying it; he also enjoys very much contemplating the superiority of his own intelligence and the lack of brains of the Head of the Federal Military Government and the other Regional Military Governors. If I had any confidence in my ability to tell character from appearances I should say that there was some mental instability in him; apart from his appearance there seems to me a touch of paranoia in the ease with which he believes unbelievable stories about the secret manoeuvres of his enemies …. In spite of the defects of character to which I have alluded above, I think that Ojukwu is basically sensible and probably moderate by current Nigerian standards. He even has a certain amount of regard for his old comrades in arms. He certainly plays on their old associations when he appeals to Ejoor and Adebayo, who are the two he believes most likely to assist him in reducing the intransigence of the North …. I remember meeting him six years ago as a young Lieutenant when I thought him polished and intelligent far beyond the average of the Nigerian officer. There seems therefore good reason to hope that he is the sort of man who will agree to compromise when he sees that he cannot have everything his own way. The Federal Military Government and the other Military Governors have come a long way to meet him; if he now rejects their latest proposals it will be evident either that his extremist advisers have intimidated him or that unrestrained power at an early age has turned a head already prone to conceit. 436

  His assessment is arguably somewhat unfair; his comment on Ojukwu’s intelligence is perhaps acceptable but his questionable mental state is a poor assessment from an experienced diplomat who knew Nigeria well. Arguably it points to Hunt’s misunderstanding of the true depth of feeling and despair experienced by the East at that time, and fits in well with his disparaging view that the East would be quickly defeated in the event of a war. His bias in favour of the Federal Government is evident; perhaps it was sheer frustration at the East’s seeming inability to compromise which led him to this assessment. It is evident that from another source, and indeed from Ojukwu’s own comments, that he did not want a war but that the frustration of the East through their consultative assembly was leading them inexorably in that direction. 437

  Towards war

  Further turmoil in the Nigerian body politic then ensured that both men were thrust into the national and then international limelight. The second coup or counter-coup can best be described as a reaction by Northern politicians to re-establish their authority, initially over the North, with the intent of re-establishing it over the whole country. The disappearance of Ironsi and Fajuyi and the subsequent actions appalled Ojukwu.

  I got in touch with Brigadier Ogundipe on the telephone and tried to persuade him and arrest the situation. His state of mind was one of helplessness, incoherent and inept. He abandoned his responsibility and fled his post. Later I got in touch with Gowon, the architect of the mutiny. I impressed on him the need to stop the bloodshed. On his insistence that he assume supreme command, I made it clear to him that I would not recognize him as Head of the Federal Military Government and Supreme Commander. I urged a meeting of the Supreme Military Council to regularize the question of leadership in accordance of military practice …. In spite of this warning Gowon went on the air and announced himself as the Supreme Commander and Head of the Military Government.

  Gowon personally told me over the phone [and the conversation was duly recorded] that the North wanted to secede …. I told him that if that would lead to peace, they could go ahead. Gowon left Lagos Island to go to Ikeja barracks, where the Northern flag of the new republic of the North was flown. A speech had been prepared for him announcing the secession of the North … It was the British and the American diplomats who intervened and stopped the North from seceding …. There is evidence that the British High Commissioner [confirmed by Cumming-Bruce] , after expounding to Gowon the opportunities now offered to him and the Northern people for the domination of Nigeria, also assured the British government’s pledge to give him every support to maintain that domination. 438

  When Gowon came to power on 1st August 1966 and made his first broadcast to the nation, there was ambiguity in his speech, leading to ongoing speculation as to his precise meaning when he stated:

  I have now come to the most difficult part, or most important part of this statement ….

  As a result of the recent events and other previous similar ones, I have come to strongly believe that we cannot honestly and sincerely continue in this wise, as the basis of trust and confidence in our unitary system of government has not been able to stand the test of time … suffice to say … the base for unity is not there or is so badly rocked, not only once but several times. I therefore feel that should review the issue of our national standing and see if we can stop the country from drifting away into utter destruction. 439

  When questioned on this he recalled the pressures of the time, and said that his own position was especially precarious and that there were various groups who wanted to get their point of view across with regard to the recent turmoil and to give their opinion as to the direction of the country. His comment about ‘the basis of unity’ was simply to placate the North and to reassure them that Ironsi’s unpopular decree 34 would be rescinded (which he did not actually state in his speech, but was to rescind on 31 August 1966 when he restored the federal system of government), but also, that because of the upheavals, a new assessment should be made as to how the country should be ruled in the future if Nigeria was to remain a sovereign state. He then went on to comment that this was why he went to Aburi with such an open and conciliatory mind and was the reason for the agreement at Aburi, where in essence he went along with Ojukwu’s assessment and plans for the future. 440 It is important to remember that by this stage Cumming-Bruce, the High Commissioner, had through his personal contacts with the Northern emirs convinced the North that separation from the rest of Nigeria would have been an unwise option for them. 441

  It is interesting to comment on Ojukwu’s assessment of the situation at that time, because as he said he had had no involvement in the second coup, and had observed it as an innocent bystander, although he did make efforts to ensure that Northern troops stationed in the East were not involved in any disturbances. In his broadcast on Enugu radio on the evening of Gowon’s speech to the nation he commented on the realities of the new situation, as he saw it. He said that the country was now divided into two, the North, the West and the Mid-West, where the second coup seemed to have been successful, and the East where it had failed. As he rightly said the East was still in the hands of the legitimate government. He was adamant that he could not accept Gowon’s elevation to Supreme Commander, firstly because Ironsi’s fate had yet to be determined and secondly that there were other more senior people in the army hierarchy who should assume the supreme commander’s position. 442 His comments reaffirm his British conservative ideal and a sense of fair play, undoubtedly imbued through his education and upbringing and in confirmation of an article he wrote whilst at Oxford: