Indeed, by the autumn of 1969 Gowon found it necessary to explain to the world why he had not brought the campaign to a successful conclusion. He was coming under increasing pressure from the international community, mainly because of the humanitarian aspects of the war. On 6 September 1969 he told the OAU Assembly of Heads of State at Addis Ababa that there were four reasons for the delay in bringing the military operation against Biafra to a successful conclusion. Firstly, he accused the racialists of a conspiracy and said that they were committed to the disintegration of Nigeria following their failure to achieve that in the Congo. Secondly, he focused on the activities of some of the humanitarian organisations, who he said were helping to sustain the secessionist regime through moral and material support, the supply of foreign exchange, arms and military equipment. Thirdly, he said that a delay to the conclusion of the war was being caused by ‘vicious propaganda and unparalleled falsehood being dished out by the secessionist regime’. This, he said ‘ was making the common man in the area feel that he was fighting for survival – against genocide.’ 462 Fourthly, Gowon pointed out that the war was being fought to quell a rebellion, not to destroy the people. When asked about his Addis Ababa statement, he said that at that stage in the war he and his colleagues had become extremely frustrated by the seeming failure of the Federal army to bring the war to a successful conclusion and, as he pointed out, it was at that stage that he had replaced his divisional commanders, hoping that fresh input would swiftly conclude matters. However, he went on to comment that it was against the background of his frustration that he made the remarks. In retrospect he said that his comment about an international conspiracy of racially motivated groups to destroy a unified Nigeria was spurious, and it was to his regret that he had not put more faith in and more support for using his public relations company Galitzine, Chant and Russell, to promote the Federal cause to the outside world. He admitted that Biafra’s use of William Bernhardt’s firm Markpress had proved in retrospect to have been remarkably successful in convincing the international community that Biafra had the right to a sovereign existence. 463

  During the war the Federal authorities, like Biafra, used a public relations company to promote their cause to the outside world. However the efforts of Galizine, Chant and Russell were far less intrusive and therefore less successful than Biafra’s Markpress. As Gowon pointed out: ‘I trained in the British tradition, and I believe that in the end the truth will prevail. I do not want any public relations firm to help me to do this.’ 464

  Arguably this was an extraordinarily naïve comment made by a head of state, who needed to make use of all available facilities in order to achieve his objective of defeating Ojukwu and his breakaway state, and later admitted that his comments about ‘truth prevailing’ were rather naïve. However it is such a telling statement, proving the sentiment and the status of this incredibly unassuming man. A final quotation about Gowon should be included, which perhaps confirms why he was able to survive in the leadership of the Federation in spite of accusations of poor and weak military control:

  It was during this period that Gowon paid his first visit to Port Harcourt … when Gowon finally arrived, the citizenry erupted with joy. Gowon’s high spirits were infectious. He spoke off the cuff cheerfully and eloquently to the leading citizens, and I noted in my diary later that day ‘The idea of One Nigeria is right in his marrow. One could not but be impressed.’ 465

  One of Ojukwu’s great strengths throughout the campaign was his overt use of propaganda, whether for external or internal consumption; it undoubtedly had a major bearing on support for Biafra’s cause and her potential success until an armistice was declared at the beginning of 1970. Externally, from February 1967 some six weeks after the Aburi meeting, Ruder and Finn in New York, and their London affiliate, Brook Hart, Ruder and Finn, were hired by the Eastern Region, at a monthly fee of $5,000 to promote their cause to a wider world. At the same time the East intended to establish missions in nine countries. 466 As Ojukwu commented, the East’s objective at that stage was to bring to the world’s attention that the killings in the North had been a form of genocide and that the East had never shared a common culture with the North, but he admitted that this public relations approach was ineffective and did little to create awareness of the East’s condition at the time to a wider world. Towards the end of 1967, he had the good fortune, although he admitted he did not know this at the time, of being informed by his Paris mission of a company based in Geneva who could potentially offer public relations support for Biafra. From February 1968, the Biafran Overseas Press Service, under the name of Marketing Press (Markpress), came into existence, and was to prove substantially beneficial in support of Biafra. As Ojukwu admitted, one of Markpress’s great strengths was encouraging him to allow journalists, members of Parliament, and other opinion-makers to visit Biafra and write reports which were then channelled through Markpress for international distribution. This was particularly effective when the issue of starvation was brought to the world’s attention through the efforts of Michael Leapman and the Sun newspaper. 467

  Their personal attitude to the war in retrospect

  Gowon and Ojukwu share the same sentiment that in retrospect they would have been more accommodating to each other and would have sought a solution to the seemingly intractable issues of the day. In their defence, one is drawn to the conditions of the time and the constraints which both men found themselves under during those increasingly tense months which led to the outbreak of war. They both consider that having gained a series of consensual agreements at Aburi they should have been more compromising and worked out a way forward which would have placated the majority of the interested parties and achieved a satisfactory settlement. However, as Ojukwu commented, the main issue the East had at the time was the uncontrolled and inhumane acts being perpetrated on the Igbo people who lived in the North, where they had settled for generations. These people were confronted with daily terror attacks which the Federal Authorities seemed powerless to control and indeed, as Ojukwu pointed out, many in the Eastern region were questioning the culpability of the Federal Authorities and began to believe that they were supporters of these inhumane crimes. Therefore in Ojukwu’s eyes the only option the East had at that time was to draw apart from the rest of the country, not with the idea of secession, but with the idea that the only solution to stop the killings was for the East to insulate itself from the North.

  Gowon’s perspective at the time was equally convincing. Whilst agreeing to the Aburi conditions, his opinion of them changed when it was pointed out that under the agreement all power in the country was vested in the regions, and not only would minority voices be overwhelmed by the power of the four major regions, but the authority of the Federal Government was totally undermined. It was this feature which Gowon was persuaded to find unacceptable. Whether or not the proposed system would have proved unworkable is open to debate, but as time went on this became an intractable situation which neither side was willing to accommodate or compromise over, in spite of the efforts of people like Awolowo, Ogundipe and Ejoor to find a way forward through the impasse.

  Both leaders enjoyed a degree of success throughout the war and they both ended the war with their reputations intact. It can be argued that Ojukwu simply ‘ran away’ at the end, but as he said when he left the country, ‘While I live Biafra lives’. There is an argument that Ojukwu was advised and agreed that with a final onslaught by Federal troops expected imminently and with Biafra’s territorial area diminishing on a daily basis, the country would simply cease to exist. The fact was that although he left under very chaotic conditions, he left without the traditional fortune that many rulers in Africa accumulate when in power, and it is apparent that even today he is referred to only with respect and affection. Although Ojukwu through his publicity machine sought to expose the apparent barbarity of the Federal Army, forcing Gowon to investigate the falseness of these accusations through the International Observer Team, there was in fact very little proven inhumane conduct by either side. This can therefore be considered a tribute to both men’s leadership and to their concern to ensure that acts of inhumanity were condemned. As Gowon commented, he had no quarrel with the Igbo people, only with Ojukwu and his colleagues, and it was this factor which disinclined Gowon to allow an overwhelmingly aggressive policy towards Biafra, and seemingly often led to lulls in the fighting.

  Ojukwu says that his main disappointment during the war was the lack of recognition by more states within the international community, although as he pointed out there were many countries who were on the verge of giving Biafra official recognition. He feels that if this had been more forthcoming Biafra would still be an entity in the world today. His other disappointment was the lack of material support which he gained from the international community, and with Britain who sided with the Federation from the beginning, selling them an ongoing supply of arms which eventually, together with Russian support, led to a military inbalance between the two sides. This, in his view, meant that Biafra could never win the war militarily but as he pointed out, once the East had decided to secede, excepting her invasion of the Mid-West, international recognition rather than a force of arms would have determined Biafra’s sovereignty.

  Acknowledging the accepted premise of Ojukwu’s de jure control over the East and Gowon’s de facto control over the Federal Government, Nigeria was fortunate indeed to have two competent, honest and well meaning leaders, albeit on opposing sides, to see the country through its civil war. Ojukwu long argued that Gowon had no legitimatcy to his claim as supreme commander of Nigeria, but equally Gowon could have challenged Ojukwu’s right to take the East out of the Federation. The fact, however, was that neither men, finding themselves in positions of power, allowed themselves to be carried away by any sort of omnipotence. Power for its own sake never seemed to have had a corrupting influence on either of them. The fact remains that both of them, after a suitable period of estrangement from their country, were allowed to return with no preconditions, and indeed both were free to involve themselves in the politics of the day. Gowon attempted this with disastrous results, causing him to seek opportunities within the current political regime that did not involve controversy. In Ojukwu’s case he is involved in politics to this day. Indeed at one of the interviews with him he explained that he was extremely busy because of the forthcoming presidential elections, in which he was a candidate. 468 One can only admire the tenacity of the man, but it is arguably a sad reflection of his wish to regain his powerful position from the past. One was reminded of a sportsman who having achieved ultimate success in his chosen field, retires, and then returns to that sport in an attempt to emulate his past glory. Because his discipline has changed and moved on beyond his past ability and understanding, he fails.

  Arguably, Ojukwu came closer to exercising dictatorial power, firstly because he had been appointed under the Ironsi regime as the East’s military governor, and that in itself gave him powers that in a democracy would only have been available to the most demagogic of politicians, and even then without the power of arms, and secondly because the people in the East looked to him as their protector from the evils of perceived and promoted genocide from the North. As a result, throughout the war his position was practically unassailable. Even the plot to overthrow him in order to make a peaceful overture to the Federal Government failed for lack of substantial support. What followed was a military embarrassment, with Biafra’s withdrawal from the Mid-West Region, leading to a replacement of the commander-in-chief of the army and the permanent popular notion of saboteurs, undermining the state’s power and its fragile sovereignty. Even then Ojukwu’s popularity did not diminish and indeed arguably was on the ascendant.

  A further strength of Ojukwu was his ability to choose his advisors, although he was not above nepotism – his father was chosen to advise him on various Eastern regional boards and his uncle C.C. Mojekwu remained a very close advisor throughout the war. Astutely, many came from the minority peoples in the region. His Chief of the General Staff and his acting Head of State in his absence was Major-General Philip Effiong, an Efik. The Chief Secretary and Head of Biafra’s Civil Service was Mr N.U. Akpan, an Ibibio, and Mr S.J. Cookey, who was Commissioner for Special Duties, was from the Rivers Region. Even Colonel Achuzia, Ojukwu’s highly successful army commander, although an Igbo, is an Asaba Igbo and a man whose natural leanings are to the Mid-West State, not to Enugu.

  On assumption of power Gowon, like Ojukwu, was in effect simply taking over an already established regime, but, unlike Ojukwu, one which had suffered extreme turmoil. Although the machinery of government through the civil service was still in place, the military force which had effectively brought him to power was in disarray, and unlike Ojukwu he had to placate and accommodate many divergent factions, not the least the three regions, including a belligerent and politicised North led by the unpredictable Lt-Colonel Murtala Mohammed. Gowon’s move to release Awolowo was certainly a wise decision which effectively, albeit slowly, gained the support of the Western Region for his regime. He also commented several times when being interviewed that, having no political ambition for ultimate power, he was not motivated by power for its own sake but rather to protect the stability of the country and his beloved army. It is easy to underestimate the strength of emotion and sentiment this man has for his ideals and his sense of tradition and heritage. As he said, his wish was to stabilise the country and protect the army; Murtala Mohammed could have taken charge, if there had been support, as indeed he was to do in 1976 under benign circumstances. At one of the interviews he was asked if he ever felt fear for his safety or for his life. He looked at the interviewer as though he had raised an inconceivably stupid notion and replied, ‘No.’ 469 An interesting observation is made of Gowon, which concurs with the writer’s impression and understanding of the man:

  When you meet someone it is very important to know what their value system is. The value system of Gowon is a rather simple one. It springs from the imposition of ethics of Sandhurst and on the ethics of a very religious C.M.S. upbringing. He is not as complex a character as yourself! The values that he has are like yours, genuine … the value system for Gowon is loyalty, straightforwardness, and the qualities of an officer and a gentleman. On the four occasions I have met him he continually used the words loyalty and honour. He spoke of the debt of Nigeria to Britain, not for the material things but for certain standards of loyalty. 470

  A final consideration must be made of both men’s upbringing and background. Although from a class perspective, Ojukwu can claim to have the advantage, the fact was that his father enjoyed success and all the trappings of wealth through his own efforts. His son was therefore the first generation to inherit and enjoy those benefits. This arguably put him at an advantage over Gowon, whose father and family were poor, but their attitude was that success could be achieved through a good western education. It was in the field of education that both men’s backgrounds were similar, not only through their respective schools but also through their religious upbringing. Gowon obtained his through his father’s conversion to Christianity and his own subsequent initiation into the Christian faith through the Church Missionary Society, and through his schooling, all of which gave him a deep and long-standing commitment to Christian ideals, which he promoted throughout his time as leader of the Federal Government. Likewise, Ojukwu also had a Christian upbringing through his formative years in Lagos, where his family were members of the Roman Catholic community and during his time in England, when he was taken under the guardianship of the Whiter family. Although religion did not play as significant part in Ojukwu’s upbringing as it did for Gowon, nevertheless it was important to him during the war, and still is today, indeed in a more overt way than Gowon. 471 It is a forceful argument that religious considerations were important to both men as they wrestled with their consciences over the rights and wrongs of the confrontation. Both have confirmed that although perhaps not uppermost in their minds, Christian beliefs played a part in the manner in which they approached and conducted the war. 472 It is also an anomaly that here were two men from similar religious backgrounds, confronting each other over a war which arguably was ethnically and religiously orientated, yet neither had an ethnic or religious orientation towards the Muslim North against whom the war was focused. However, that idea challenges the argument that this was an ethnic war, when the facts seem to point incontrovertibly to the war being commercially orientated, and to the international powers whose commercial considerations were under threat. Arguably Gowon was the protector of those commercial interests and Ojukwu, the protagonist who sought to protect those natural resources for Nigeria, or perhaps Biafra if she had survived, not for the international powers.

  CHAPTER 7

  CONCLUSION

  In the final analysis the Nigerian tragedy has been bedevilled by a set of oppositions – generalised, stereotyped, not necessarily of the same order and maybe imaginary, yet each widening the wound and reducing the hope of healing it; North vs South, Islam vs Christianity, alleged feudalism vs assumed socialism, federal vs unitary preferences, traditional authority vs achieved elitism, have vs have nots, each with sinister undertones of tension, irreconcilability and threatened withdrawal. None was quite entirely accurate. Nevertheless each opposing set had sufficient seeds of truth within in it to permit, and even fertilize, the growth of feared fact from the semi-fiction of its existence. 473