It was therefore easy for Ojukwu to take control of the reins of regional government and ensure that in the event of secession the functions of government remained intact and indeed gave weight and control to the new breakaway state, helping to ensure the efficient running and stability of a modern sovereign country. These apparatuses of state were to remain the backbone of Ojukwu’s administration throughout the short life of Biafra, and arguably were important to Biafra’s survival. It not only gave him control but, in the light of Ironsi giving him the military governorship of the region, it gave a legitimacy for his leadership, and although he ruled through a small group of advisors, and paid a degree of acknowledgement and respect to Biafra’s Consultative Assembly of representatives and elders, his power in effect was absolute. His position, arguably, was therefore much more secure than that of Gowon, who throughout his administration had to rely on the support of many more factions within the Federal Government, which ultimately caused his downfall.

  These factors are important when considering the war’s longevity. Without Ojukwu’s secure and legitimate power base it is possible that Biafra as a state would have collapsed far sooner, because in effect he was an unchallenged leader, a position he was to hold until the very end of Biafra’s life. Even today, some forty years later, he is still held in awe and respect by the elders in the Igbo community. 317

  However, it was Biafra’s ability to harness its creative inventiveness which was a major factor in determining her ability to survive so long. Biafra was indeed fortunate in having a well-educated minority whose skills, creativeness and inventiveness were brought to bear during the war. Colonel Ahhanya, a qualified engineer, was charged with the task of bringing together scientists, engineers and people with specialised skills who would support him in the challenging task of forming a group called Research and Production (RAP). Ojukwu realised early on in the campaign that Biafra’s survival would depend on its resourcefulness to counter shortfalls which the young country would meet as the war developed. 318 RAP became involved in an extraordinary range of activities, ranging from the chemical group to the clothing and steel helmet group. Some were more effective than others, but all gave weight to Biafra’s survival.

  Under RAP a range of directorates was established in an attempt to provide for the well-being of the army as well as the civilian population. Some of these directorates were more successful than others, and some were accused of, and found to be, stockpiling and trading their goods in a black market, as mentioned in the previous chapter. However, others eventually, through a process of trial and error, helped create support for Biafra. Scientists under the leadership of Dr Okpala from Nsukka University were given the responsibility of developing arms and rockets for Biafra’s army. They produced two types of rocket, ground-to-ground and ground-to-air, which were effective in defending Calabar and Onitsha. 319 However, their most successful development was an anti-personnel mine, ‘Ogbunigwe’ which means ‘Kill ‘em plenty’, nicknamed ‘Ojukwu’s bucket’. It was nothing less than a metal container charged and filled with metal pieces. The Biafran Commissioner for Information, Dr Eke explained: ‘ The Ogbunigwe, which we are producing at the rate of up to 500 per day, is effective up to a range of half a mile, clearing an angle 60 degrees wide in front of it.’ 320 It had a devastating effect on the Federal forces, achieving notoriety and building confidence amongst Biafran soldiers because it gave them an easily produced armament which they knew was an effective defence against their enemy. Its support was to make Biafran soldiers stand and fight rather than simply disappear into the jungle when attacked by a generally better armed and better supplied enemy, as in the battles at Awka and Abagana. 321

  Oil production and refining became increasingly important as the war progressed. Initially it was of little significance because Biafra had ready access to extensive oil supplies. However, following the loss of Bonny Island and Port Harcourt and the area’s hinterland, oil supplies became scarce and production and refining became a priority. Under the Petroleum Management Board, the production and supply of crude oil and its refining continued and adequate supplies were maintained throughout the war. Indeed by its end almost every army contingent supported and refined its own fuel supplies. 322 A report in The Times dated 5 March 1969 explained:

  Far from supplying fuel to the Biafran Government or military, the churches and the Red Cross get a weekly allocation from the Biafran Government of 1000 gallons of diesel fuel. Since the taking of Bonny Island in July 1967, Biafra has been under naval and land blockade…. Where does the fuel come from?

  At a Biafran Army divisional headquarters I saw one of their homemade refineries in action. The man in charge of it, an economics graduate of Durham University, Mr Nwofili Adibuah, aged 34 explained: ‘The process we use is fractional distillation using these crude cooking pots. These are our mini-refineries’ …. Mr Adibuah commented: ‘The petrol comes off first, then the kerosene and final[ly] the diesel.’… This particular mini-refinery which consisted of three ‘cooking pots’, was producing 280 gallons of petrol and 100 gallons of kerosene and 250 gallons of diesel fuel per day … this has since been followed by several others both at divisional and brigade level. There are even private citizens who are today refining their own fuel in their back yards so as to keep their cars on the road.

  Dr Ben Nwosu, a distinguished Biafran nuclear physicist, who trained in London and the United States and worked until recently at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, told me: ‘Our main refinery, which is considerably more sophisticated than what you have seen produces 25,000 gallons of fuel per day and we are now investigating the possibility of making our own aviation fuel.’ Dr Nwosu continued: ‘But we do more than produce equipment for the army. We have decided [to produce] what we call survival gin, which has palm wine at its base. Until we lost Abakaliki we were able to produce our own salt. We make our own matches, dyes for military clothing, soap made from palm oil and caustic soda, shoe polish and farm implements.’ 323

  In order for a modem state to function efficiently, circulation of money internally and externally is a priority. Biafra was no exception, especially when considering its needs for external commodities, in particular arms. When secession became a real probability the adequate supply of finance became an imperative. Indeed if the fledgling state was to survive, a secure financial base was essential. Initially this proved a problem, in spite of Biafran funds being based on Nigerian currency and Nigeria being a member of the Sterling Area. Eastern Nigeria was dependent on the central administration for its allocation of funds, and at the point of secession this allocation was quickly suspended. The challenge for Biafra was to create situations to ensure the ready circulation of internal and external funds. This at times was to border on the desperate, at others on the farcical, but throughout its independence evidence shows that given all its constraints it was able to retain a reasonable liquidity of funds. As Ojukwu commented: ‘We were fortunate in having most of the machinery for running the state, because of the highly developed infrastructure, because of regional independence, long since developed by the colonial administration.’ 324

  One of the first decrees made by the newly independent state of Biafra was No 3 of 1967, The Bank of Biafra Decree. The decree stated: ‘ The Bank shall carry out all the central banking functions in the Republic including the administration of foreign exchange and the management of the public debt of the Republic.’ It also confirmed that the bank would maintain parity with the Nigerian pound.

  Because Nigeria was not prepared to allow Biafra its sovereign status, establishing a defensive policy was priority, and the funds to secure adequate outside supplies of arms were paramount. Evidence suggests that initially some of this funding came from the population; indeed Ojukwu himself was rumoured to have put some of his family’s fortune at the disposal of the state. 325 Other sources used were the issuing of ten-year bonds, although there is no evidence to show that this was successful. However, by far the most important strategy for Biafra in its quest for foreign exchange was its conversion of its holdings in Nigerian currency. On

  30 December 1967 Nigeria’s finance commissioner stated that ‘£37 million had been seized by the rebels in the East’. 326 Biafra, however, claimed that by January 1968 it had collected £53 million. Debatable though the amounts were, the evidence would point to a sizeable figure, and these funds, including a further £6 million raised at the start of secession, were all deposited in Europe. 327 This gave Biafra adequate funds to create good external arms supply lines to support its military defence force and to ensure her survival against external attack. There is documentary evidence to show that in July 1967 Biafra entered into an arrangement with Rothschild Bank in Paris to sell her oil and mineral rights for a period of ten years, for the sum of £6 million. 328 The British High Commission questioned the evidence but obviously felt at the time that it did have a degree of authenticity:

  A questionable piece of evidence is the mysterious document which the Federal authorities produced purporting to show that Ojukwu has assigned all mineral rights to the Rothschild Bank for a £6 million consideration.

  Paris suggested in their telegram No 428 that any such policy is likely to come elsewhere than from the Quai d’Orsay, presumably from the Special Department of African Affairs in the Elysee, reflecting therefore a policy more personal to General de Gaulle. Our impression here supports this suggestion.

  Hunt, the British High Commissioner, then goes on to suggest:

  the Nigerian Authorities are convinced that the French are now firmly behind Ojukwu and that it is only the French subsidies, which by now have reached many millions of pounds, that keep Ojukwu going. I believe that neither the French Embassy in Lagos nor the Quai d’Orsay is involved; indeed my French colleague here continues to be vehement in his professions of support for the Federal cause. The Federal Government believe that SAFRAP, the state-owned French Petroleum Company, is the channel for the subsidies. The odds are against Ojukwu winning even the help of French mercenaries; but an oil company which is used to spending large sums on speculation in unproductive trial drillings is not likely to blench at risking £10 million or so when there is a chance, however slim, of acquiring properties which cost the present owners £200 million. 329

  When questioned on the authenticity of the Rothschild document and Hunt’s comments to his Secretary of State, Ojukwu refused to be drawn into discussion on the matter. It is therefore apparent that whatever the truth, the fact was that there was considerable material support by France for Biafra and it seems reasonable to assume that either through Rothschild Bank or the French state-owned company SAFRAP, subsidies and or finance were forthcoming, and proved a valuable source of foreign currency to support Biafra.

  A chance of further funding also came following Biafra’s invasion of the Mid-West region. Some £2 million out of a total £12 million found its way to a bank in Asaba, from Benin. This money was collected by the retreating Biafran Army from bank vaults in Benin. It seems that the balance of £10 million was too difficult to transport at the time. However, it seems that little of this ended up with the central bank of Biafra. Some was probably spent funding the Mid-West invasion and retreat and some was simply stolen by Biafran soldiers. Achuzia recalls that his pay and records chief, Lt-Col. Morah absconded with a large quantity of money and caused him embarrassment over payment to his troops. According to Achuzia the money was part of the consignment of funds collected at Benin for transportation to Biafra’s central bank. Morah was eventually arrested trying to affect his escape to Cameroon, and brought back to Achuzia for a summary court-martial but without the money. Achuzia threatened to shoot Morah for his ‘despicable’ behaviour. However, Achuzia was ordered by Ojukwu to return Morah to Biafra’s army headquarters, where he was promptly promoted to a more responsible position. 330 It seems likely that very little of this money ever found its way to the vaults of Biafra’s central bank; that indeed is what Symes records in his document Bank Notes of Biafra . 331

  By August 1967 the Federal authorities were becoming aware of the increased currency movements from Biafra to Europe and its conversion into foreign exchange. In an effort to control this, a decree was issued to the effect that Nigerian currency exported from Nigeria, including that from the East, would not be redeemed by the Nigerian Government. At the same time the Federal Government were taking further steps to make currency transactions even more difficult for the recalcitrant regime: it planned the introduction of a new currency. Once the new notes were in circulation it could stop the redemption of the old currency, eventually making currency held by Biafra worthless. The date from which the new currency would come into effect was 22 January 1968. Prior to this date there was an unseemly rush by currency speculators as well as the Biafran authorities to redeem old currency for new. Biafran currency holdings were sold at a heavy discount, and the proceeds were then repatriated back to Nigeria. In one case, on 12 January 1968 some twenty tons of Nigerian banknotes were flown into Switzerland, but only seven tons were allowed to be unloaded, since thirteen of the twenty tons had been shipped in a Rhodesia-registered aircraft; Switzerland did not have diplomatic relations with Rhodesia. The aircraft continued its flight to Lisbon. In another case, on 20 January, some £7 million of Nigerian currency was seized at Lome in Togo. This was repatriated to the Nigerian authorities. It was rumoured that Nigeria paid Togo a substantial sum of money for this service. 332 In the event the Nigerian authorities brought forward the date for introducing new currency to 3 January 1968. By late January Ojukwu announced the introduction of Biafra’s own currency. Undoubtedly Nigeria’s introduction of a new currency did much damage to Biafra’s ability to gain foreign exchange. In a speech almost a year later he deplored the untoward action by the Federal Government:

  The government has long been aware of the terrible experiences of our people over the issue of currency. The present difficulties started when early last year Nigeria, on the advice of Whitehall, suddenly decided on its wicked and diabolical plan to dispossess our people of their wealth by means of the notorious currency switch. We had to do something quickly to save the near disastrous situation. New currency was introduced. 333

  An interesting development then occured, which helped Biafra’s ability to trade abroad, but which hindered the Federal Government’s attempts at controlling their currency’s flow into the East. Although the Federal Government introduced her new currency towards the end of January 1968, the Federal authorities were concerned that it would fall into the hands of Biafra, especially in disputed areas which often changed sides. It was therefore decided that the old currency would be retained for those areas. This effectively allowed for three currencies to circulate in Nigeria. There is evidence to show that by retaining their old currency, the Federal authorities were powerless to stop Biafra trading in the new currency which was of particular benefit to Biafrans and their ‘attack markets’. 334 Although the Federal Government’s new currency caused currency shortages for Biafra and the old currency suffered severe devaluation, even as late as 1969 all currencies were still traded, and it seems likely that some of this new currency was used to secure ongoing arms supply from abroad. Because the first attempt by Biafra to introduce her own currency was carried out in haste to resolve an immediate need, the notes produced were of poor quality, but a second attempt was made in 1968, and efforts were made to ensure that the notes were of a higher standard (see Appendix). The evidence suggests that these notes were produced in Switzerland. 335 The Biafran authorities were quick to create a revenue-earning opportunity with the issue of their new notes which, along with their postage stamps, were sold at considerable profit to avid collectors throughout Europe. 336 Collectors paid £20.10s (in stirling) for the two notes of £1 and 5 shillings. 337 However, the conclusion drawn from attempts by the Federal authorities to curtail Biafra’s use of its currency for foreign exchange is that, although it created shortages, it was unsuccessful. The other fact to be taken into account was that by mid-1969 Biafra had been compressed into 5,000 square miles and by that time there were a limited number of goods available, which meant that demand for currency was reduced.

  Finally, the Biafrans, never slow to exploit a commercial opportunity, made landing charges for aid-agency aircraft flying life-saving goods into the beleaguered state. Consequently this levy charged on humanitarian aid meant that donors from the international community were not only funding the aid but were actually being charged for supplying support. It is doubtful whether any aid agencies considered this detrimental to their cause of saving lives, but the donor public might well have questioned Biafra’s attitude to their benefactors, and such knowledge could well have affected the flow of funds destined to relieve Biafra’s suffering. Even at the end of hostilities the Biafran Government had ordered the production, in Switzerland, of gold coins as collector’s sets for resale. Biafra gained the royalties a few days before her collapse. It seems the only person to benefit from this exercise was William Bernhardt, the owner of Markpress, who commented that he offered some sets to Ojukwu but by then he had left Biafra and pleaded penury. 338

  Unquestionably Biafra’s creative ingenuity helped it to survive. Eastern Nigerians have a great capacity to ‘make do and mend’, 339 and during the war every effort was made by the majority of the population to ensure that equipment was maintained or recycled. Of course, as Achuzia and Gbulie commented, there was some abuse by people in privileged positions and there was always a thriving ‘black market’ for all commodities, but as they added most of the population led a subsistence life before the war and therefore they were used to privations and hardship, so a war hardly changed their status, until perhaps towards the end when even basic food resources were in short supply. It was probably the middle and educated classes, at least those without official connections, who found the deprivation most difficult to bear. But Biafra’s ingenuity and her people’s ability to live life as normally as possible and to keep the institutions of state running undoubtedly helped to sustain its longevity.