Foreign support and aid agencies

  The British, as the ex-colonial power, were concerned to retain as much influence as possible, before and throughout the civil war. Initially, prior to the war and on Gowon’s accession to power, its policy was to try to prevent secession by the Igbos; when this failed its position, and that of the Americans, was one of neutrality. Its priority was to protect its substantial investments in the country, and one of its major commitments was to oil extraction. Shell had sizeable investments amounting to £200 million. At the outbreak of the war Shell had discovered that Nigerian oil production would exceed all planned expectations. In conjunction with the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) it was decided that none of these new discoveries would be divulged to Nigeria or Biafra:

  Mr Stanley Grey, the Managing Director of Shell/BP in Nigeria had frank talks with the High Commissioner and the Dutch Ambassador on 28 October(1966) …. Mr Grey made the following points:

       1.  He confirmed what he had told us a month ago, that the scale of the Nigerian oilfield had been revealed in the last three months to be vastly greater than had previously been estimated. Shell/BP output was running far in excess of expectation. The revenue due to the Nigerian Government by 1970 was now practically double the figure estimated in the summer and previously.

       2.  In reply to the High Commissioner’s enquiry, he said that he had not yet informed any Nigerian authority of this spectacular change. He felt that it was better at this juncture that both the Military Government and the Eastern Government should not realise that the oilfield was so much more valuable than had been reckoned. The High Commissioner said that he entirely agreed.

       3.  He confirmed that Shell/BP were investing an additional £40 million this year ….

       4.  He felt that the oil companies could adjust their relations to any set of political changes ….

       5.  He had had a friendly and satisfactory meeting with the Military Governor of the Mid-West (Ejoor), who had started by jocularly describing himself as a future employee of Shell/BP ….

       6.  He remained satisfied with his relationship with both the Military Government and the Eastern Government. Colonel Ojukwu was both capable and hard-headed, and showed a statesmanlike attitude towards the oil companies. Ojukwu said he would not wish to alter the arrangements for payment of oil revenue for 2–3 years …. No embarrassing pressures had been brought to bear by the Eastern Government on Shell/BP. Some time ago a secret approach had been made by Ibos to see if Shell/BP would finance a coup to overturn the Abubakar government. Mr Gray made it absolutely clear that in no circumstances was Shell prepared to play politics ….

       7.  Shell/BP were subscribing £1,000 to the Eastern Relief fund through the Red Cross. He realised they would not get away with as small a contribution as this.

       8.  He had a satisfactory first meeting with Colonel Gowon. He found that Colonel Gowon had only the most elementary knowledge of the subject of oil operations etc. He seemed to be very uncertain about the attitude that the oil companies were likely to take as the political situation developed. Mr Gray had said that Shell/BP would maintain their payments to the Military Government, and Colonel Gowon seemed to be agreeably surprised by this clear-cut assurance. He had also shown some signs of suspicion that Shell/BP might be supporting the Eastern Government financially, and Mr Gray had made clear that the company did not make political contributions. 340

  Initially, Britain’s policy of neutrality ensured that, whichever side won, Shell’s investment in oil exploration would not be compromised. 341 However, Britain was already Nigeria’s main arms and armaments provider, and therefore it found itself in a very difficult position from the start. Its immediate decision was to continue supplying Nigeria arms as it had been, but restricting the supplies to small arms. Britain’s official policy was at this stage: ‘For the moment, therefore, the only policy for us is to wait, husbanding our limited influence with the Federal Government without antagonising the Igbos any more that is strictly unavoidable.’ 342 The decision did not suit the Federal Authorities who, like the Biafrans, went exploring other potential suppliers. In an FCO document dated 20 November 1967: ‘We know from secret sources that Ojukwu is still getting large supplies of arms from the continent, through Portugal and with the obvious connivance of the Portuguese authorities. His emissaries have also been in touch with French officials, and there are indications that he is trying to raise a force of mercenaries.’ 343

  As the war progressed, Britain, under the premiership of Harold Wilson, did try to be more accommodating to the Federal Government’s needs but never fulfilling their absolute demands. Wilson found himself following an increasingly uncomfortable path, supplying arms to the Federal Government whilst officially denying the amounts of these supplies. 344 At the start of the war supplying arms to the Federal Government was not a major political issue in Britain. The war did not feature highly in its public’s mind and had not become politically controversial. However, once it became of major significance Wilson’s Labour government found itself morally and politically compromised. It had decided to continue to allow arms to be sold to the Federal Government, because that was the traditional policy, but then found itself compromised as the war progressed when Labour Party members became antagonistic to the policy because of their, and their constituents’, humanitarian consciences. Initially the policy was termed ‘defensive armaments’ and subsequently ‘traditional armaments’. At the same time the British Government became increasingly concerned about and suspicious of other countries’ attempts to gain influence over the Federal regime. This suspicion was at the time very real:

  We know also from secret sources that Ojukwu is still getting large supplies of arms from the continent, through Portugal and with the obvious connivance of the Portuguese authorities. His emissaries have also been in touch with the French officials, and there are indications that he is trying to raise a force of mercenaries ….’

  A major reason for the British Government’s decision to supply the Nigerian Government with armaments has been the fear that the Soviet Union would move in lock, stock and barrel as she has already taken the opportunity of doing in several countries of the Middle East since the six-day war…. Although communism and the prospect of Soviet domination ill-accords with the western outlook and the free enterprise spirit of the Nigerians, the Soviet threat to the largest and richest country in all black-Africa must be viewed with the gravest apprehension. 345

  At the start of the war both sides looked to arms suppliers who could accommodate their needs, and they both achieved success and failures in their searches, but as the war progressed, humanitarian considerations came into play. Essentially, although Britain initially posed as neutral, its underlying sympathies lay with the Federal Government. Similarly Biafra had the support of Portugal and subsequently France took an interest in the fledgling state. Therefore, arguably even from the war’s earliest days, both sides had the covert support of some of the great powers. Debatably, it was the outside arms support, balanced between both sides, coupled with the humanitarian concern over genocide and starvation, which was a major factor which ensured the war’s longevity. It seems that throughout the campaign when one side was winning the physical war the other side was winning the moral war, and arguably it was this changeable state which ensured its longevity and even up to its final days gave Ojukwu confidence that Biafra would achieve ongoing sovereignty.

  The aid agencies

  When the war started it was seen by the west, if at all, as a localised tribal affair in a remote country in Africa. As the historian, Marjorie Perham, commented in the Oxfam News , April 1968, ‘A terrible and bloody war is going on. Why do we hear little or nothing about it in the press or on the radio … the need must be known. The strange silence in Britain about this war must be broken.’ 346

  Her comments were about to be answered in a most dramatic way. The war came to the western public’s attention initially in the Sun newspaper’s picture reports in June 1968, and then through the Independent Television News (ITN) programme News at Ten , and its report about the starving and dying children of Biafra. 347 It is hard now to imagine how dramatically these images impacted on the western public, but the impression was so great that arguably it was a major reason for Biafra’s survival. Because it struck such a strong cord of sentiment with people in the west, it enabled Biafra to mine a new source of ongoing material and financial support. Even today, when asking people in Britain about the war, a common response is: ‘Oh! That was the war with the starving, pot-bellied black children?’ 348

  Once the west became aware of Biafra’s apparent plight there were determined efforts to come to the support of the underdog. Pressure was put on Harold Wilson’s precarious government to stop the flow of British arms to Nigeria, which caused the administration to underplay the arms supply to the Federal Government:

  I have looked most carefully into the request for military supplies which you have made. There is nothing I fear we can do to help over jet aircraft and fast 30 knots patrol boats. These could not have been in any case made available in anything like the time to affect the current situation in Nigeria. We could however, if you wish, allow you to purchase twenty-four Bofors guns … and we could arrange to train a sufficient number of Nigerian soldiers in their use by arranging courses in this country…. We have also considered the general question of arms supplies, and I wish you to know that we do not intend to put any obstacle in the way of orders placed in this country for reasonable quantities. 349

  And:

  You may inform the Federal Authorities that Her Majesty’s Government [HMG] are prepared to release 10,000 mortar bombs…. It becomes progressively harder to go on releasing ammunition in the face of reports on bombing hospitals. A reliable British witness who was in Umuahia until 1st March has told us that to his personal knowledge four hospitals have been bombed …. A motion has been put down in the House of Commons, over the signatures of forty-three members, welcoming the support HMG has given to the peace initiatives of the Commonwealth Secretariat but arguing that ‘As a pre-condition HMG take all possible steps to prevent the supply of arms for use in the war in order to demonstrate genuine neutrality.’ 350

  However, the main effect was to create funds for the aid agencies, in order to help the suffering Biafrans. ‘From June 1968 the allocation of funds under my jurisdiction for Nigeria and Biafra expanded at a disproportionate rate.’ 351

  Most importantly, it gave Ojukwu a new opportunity to put pressure on the international community to come to his country’s aid, and to stop Britain and other countries supplying arms to Nigeria. Through his public relations company, Markpress, starvation and the genocide of his people was promoted throughout the world to good effect. It was, therefore, this sudden revelation in the West’s national press that brought great support for Biafra’s survival, but its incidental and unknowing effect was to help Biafra survive for a further eighteen months and so prolong the agony of the war.

  Foreign support came from a number of sources during the war and was extremely important to Biafra’s survival. 352 Assistance came in most cases, France and Portugal being to a large extent the exceptions, because of the west’s perception that it was a humanitarian imperative to protect and save lives from starvation, disease and the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians. Information coming from Biafra was biased through the state-funded public relations company, Markpress, and from news reporters who were anxious to gain dramatic headlines, using exaggerated or unsubstantiated numbers, which arguably, created a biased picture in the minds of the populations of Western Europe and America. Ojukwu admited that support for Biafra of this nature gained it international assistance at the expense of the Federal authorities. His primary aim was to stop the supply of arms from Britain to Federal Nigeria by gaining support from the British public to put pressure on the British and other governments. 353 Supporting him were three separate but closely entwined factors. First were the aid agencies, who provided large quantities of supplies throughout the war. The aim of all aid was to alleviate the suffering of the Biafran and the Nigerian people, and there is evidence that in the early days much of this aid found its way to its correct destination. 354 However, as the war gathered momentum and saw Biafra increasingly in need of supplies, much of this aid became misappropriated and redirected. Secondly, as the Biafran cause gained international support, arms and armaments were increasingly supplied by France. France never officially recognised Biafra but comments by De Gaulle, and recent confirmation from Ojukwu, showed where France’s sympathies lay. 355 Thirdly, there were individuals who offered support to Biafra, either for their fighting prowess or because of their humanitarian conscience and belief in Biafra’s cause.

  In the early part of 1967, Oxfam had given help and aid to the Irish Holy Ghost Fathers, who were based in the Eastern region. However, Oxfam, keen not to be seen as partisan, gave support to both sides. Brierly, as Oxfam’s Field Director for West and Equatorial Africa, emphasised the importance of giving help to both sides. 356 By February 1968 Oxfam had evenly donated the not inconsiderable sum of £59,300 in support of the war’s victims, but, although Brierly was at pains to show no bias to either side, he had not taken into account the effects of the June press publicity about the Biafran people. Much against his wishes he found himself compromised over Oxfam’s determination to break ranks with the other aid agencies, and establish its own airlift into Biafra. Having decided on a partisan approach to the problem, the net effect of this initiative was to put him in an extremely uncomfortable position with the Federal authorities, and it led to Brierly’s resignation. 357 Gowon naturally was extremely sensitive to aid agencies deciding on independent courses of action, as was shown when the International Red Cross decided on unitary action.

  Although the effect of the aid agencies was to help to prolong the war and Biafra’s survival, their efforts were often frustrated by both sides’ intransigence as to the best way of getting aid to the neediest causes. The reasons for this occurred from the middle of 1968 when Nigeria was in the ascendancy, militarily, and, having successfully overrun Port Harcourt, had effectively landlocked Biafra. How were the aid agencies going to supply the much needed aid to support Biafra’s starving masses? The two schools of thought centred round air and land supplies, either direct supplies into Biafra, or supplies through notionally Federal-held territory. Gowon and the Federal Government supported a land corridor through territory which they felt they controlled. But their position was in fact being challenged by Biafran forces, which were still very much in evidence in the disputed territory. 358 Ojukwu and the Biafrans felt that this would make them far too vulnerable to attack from Federal forces. The fact was that the proposed land corridor ran straight through the middle of Biafra’s existing, though challenged, territory, and however supportive the foreign powers might have been to make sure the corridor was only used for humanitarian purposes, the opportunity for Federal troops to infiltrate and overrun the area was simply too great. 359 Even the charity, Save the Children, came out against the idea:

  The Myth of Mercy Corridor. Lord Hunt’s Mission to survey relief requirements in Nigeria and Biafra visited the area in July. In the House of Lords on August 28th 1968, Lord Hunt estimated the need for relief supplied to be 300 tons a day and he hoped this could be moved by five-ton trucks passing up and down the ‘mercy corridor’ – conceived as a 20 mile wide demilitarized zone down the middle of which would run the 57 mile long Enugu–Okigwi road. Sir John’s solution would postulate 60 five-ton trucks doing the return journey each day and competing for space on the road with army traffic. The Enugu–Okigwi road is flanked on either side by dense jungle, just 16 feet wide tarmac surface badly cut up by half tracks, armoured cars, and other heavy militant transport. There are countless blown bridges, some of which have been replaced by narrow Bailey bridges, and shell holes and mine holes pits the surface. The whole length is littered with destroyed cars, land rovers of all descriptions, mute witness to the tide of battle which has ebbed and flowed down the road in two years of war. The road now thrusts like a spear into the heart of Iboland and the advance of Colonel Shuwa’s Nigerian First Division south is entirely in Ibo country. Biafran guerrilla activity continues in the area; to the West, the Enuga–Onitsha road is still unsafe and the 34 Niger River Bridge has not yet been repaired. To the East, the Biafrans move at will and forage deep into the North above Enugu for food. The road is cut and ambushed several times each week, and at the end of September a Nigerian truck was blown to smithereens with a home-made rocket, killing the driver and another soldier. 360

  Biafra favoured air support ideally from neighbouring countries 361 (St Tomé, Fernando PO and later Benin, were used by Biafra to supply arms). The Federal Government was against this because it left them with no control over the contents of the air supplies. The inference was that arms would be flown in with humanitarian aid, which to a greater or lesser extent was exactly what happened. 362 Ojukwu essentially won his argument, due to Gowon’s Christian sensitivities. 363 There followed an uneasy truce, which continued until the end of the war, intermingled with the Federal Government’s periodic attempts to control the airlift and carry out threats to attack aircraft not involved in humanitarian aid. These attacks were generally not very successful, not only due to the inexperience of some of the Federal pilots, but mainly due to the high rewards being paid to all foreign pilots willing to risk their lives on both sides. These pilots had a vested interest in making sure that their compatriots and their aircraft, many known to them on the other side, were not shot down and killed.