Not only did the Federal Government have the daunting task of massive expansion of its army, but it also had to overcome logistic and topographical barriers. The logistics of supporting an army some four hundred miles from its base proved extremely testing, especially at the start of the campaign. As the war progressed, and especially after Federal forces captured Port Harcourt and seaborne support became available, this problem became less acute. However an intractable constraint was the territory over which the war was fought. Together with the weather these were to prove ongoing challenges for all Federal forces. This was especially true during the rainy season from April each year, when troops found that advances were extremely difficult to achieve, in spite of the army preferring to move only along the major roads. Added to this was the troops’ deep superstition and fear of the dark, which meant that nocturnal activities were very limited.

  As an example of Gowon giving his commanders a high degree of autonomy to create and control their own divisions, Adekunle was given the task of recruiting and training his men, and as he said he sought recruits from a variety of sources including released prisoners. He often exercised his responsibility for procuring arms and provisions. 275

  The divisional commanders exercised supreme power over life and death both in military and civil matters within their commands … The fact that their headquarters were a long way from Lagos and difficult to reach because of poor communications reinforced their autonomy. Adekunle was particularly fast off the mark when he needed something urgently. On one occasion, he called the British Leyland representative (an Englishman) into his office in Port Harcourt and ordered forty Land Rovers on the spot. When the representative asked for the customary down payment, the ‘Black Scorpion’ promptly paid him £50,000 in cash over the top of his desk and promised the balance on delivery. On another occasion, Adekunle walked into a large store in Lagos and bought half a dozen typewriters for his divisional offices. He told the two expatriate salesmen to come with him to Ikeja where he would settle the account. They did so – it was in the morning – but when they got there Adekunle simply put them on his plane and flew them off to Port Harcourt, 400 miles away. There they were paid in cash and sent back to Lagos in his aircraft, arriving just before nightfall. 276

  However autonomy also led to great rivalry between divisional commanders, which proved detrimental to the Federal authorities in their attempts to secure their objective:

  The rivalry between the three Divisions … covered every field … from the capture of significant Biafran towns to competition for arms, supplies and reinforcements from Lagos … the Shell oil depot in Apapa had permanent representatives, from each division, vying with each other over petrol supplies. Adekunle was especially prone to flying back to Lagos suddenly and personally supervising the routing and sometimes ‘re-routing’ of ammunition and other supplies to his own Division …. Yet more extraordinary was the fact that at least two Divisions had their own arms buyers operating in Europe independently of the Federal Government. 277

  However as the war progressed the divisional commander’s style of independence proved to be ambivalent. Undoubtedly Adekunle enjoyed some spectacular successes at Calabar, Port Harcourt and Aba, but in an attempt to take Umuahia and Uli, in competition with his rival, Murtala Mohammed, the commander of the First Division, he lost Owerri. Murtala Mohammed also exercised autonomy from Lagos over his command, but he enjoyed much less success than Adekunle. On three occasions he failed to take Onitsha against the redoubtable Joe Achuzia’s forces, succeeding in the end when he approached the problem by crossing the river Niger further north and attacking Onitsha from that direction.

  By the middle of 1969 Gowon decided that these commanders should be replaced. It is possible that he felt that they were simply becoming too powerful and independent of his command and would potentially offer a threat to his power base. When questioned on this, his comments were ambiguous, but seemed to confirm that this sentiment was close to his thinking at the time. 278 Murtala Mohammed had been his closest rival during the traumatic days following the second coup, and of course he was to oust him from power in the future. Adekunle had become hugely popular with the Yoruba population, and although only half Yoruba, his mother was a Bachama, from the Middle Belt; his popularity with people in the Western Region was a potential challenge to Gowon’s position. ‘Regional pride being what it is, and Adekunle having acquired hero’s status to many Yorubas, it was necessary that all three commanders be moved simultaneously.’ 279 According to Adekunle, he still feels bitter about being replaced at a time when, as he said, he was in a position to bring the war to a successful conclusion. 280

  The end

  Nigeria concluded the war, which had had many international ramifications and involvements, without a single foreign arbiter or force setting foot on its soil. This attested to the willingness of Nigerians to give peace a chance. The foreign press had prophesied a bloodbath. Even the Pope, as he saw the crisis drawing to a close, said that unfortunately in the Nigeria conflict weapons had leverage over humanity. He saw the Nigerian war reaching its end with the terror of possible reprisals and massacres of a defenceless population. 281

  By early January 1970, Biafra’s situation had become virtually untenable. Its territory had been reduced to a small enclave barely 60 by 100 miles, a fraction of its original size. Many of its provinces were already under the jurisdiction of the Federal authorities. Those of its people who had remained were confined within smaller areas, and the territory was increasingly unable to support itself. In spite of these constrictions and privations why was it that Biafra collapsed so suddenly? Was the political will to survive simply draining away, or were there forces strong enough to continue the fight? There were reports that political support for Biafra was waning, but there were members of Biafra’s administration who were keen and prepared to wage a guerrilla war in order to sustain Biafra’s objective of independence. Until the closing stages of the war, the sentiment still persisted that if more substantial international official recognition could be achieved then Biafra, even at this late time, could achieve sovereign status. It was based on the assumption that the longer she conducted a guerrilla campaign the greater opportunity she would have to secure a negotiated settlement and international recognition. 282

  Ojukwu called a conference of his war cabinet on 6 January 1970. At the conference he blamed the army for Biafra’s current predicament and said that the people had lost confidence in its ability to defend its sovereignty. At this meeting both the chief secretary to the Biafran Government, N.U. Akpan, and the Chief Justice of Biafra, Sir Louis Mbanefo, supported this argument. Ojukwu also made the point that following the loss of Aba province and its main town, Aba, if Nigerian troops crossed the river Imo, Biafra’s position would indeed be precarious. Various military representatives at the meeting voiced their opinion over the army’s loss of support, but it was left to the commander of the Biafran Organisation of Freedom Fighters, Colonel Ebenezer Aghanya, to confirm that Biafra should continue in its struggle to achieve its independence. Ojukwu gave his whole-hearted support to this sentiment and then succeeded in producing a coup de grace. He explained that his government had gained possession of top-secret Nigerian documents which confirmed that Federal forces were under express orders to massacre all male Biafran adults when, as anticipated, Biafra capitulated. He affirmed that these documents were genuine by arranging for certified copies to be distributed. He also confirmed that there was to be a resumption of guerrilla operations under Colonel Achuzia. Achuzia had been operating in Federal territory in the Mid-West region for some months, during which time he had encountered the Italian oilmen. 283

  On 10 January 1970 Biafra held its last cabinet meeting. According to an eyewitness account, Ojukwu was insistent that everything should be done to salvage what was left and end the suffering. He reluctantly agreed to leave after he had ruled out the idea of ‘a government in the bush’. He left Uli airport on 11 January, with N.U. Akpan, the chief secretary to the cabinet, Michael Okpara, advisor to Ojukwu and Major-Gen. Madiebo, commander of the Biafran army. He said that he was leaving ‘in search of peace, leading a delegation, in order to give it maximum effect, and to speed up matters, in order to save lives of the people and preserve the concept of Biafra’. He continued, ‘I did this knowing that whilst I live, Biafra lives. If I am no more, it would be only a matter of time for the noble concept to be sent into oblivion.’ 284

  When questioned about his final departure from Biafra, Ojukwu confirmed that at the time, although it seemed on the one hand that he was abandoning a lost cause, he felt with his advisors and colleagues that this was the best course of action, which could have helped lead to a form of negotiated settlement which would have seen Biafra gaining some form of autonomy, although, as he commented ruefully, he had not expected Effiong to give up the fight so quickly and so readily. 285

  Achuzia’s account of Ojukwu’s departure is much more colourful: ‘Ojukwu told me that a meeting had been arranged in Liberia by President Taubman, to negotiate a peaceful settlement between him and Gowon.’ 286

  There are conflicting views as to why the war came to an abrupt end. As Hunt comments: ‘Right up to the end he (Ojukwu) was winning the propaganda war, and he had realistic hopes that a combination of white European countries would come to his rescue and nullify his military losses.’ 287

  Even the Scott Report states that its aim is ‘to examine whether either side can reach a successful military conclusion before the end of the dry season’. 288 Scott defines this as the end of April 1970. His assessment concluded that the Federal forces were capable of achieving military success, but with a number of qualifications. Scott had based his report on a debate in the British House of Commons on the Nigerian Civil War on 9 December 1969. The motion read:

  That this House, in the name of humanity and realism, calls for a change in Government policy over the Nigerian Civil War, which after two and a half years cannot now be won by either side; and urges Her Majesty’s Government to press through the Security Council of the United Nations for an immediate and total arms embargo on the supply of arms to either side. 289

  Gbulie is of the opinion that Ojukwu had lost support politically. As he says, by then Nnamdi Azikiwe had deserted him and was actively promoting the East’s reconciliation with the Federal Government. Effiong, his military commander, was also wavering in his support for continuing the fight. Immediately after Ojukwu fled the country Effiong simply disappeared, and it was left to others, notably the chief justice Sir Louis Mbefano and Col. Achuzia, to broker a peace. 290 He is also of the opinion that many senior civil servants had reneged on support for Biafra and indeed had been clandestinely communicating with members of the Federal opposition for some time. As Achuzia said: ‘It was a fairly open secret that civil servants from both sides met throughout the war at Ukei, in the Mid-West. Trading went on at these meetings as well as intelligence swapping. I felt that this created doubts in our people’s minds that we could ever win the war.’ 291

  Ojukwu claimed that he had tacit and material support from a number of European countries, including Ireland and Holland, in the Middle East Israel, and in Africa, beside the countries which had already recognised Biafra, South Africa was ready to acknowledge her officially. He hinted that if France had not been so ambivalent in her relationship with Biafra and indeed had officially recognised her, all the other nations emotively backing Biafra would have fallen into line and the country would still be a sovereign unit today. 292 As the official Foreign and Commonwealth report pointed out, on 31 May 1968 France did in fact recognise Biafra, in a ‘quasi’ fashion, and from that time onwards she dramatically increased the supply of arms to Biafra. However, this was still not sufficient to encourage official recognition from other supportive nations. As Ojukwu pointed out, without that international support, Biafra’s cause was lost. 293 Achuzia states that the Biafran army was far from defeated, and that he had received instructions from Ojukwu several months before the ceasefire that the army was to be divided into three sections, a defensive army commanded by Col. Kalu and an offensive army commanded by Col. Achuzia, with a third of these two forces to be rotated for training and support for the other two armies. In his opinion this force, consisting of 150,000 well-trained and well-armed men, would have been able to defend Biafra for many months to come. As he said, the army was far from defeated and the Federal forces never succeeded in overrunning Uli airstrip, allowing for an ongoing flow of arms and goods into Biafra. He is dismissive of the fighting strength of the Federal forces, confirming that his forces were more than a match for the opposition, and that he was prepared to continue the fight, as a guerrilla war if necessary, until international pressure forced official recognition for Biafra. However, as he pointed out, he was induced by Biafra’s chief justice, Sir Louis Mbanefo, to broker a peace with the Federal forces. According to Achuzia, who it seems by then had achieved popular folk hero status, the troops would only agree to a ceasefire if he ordered one. It was to take his English wife Ethel to ask him ‘is this your war Joe?’ for him to agree to a ceasefire. 294

  Because of its superiority in arms and because it was the ‘status quo’ authority throughout the war, and enjoyed the support of the former colonial power, it was perhaps inevitable that the Federal Government would achieve its objective and bring Biafra back into the Federation. However, Ojukwu’s campaign to promote Biafra to the outside world proved very successful. Even late in 1969 when the British Conservative party sent Lord Carrington to visit both sides in Nigeria, he was impressed with the spirit of the Biafran army, commenting that he saw neither side altering their respective positions on Nigerian unity and Biafran sovereignty. 295 Frederick Forsyth commented that even Nigeria’s third and final assault on Biafra had petered out. 296 In spite of losing much of its territory by the end of 1969, Biafra’s ability to survive had proved conclusive. Her use of ‘attack markets’, boy soldiers and its ongoing superb intelligence network had all helped in this process. On the negative side, Ojukwu’s style of running the Biafran state had arguably proved detrimental in sustaining its sovereignty, and it had certainly created problems of supply to its armed forces. The supply of arms had been problematic for both sides, but on balance the Federal forces had had much easier access to supplies from outside the country, and this had helped its achieve her objective. More arguable is Gowon’s style of control, or rather lack of it, which had mixed results and eventually led him to replace his commanders with more compliant people who had less ambition and were therefore not a threat to his position. Logistics, land and climate also played their part in determining the outcome of the second part of the war. The Biafran army was perhaps better placed to benefit from these. It knew the territory, and although supplies were intermittent and often non-existent, they never had far to travel, and added to this the army knew the land well and had the support of the local people. Eventually, although the outside world felt that Biafra would not capitulate to the Federal Government, it seems that internally by the end of 1969 Biafra’s sovereignty was highly questionable and that it was only a matter of time before she effected surrender.

  CHAPTER 5

  BIAFRA’S LONGEVITY

  Because they are convinced that ‘no condition is permanent in this world’ {an Igbo motto} they are adaptable to a degree and prepared to learn new ways ….

  Ironically it is their hard work and their success that have contributed to make the Biafrans so unpopular in Nigeria, and notably in the North. Other characteristics are adduced to explain the antipathy they manage to generate; they are pushful, uppity and aggressive say the detractors and energetic say the defenders. They are money-loving and mercenary says one school; canny and thrifty says the other. Clannish and unscrupulous in grabbing advantages, say some; united and quick to realise the advantages of education, say others. 297

  Nigeria had vast petroleum resources … and was by no means irrelevant to the course of events … and was subject to the influence of external factors directly related to Africa’s recent colonial past and to the present context of contest between imperialist powers and the people of the newly independent countries. 298

  How was Biafra able to survive from July 1967 to January 1970, a period of 30 months, in the light of the Federal Government’s claim that it would defeat Biafra within weeks? During that time Biafra suffered extreme privation, leading to mounting malnutrition, disease, illness and death; diminishing land space, which caused severe reductions in food and other resources, and homelessness and increasing numbers of refugees, and mounting military opposition, putting further pressure on Biafra to capitulate. Ongoing attempts at negotiated settlements and peace initiatives, Biafra’s resourcefulness, ranging from extensive innovativeness to brilliant sagacity, the support it received from foreign aid agencies and foreign countries, and the use of propaganda, which helped Biafra to promote and sustain accusations of genocide, all helped to prolong Biafra’s survival, but it was perhaps its military resourcefulness and the innate weakness of the Federal forces, together with Biafra’s terrain and the weather, which determined the length of the war. However, the most significant feature which linked all these factors was the effect that the international press and Biafra’s overt and ongoing use of propaganda had on the longevity of the war. It is likely that without them the war would indeed have been a much shorter affair.

  Attempts at negotiated peace settlements

  Undoubtedly negotiated peace settlements played their part in sustaining the war, for four reasons. Firstly, at the start of the war neither side was strong enough to bring hostilities to a conclusive end, and therefore both sides demanded help from outside agencies. Secondly, these agencies were themselves not able to offer total support for one side or the other, due to internal and external pressures, and so sought compromise. Thirdly, the fact that outside agencies were ambivalent in supporting one side or the other meant that in their eyes compromise was the only way to secure a lasting peace. Fourthly, it is a reasonable proposition that at the start of the war the negotiating stance of both parties was strong, as neither side could claim physical superiority over the other. This in itself ensured the war’s longevity, because the outside agencies sought compromise. As the war progressed, the balance of power edged more to the Federal side, thus weakening Biafra’s bargaining position, and its demands were less well received by outside agencies intent on brokering a peaceful settlement.