He also commented on the coup of 15 January 1966, writing ‘those who subsequently assumed power have so far failed to do anything to the mutineers and possibly, the alleged civilian brains behind such a mutiny’. 65

  On 24 May 1966 Ironsi broadcast to the nation and introduced his infamous decree number 34. He declared ‘ the former regions are abolished, and Nigeria grouped into a number of territorial areas called provinces…. Nigeria ceases to be what has been described as a federation. It now becomes simply the Republic of Nigeria.’ 66 The North, feeling threatened by the potential of further Southern and essentially Igbo incursion into their sovereignty, instigated severe and violent civil unrest, centred on attacks on the Igbo population. Although Ironsi attempted to placate the North by embarking on a tour of Northern cities, culminating in an address he was to make to a Natural Rulers Conference in Ibadan on 28 July 1966, a Northern military mutiny broke out on the evening of 28 July 1966. Ironsi and his host Lt-Col. Fajuyi were arrested at Government Lodge in Ibadan. Their whereabouts and their subsequent deaths were not to be officially acknowledged for another six months. The counter-coup appeared to be Northern led, and quickly spread to Kano and Kaduna. The remaining senior officer, Brigadier Ogundipe, attempted to negotiate with the rebels, but when his efforts failed he handed his command to Lt-Col. Gowon, the army’s chief of staff, who also attempted to bring the rebellion under control. After fierce discussion with a rather hot-headed and unpredictable Northern officer, Murtala Mohammed, it was accepted that Gowon should take charge and attempt to bring a semblance of stability back to the country’s anarchic and lawless state.

  The two military leaders

  Lt-Col. Yakubu Gowon, a Northerner, but a Christian, and thus acceptable to most soldiers, became de facto leader of Nigeria in tumultuous and potentially anarchic conditions. Not only was the North considering secession, but the West, under the political leadership of Chief Awolowo, who had been released from prison by the previous military regime, was also considering its position. Added to this, the East was feeling increasingly vulnerable to Northern attack because of increasing anti-Igbo sentiment shown in the second coup and by subsequent physical attacks in Hausaland. This was to lead to the mass exodus of most Igbo people from the North, many of whom had lived there for many generations. Added to this, Lt-Col. Ojukwu, the military governor of the Eastern Region, who had been appointed by the previous military regime, not only had military control of the region but his political position in the region was on the ascendant, and he was not prepared to accept Lt-Col. Gowon as supreme commander of the army, let alone head of state. As he stated, ‘Militarily Gowon is not my superior and the question of acknowledging him does not arise’. 67 Ojukwu’s unwillingness to accept Gowon’s de facto position and their deteriorating relationship was to be an important factor which led to the outbreak of the civil war. Consequently Gowon’s position was tenuous and extremely precarious. Gowon also made a somewhat ambivalent announcement to the nation, when he told the country what had happened when announcing that he had taken control:

  As a result of the recent event and the other previous similar ones, I have come to strongly believe that we cannot honestly and sincerely continue in this wise, as the basis for trust and confidence in our unitary system of government has been unable to stand the test of time. Suffice to say that putting all considerations to the test, political, economic as well as social, the base for unity was not there, or is badly rocked not only once but several times. 68

  Did this mean that the federation was no longer a feasible option or did he simply mean that unitary government was not the way forward? His speech was to lead to much speculation. Finally Gowon found the posturing of his highly volatile Northern colleague Lt-Col. Murtala Mohammed, who was intent on mounting an immediate invasion of the East, very difficult to contain.

  By mid-September 1966 Gowon had brought the army under sufficient control to feel that his position was less vulnerable, and to be in a position to call an ‘Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference’ in Lagos. He offered the conference four options for the country’s future government: a federal system with a strong central government, a federal system with a weak centre, a confederation, or an entirely new unproposed system. Interestingly no region suggested secession, but a confederation was proposed by the North and the East. Shortly afterwards the North reversed its proposal for confederation and came down firmly on the side of federation. It would seem that the Middle Belters, including the Tiv minority group and the army Northerners, felt that confederation would lead to dominance once again by the traditional Hausa-Fulani Northern rulers, and they were anxious to avoid this at all costs. These deliberations were hastily abandoned in the light of serious troop rioting in the North, leading once again to the slaughter of Igbos and looting and burning of their property. This latest pogrom led to the mass evacuation of most Igbo people from the North, during which time the Northern government did little or nothing to contain attacks on the Igbos.

  An example of the mayhem which ensued came from a fireman at Kano, who stated that he was on duty when eight armed soldiers arrived at the station:

  A sergeant ordered that all Easterners should raise their hands … The sergeant asked us whether we could remember what happened on January 15th when the Prime Minister (Balewa) and the premier of the North (the Sardauna of Sokoto) lost their lives and the Ibos were all very happy. We said, ‘No, Sergeant.’ Paying no heed to that he asked us to give our names and addresses and send any messages we have for our people because we were going to die…. They drove us five miles away to the Katsina road, brought us down and started shooting us. I felt my leg shattered and fell down …. I managed to crawl into a bush. 69

  The massacres continued throughout September and October, and Ojukwu, the East’s military leader, made much play then and throughout the ensuing war about the numbers of people killed during the pogrom. Although accurate figures are impossible to obtain, accounts indicate that several thousands of Igbos lost their lives, and the idea of secession as a protective mechanism for the survival of the Igbo people took hold. In fact it is reasonable to comment that from that time onwards a confrontation between the federalists and the East was not a question of ‘if’ but ‘when’. Indeed Ojukwu himself felt threatened, and refused to attend any more meetings of the Supreme Council. These were critical days for Nigeria’s future as a nation. Its survival hung very much in the balance; not only was the East in a state of extreme insecurity but the West was feeling vulnerable to incursion by the North. At the heart of the problem was the North’s reluctance to withdraw its soldiers from the Western Region. However this seems to have been eased by Gowon when he invited Chief Awolowo to be his deputy in the country’s new government. This move effectively brought the Western Region firmly on to the Federal Government’s side. This, together with robust support from the North’s and Mid-West’s military governors, meant that the Federal Government’s power was in the ascendant, and Ojukwu and the East were increasingly isolated. It was not Gowon’s intention to ostracize the East. Indeed he went out of his way to ensure that all Igbo civil servants who were forced out of their jobs in the North and fled to the East continued to receive their civil service pay. However matters were clearly now deteriorating towards a clash between the East’s regional government and the rest of the Federation, particularly when it was discovered that a crashed plane destined for Port Harcourt in the East contained a supply of arms destined for Ojukwu’s government. Gowon stated, ‘If circumstances compel me to preserve the integrity of Nigeria by force, I will do my duty.’ 70

  Was there an inevitability about this war? Undoubtedly from the earliest days of its inception Nigerian religious diversity created the ingredients for confrontation. This indeed was exacerbated by the first ruling Governor General’s unwillingness to administer the country other than as two autonomous regions. Perhaps if he had listened to other advice, to run the country as a number of regions to cater for the needs of ethnic minorities, nationalism may have become a stronger political force and therefore ethnic politics would not have created such division within the country. It is also arguable that the Westminster style of government was inappropriate for a country with such ethnic and cultural diversity. Furthermore, the British did not help the economic development of the country except in areas which directly benefited British commercial strength and power. This meant that by the time independence arrived there was insufficient inward investment to help in the development of infrastructure. Perhaps the biggest indictment of British rule was the way it acted as ‘gateman’ 71 to the economic well-being of the country; this meant that whoever was in power after independence not only controlled the exchequer but all movement of funds and trade in and out of the country, much in the style of Britain’s rule. This in itself led to an appalling abuse of power, which indisputably created the right atmosphere for the first coup. It was also the chronic fear of the Western and Eastern Regions of being taken over by the North which made these regions continually try to control the power of the North. Ultimately though it was the intransigence of two men, unwilling to compromise and see the other side’s point of view, that led to this horrific and tragic war.

  Lugard was put under enormous strain to control the country, not only because he had to subjugate the North, his job in the South having been done for him to a large extent by the Royal Niger Company and the crown colony of Lagos, but also because of financial constraints. An option to rule indirectly, through compliant rulers in the North, seemed an extremely attractive alternative to direct rule. This however came at a cost. The cost was to leave the North hopelessly behind the South educationally. This was to have a devastating effect when the time came to Nigerianise government institutions. There simply were not enough western-educated Northern Nigerians to fill the vacant posts in line with the North’s population. It was therefore inevitable that rivalry and jealousy of the most appalling kind should break out in the North following the first coup. Even before that time there were incidents in the North of ethnic conflict, hardly surprising when the opportunities for advancement were seen to go to the North’s ethnic rivals from the South. Not only did they grasp the government institutional jobs but they were also seen to be creating the best entrepreneurial opportunities as well as filling many of the professions. Could this have been avoided if Lugard had challenged the Northern rulers’ determination to keep the region unsullied by Christianity? Logically the answer must be in the affirmative. Islamic-style education, although meritorious in its own right, was hardly a match for Western education, in view of the fact that British and by inference Nigerian institutional government was based on European traditions and its style of democracy. Questionably, Lugard’s other failing was not to listen to more experienced advice, which had recommended the country be divided into a series of regions to take account of ethnic minorities. This might have allowed for a stronger voice for political nationalism, which might then have triumphed over tribalism. This argument could well have been strengthened if the North had embraced western education. The initial efforts by Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikewe were stillborn after Awolowo became intent on creating a party which demanded support from the West and the Yoruba people, and showed no favour to other tribal and ethnic groups. Inevitably this led to politics taking on a distinctly ethnic and regional flavour.

  Britain’s reason for colonizing Nigeria had been for trade, and to stem the interference and competition from other European powers. Having developed and capitalized on this trade it was anxious to protect it, especially as independence approached. It was therefore important that it left the country in the hands of a compliant and friendly government. Having instituted the Westminster style of government she was able to hand over control to the one people through whom she had ruled the country in the North, the Hausa-Fulani. This was based simply on the fact that the North, being the most populated, had produced the most votes and therefore the most members of parliament, and thus the majority in a coalition government. However, real power was still vested in Northern rulers, especially the Sardauna of Sokoto. As The Times reported, after the first coup, and following the Sardauna’s assassination: ‘he ran his party autocratically and his administration as his personal court. To the emirs he was British interference carried to extremes … for the emirs it meant that colonial control instituted by Lord Lugard was at last ended.’ 72

  Rule by a sycophantic friendly North was very satisfactory for the British, but it hardly matched the expectations of the educated members of the population, especially from the South, who sought greater democracy for the federation. The weakness of this style of government was further compounded by the ease with which the new rulers found that they could control and spend the county’s wealth. They realised early on that their interest was best served by ‘the same strategy of gatekeeping that had served the colonial state’. 73 To say that they treated the exchequer as their own funds is no understatement; the outward ostentation and corruption of some government ministers and the abuse of power led many Nigerians to question the desirability of the first republic, and made them determined to replace it.

  A further factor that must be taken into account was the physical dominance that the North exercised over the rest of the country. Not only did it cover the largest geographical area, it was the most populous, which, under the Westminster-style constitution, gave it the greatest political power, but it was also the favoured inheritor of sovereign power from Britain. Fear of crushing domination by the North encouraged both the West and the East to court her cooperation for political power. When this failed to satisfy the country’s intellectual elite and growing educated middle class, and when the North’s corruption and corrupt practices seemed to invade all aspects of Nigerian life, the only option was rebellion.

  Undoubtedly Ironsi’s decree 34, ordering the unification of the civil service and the confirmation of greater centralised government, hastened the demise of his short-lived regime and made the North determined to bring the rest of the country back under its control. Indeed, following the second coup, it was with the greatest difficulty that the newly appointed de facto head of state had restrained his Northern brother officers from overrunning and crushing the power of the East. Fear of such an invasion by the North only exacerbated the East’s desire to break free from the Federation and the oppression of the North. The West also felt oppression from the North, firstly because of a reluctance to withdraw Northern troops stationed in the West and secondly because of her vulnerability and isolation should the East secede from the confederation. As late as May 1967 Chief Awolowo, the Western region Yoruba leader, declared in a speech to the Western opinion-formers:

  Only a peaceful solution must be found to arrest the present worsening stalemate and restore normalcy. The Eastern Region must be encouraged to remain part of the Federation. If the Eastern Region is allowed by acts of omission or commission to secede from or opt out of Nigeria, then the Western Region and Lagos must also stay out of the Federation. 74

  Finally it was the intransigence and irreconcilable differences between Gowon, the de facto leader of the Federation, and Ojukwu, the Eastern Regional governor, appointed by Ironsi, the former leader, that determined an inexorable slide towards civil war. When he assumed power Gowon’s position was extremely precarious. He was only acceptable to the North because he was a Northerner, albeit a Middle Belter, and to the South because he was Christian. One of his first moves on taking power was to rescind Ironsi’s decree 34, thus immediately placating the North. However his position remained tenuous, particularly in his relations with Awolowo and the West, although he did placate him by bringing him into his administration as his deputy. But it was his relationship with Ojukwu that proved intractable. For his part Ojukwu never accepted Gowon’s position and refused to serve under him. He would only compromise by serving the Federation as Gowon’s equal, an impossible state of affairs for controlling and running such a large and diverse country as Nigeria.

  CHAPTER 3

  THE PATH TO WAR AND

  ITS BEGINNING

  Let us learn our lessons. Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. Once the signal is given, the statesman is no longer master of policy but the slave of the unforeseeable and uncontrollable events – all take their seats at the Council Board on the morrow of a declaration of war. Always remember, however sure that you can easily win, there would not be a war if the other man did not think he also had a chance.

  Churchill, My Early Life (1958)

  One of the effects of the second coup were the uncontrolled racial attacks on the Igbo people, which created paranoid fear, leading to a determination that the East’s destiny was secession from the Federation. However it was the different interpretations by Gowon and Ojukwu of the Aburi Agreement, which engendered a breakdown in communications by both sides. The effect of Isaac Boro’s declaration for independence of his people helped lead Gowon and his senior civil servants to propose and then initiate the formation of twelve separate states within the Federation. This action effectively led the Eastern Region unanimously to declare a state of secession from Nigeria. Biafra’s declaration led Nigeria to declare a ‘police action’ 75 or ‘Operation Unicord’ 76 against the recalcitrant region, because many within the Federation, including the British High Commissioner, thought that Biafra would be quickly defeated and her people brought back into the Nigerian fold. 77 At the outset the Federal Government little realised the determination of the East to defend its independence, especially against the all-invasive power of the North, and that it would fight until recognition by the wider world would confirm its independence. The opening stages of the conflict proved disastrous for Biafra but its brilliant counter invasion of the Mid-West Region dramatically altered the Federal Government’s thinking on its conduct of the war. Following the result of this invasion and its ultimate failure the war then settled into a finely balanced contest between both sides. It was not until June 1968, that the outside world suddenly became aware of the conflict, through the medium of the press with its graphic pictures of ‘pot-bellied’ black children.